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ESSAY
DISBANDING POLICE AGENCIES
Anthony O’Rourke,* Rick Su** & Guyora Binder***
Since the killing of George Floyd, a national consensus has emerged
that reforms are needed to prevent discriminatory and violent policing.
Calls to defund and abolish the police have provoked pushback, but
several cities are considering disbanding or reducing their police forces.
This Essay assesses disbanding as a reform strategy from a democratic
and institutionalist perspective. Should localities disband their police
forces? One reason to do so is that discriminatory police departments are
often too insulated from democratic oversight to be reformed. But can
localities succeed in disbanding and replacing their forces with something
better? Unfortunately, the structural entrenchment of sherifs’ ofces and
municipal police forces insulates them against such attacks as well. To
challenge police power, localities may have to disband, and to disband,
localities may have to alter the legal structure of state and local government. Reformers must use rare moments of mobilization like this one to
overcome the misguided eforts of past reformers to lock in their victories.
Successful reformers can best avoid repeating such mistakes by trusting
in the democratic experiment and concentrating supervision of law
enforcement at one level, the most local.
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INTRODUCTION
Across the country, crowds braved the pandemic to demonstrate
against racism and police violence, with the seeming support of every
organization with a public relations department.1 Yet amid this consensus,2
1. See David Hessekiel, Companies Taking a Public Stand in the Wake of George
Floyd’s Death, Forbes (June 4, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhessekiel/2020
/06/04/companies-taking-a-public-stand-in-the-wake-of-george-ﬂoyds-death/?sh=7c135ec1
7214 [https://perma.cc/57JV-4R84]; Inti Pacheco & Stephanie Stamm, What CEOs Said
About George Floyd’s Death, Wall St. J. (June 5, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/whatexecutives-said-about-george-ﬂoyds-death-11591364538 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
2. Polling during the summer of 2020 showed consensus support for changes in policing, including punishment (ninety-six percent) and exclusion (ninety-eight percent) of
abusive ofcers, improving community relations (ninety-seven percent), more collaboration
with community organizations (eighty-two percent), and “ending stop and frisk” (seventyfour percent). See Steve Crabtree, Most Americans Say Policing Needs ‘Major Changes’,
Gallup (July 22, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/315962/americans-say-policingneeds-major-changes.aspx [https://perma.cc/JR7K-MLGN]. In November, voters approved
added police oversight measures in Berkeley, Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose, San Diego,
and Sonoma County (CA); Portland (OR); Columbus and Akron (OH); Pittsburgh and
Philadelphia (PA); Kyle (TX); and King County (WA). Madison Pauly & Samantha
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demonstrators’ calls to “abolish” or “defund” the police provoked controversy.3 These slogans expressed that discriminatory police violence is a
policy,4 not a “split-second judgment[]”5 or the work of “bad apples”;6 that
the war on crime diverted needed resources from the poor communities
it preyed upon;7 and that a good society achieves safety by peaceful, participatory means.8 Conservative critics seized on these slogans as incendiary
Michaels, BLM Activists Demanded Police Accountability. In City After City, Voters Agreed.,
Mother Jones (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/11/blmpolice-accountability-george-ﬂoyd-breonna-taylor-election-ballot-measures [https://perma.
cc/G3ZP-S4T9].
3. In July polls, structural changes with signiﬁcant—but partisan—support included
“major changes” in policing (ﬁfty-eight percent), eliminating police unions (ﬁfty-six
percent), eliminating “enforcement of nonviolent crimes” (ﬁfty percent), and shifting
funds from police to social programs (forty-seven percent). By contrast, few Americans
supported “abolishing police departments” (ﬁfteen percent), irrespective of racial group or
partisan afliation. See Crabtree, supra note 2.
4. See Paul Butler, Chokehold: Policing Black Men 2–3 (2017) (“[T]he police, as
policy, treat African Americans with contempt.”); see also Michelle Alexander, The New Jim
Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness 176 (10th anniversary ed., 2020)
(“Police supervision, monitoring, and harassment are facts of life . . . for all those who ‘look
like’ criminals. Lynch mobs may be long gone, but the threat of police violence is ever
present.”); Alex S. Vitale, The End of Policing 50–54 (2018) (“Today’s modern police are
not that far removed from their colonialist forebears. They too enforce a system of laws
designed to reproduce and maintain economic inequality, usually along racialized lines.”).
5. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
6. See Vitale, supra note 4, at 29; Alexi Jones & Wendy Sawyer, Not Just “A Few Bad
Apples”: U.S. Police Kill Civilians at Much Higher Rates than Other Countries, Prison Pol’y
Initiative (June 5, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/06/05/policekillings
[https://perma.cc/CWW6-C7XG].
7. See Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making
of Mass Incarceration in America 1–2 (2016) (“Following the passage of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Act, the federal government began to retreat from and eventually
undercut many of the Great Society programs . . . .”); Loïc Wacquant, Punishing the Poor:
The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity 41 (2009) (describing America’s
replacement of the “(semi)- welfare state by a police and penal state,” which criminalized
marginality); BAN Defund CPD Demands, Black Lives Matter Chi., https://www.blacklives
matterchicago.com/ban-defund-cpd-demands [https://perma.cc/7JSA-JRUG] (last visited
Jan. 12, 2021) (noting that “Chicago spends nearly 40% of its annual operating budget, over
$1.8 billion, on the Chicago Police Department” and calling for a reallocation of these funds
to public services); What Defunding the Police Really Means, Black Lives Matter (July 6,
2020), https://blacklivesmatter.com/what-defunding-the-police-really-means (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (“[A]s long as we continue to pump money into our corrupt
criminal justice system at the expense of housing, health, and education investments—we
will never truly be safe.”). See generally John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Allocating
Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle Against Crime, 27 J. Legal Stud.
1, 1–2 (1998) (examining, empirically, the marginal social costs and beneﬁts of
incarceration as compared to expenditures on social programs).
8. See Marianne Kaba, Opinion, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y.
Times (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/ﬂoydabolish-defund-police.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (advocating for a society
“built on cooperation instead of individualism, on mutual aid instead of self-preservation”);
Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might Change Your Mind, N.Y.
Times Mag. (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prison-
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threats to leave society defenseless against crime,9 while liberal centrists
fretted that hyperbolic rhetoric would fracture a fragile consensus for
reform and an electoral coalition poised to retake power.10 Yet the
Minneapolis City Council proposed a referendum and city charter amendment to disband its police force and replace it with a new “Department of
Community Safety and Violence Prevention.”11 While Minneapolis’s
eforts have stalled,12 initiatives to substantially reduce police budgets continue to make headway in other cities.13
abolition-ruth-wilson-gilmore.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing the
abolition movement and its emphasis on holistic and proactive approaches to investing in
communities).
9. See Dartunorro Clark & Caroline Vakil, Barr Claims Defunding Police Would Lead
to ‘Vigilantism’ in Major American Cities, NBC News (June 8, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.
com/politics/politics-news/barr-claims-defunding-police-would-lead-vigilantism-major-am
erican-cities-n1227866 [https://perma.cc/VYN2-HSPA]; Julia Musto, Law Enforcement
Experts on Defunding, Dismantling Police: ‘When You Call 911 Who Is Going to Come
Out?’, Fox News (June 27, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/media/law-enforcement-pan
el-defund-police [https://perma.cc/ZX33-RZYG].
10. Fadel Allassan, James Clyburn: “Defund the Police” Slogan Could Hurt Black Lives
Matter Movement, Axios (Nov. 8, 2020), https://www.axios.com/james-clyburn-defundpolice-black-matter-2900b5f-a61e-4ab8-89f-26d73400d413.html [https://perma.cc/5SHGDZCG]; Sarah Ferris, Marianne Levine & Heather Caygle, Hill Democrats Quash Liberal
Push to ‘Defund the Police’, Politico (June 8, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020
/06/08/defund-police-democrats-307766 [https://perma.cc/67PL-M5W2]; Amie Parnes,
Jordain Carney & Cristina Marcos, Biden, Democrats Seek to Shut Down Calls to Defund
Police, Hill (June 9, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/501730-biden-dem
ocrats-seek-to-shut-down-calls-to-defund-police [https://perma.cc/2658-5VK3].
11. Liz Navratil, Minneapolis City Council Votes Unanimously for Proposal that Could
Replace Police Department, Star Trib. (June 27, 2020), http://strib.mn/2Zrc16z [https://
perma.cc/T69K-J6UM].
12. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
13. See Wesley Lowery, The Most Ambitious Efort Yet to Reform Policing May Be Happening in Ithaca, New York, GQ (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.gq.com/story/ithaca-mayorsvante-myrick-police-reform [https://perma.cc/K4LT-749V] (reporting that the mayor of
Ithaca, NY proposes replacing the police department with “Department of Community Solutions and Public Safety”); Roge Karma, Los Angeles Voters Just Delivered a Huge Win for
the Defund the Police Movement, Vox (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/11/4/2
1549019/measure-j-police-abolition-defund-reform-black-lives-matter-protest-2020-electiongeorge-ﬂoyd (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting the success of a ballot
measure that will likely, in practice, “redirect[] [money] from police department budgets
to . . . alternative service providers”); Matt Markovich, Defunding Seattle Police: City
Council OKs Sharp Cuts but Avoid 50% Budget Reduction, KOMO News (Aug. 10, 2020),
https://komonews.com/news/local/defunding-seattle-police-city-council-poised-to-cutdepartments-budget-today [https://perma.cc/C8VX-YD2C] (reporting that the Seattle City
Council approved a spending plan that would reduce funding to its police department);
Gabriela Milian, What Does Defund the Police Mean for Los Angeles, ABC 7 (July 2, 2020),
https://abc7.com/6293495/?ex_cid=TA_KABC_FB&utm_campaign=trueAnthem%3A+Tr
ending+Content&utm_medium=trueAnthem&utm_source=facebook [https://perma.cc/
6LSX-74P5] (“The Los Angeles City Council approved a $150 million budget cut to the Los
Angeles Police Department’s budget . . . .”); Meena Venkataramanan, Austin City Council
Cuts Police Department Budget by One-Third, Mainly Through Reorganizing Some Duties
Out from Law Enforcement Oversight, Tex. Trib. (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.texas
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This Essay ofers a democratic perspective14 on dissolution of police
agencies as neither utopian, nor anarchic, but as the kind of institutional
experimentation15 that should be routine in a properly functioning
democracy. The existence, function, jurisdiction, and governance structure of police agencies are, after all, questions of institutional design,
properly resolved by a democratic public. Consider ﬁrst, the wide range of
police functions and powers—combining investigation, security, custody,
community caretaking, and emergency response.16 Police serve as agents
of both judicial and executive branches of government and intervene in
disputes and mental health crises.17 Should all of these functions be performed and prioritized by the same agency? Consider second, the
enormous multiplicity and overlap of our 18,000 police jurisdictions,

tribune.org/2020/08/13/austin-city-council-cut-police-budget-defund [https://perma.cc/
R75H-VQTL] (“The Austin City Council unanimously voted to cut its police department
budget by $150 million . . . .”).
14. This perspective is informed by a rapidly growing literature, including David Alan
Sklansky, Democracy and the Police 5–6 (2008) (exploring “how our notions about the
police and our strategies for police reform might change if they were rooted in a more
explicit, and richer, set of ideas about democracy”); Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko,
Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1827, 1832 (2015) (“Rather than attempting to
regulate policing primarily post hoc through episodic exclusion motions or the occasional
action for money damages, policing policies and practices should be governed through
transparent democratic processes such as legislative authorization and public rulemaking.”); Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community
Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 Wake Forest L. Rev. 793, 798 (2016)
(“[M]arginalized communities and community stakeholders should have a direct role in
the consent decree monitoring process.”); Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a
Power Lens, 130 Yale L.J. 778, 783 (2021) [hereinafter Simonson, Power Lens] (“[C]oncentrating on power arrangements and a particular form of contestatory democracy . . . open[s]
up police ‘reforms’ to new institutional arrangements . . . .”). While theorists have identiﬁed
democracy with a variety of diferent values and institutional schemes, a wide range of such
theories requires accountability of ofcials to constituents. See Bernard Manin, Adam
Przeworski & Susan C. Stokes, Introduction to Democracy, Accountability, and
Representation 1, 1–26 (Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes & Bernard Manin eds., 1999)
(noting that the claim “that democracy systematically causes governments to be representative . . . is widespread”). See generally David Held, Models of Democracy (3d ed. 2006)
(undertaking a comparative survey of democratic models). The democratic case for a
popular power to disband police agencies rests on its value as an accountability mechanism.
15. See generally Archon Fung, Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban
Democracy (2004) (discussing participatory democracy as a strategy for police reform);
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Democratic Experimentalism, in Searching for
Contemporary Legal Thought 477, 478 (Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins eds.,
2017) (“Democratic experimentalism aims . . . to show . . . that dominant understandings
of law should be revised to make the most of their potential.”).
16. See generally Barry Friedman, Disaggregating the Police Function, 169 U. Pa. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 26–52), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3564469 (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Friedman, Disaggregating] (providing an
overview of the activities in which police ofcers engage beyond strict law enforcement).
17. See id. (manuscript at 22–52); see also infra note 337 and accompanying text.
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employing almost 900,000 armed ofcers and 400,000 civilians.18 Is this
arrangement of jurisdictional authority optimal? Is this enormous capacity
for coercive force necessary? Consider third that it is axiomatic that in a
democracy, use of force must be subject to democratic supervision.19 What
institutional design would best achieve this democratic control?
18. Duren Banks, Joshua Hendrix, Matthew Hickman & Tracey Kyckelhahn, DOJ,
Bureau of Just. Stat., NCJ 249681, National Sources of Law Enforcement Employment Data
1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PCMF6HG] (“Law enforcement in the United States is made up of about 18,000 federal, state,
and local agencies.”); Mike Riggs, How a City with Two Dozen Law Enforcement Agencies
Handles a Huge Crisis, Bloomberg CityLab (Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2013-09-25/how-a-city-with-two-dozen-law-enforcement-agencies-handles-ahuge-crisis (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“There are roughly 27 law enforcement
agencies with overlapping jurisdiction in Washington, D.C.”). In 2016, 12,261 general
purpose local police forces reported 468,274 sworn ofcers and 131,274 full-time civilian
employees. Shelley S. Hyland & Elizabeth Davis, DOJ, Bureau of Just. Stat., NCJ 252835,
Local Police Departments, 2016: Personnel 2 tbl.2 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/lpd16p.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKE8-8AF9]. Not all municipalities have their
own police forces, and many people live in unincorporated areas. Darryl T. Cohen, Geofrey
W. Hatchard & Steven G. Wilson, U.S. Census Bureau, Population Trends in Incorporated
Places: 2000 to 2013, at 1–7 (2015), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library
/publications/2015/demo/p25-1142.pdf [https://perma.cc/PFQ6-YAEM] (reporting that
there were 19,508 incorporated municipalities in 2013, encompassing 62.7% of the U.S.
population). Also, 3,012 general purpose sherifs’ ofces reported 360,000 full-time
employees, of which 173,000 were sworn ofcers. Connor Brooks, DOJ, Bureau of Just. Stat.,
NCJ 252834, Sherifs’ Ofces, 2016: Personnel 1 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/so16p.pdf [https://perma.cc/PFS2-B6VE]. Almost every county or county
equivalent appears to have a sherif. See id.; How Many Counties Are There in the United
States?, U.S. Geological Surv. (Apr. 3, 2008), https://www.usgs.gov/media/audio/howmany-counties-are-there-united-states [https://perma.cc/V5ZV-TSKD] (stating that there
are 3,007 counties in the United States). In 2008, there were 60,772 sworn and 32,376
unsworn state police ofcers and 60,432 sworn and 33,861 unsworn ofcers in specialpurpose state and local forces. Banks et. al, supra, at 5. In 2016, 132,000 federal law
enforcement ofcers served in about eighty diferent forces—though the number of federal
full-time civilian employees in law enforcement functions was undetermined. Connor
Brooks, DOJ, Bureau of Just. Stat., NCJ 251922, Federal Law Enforcement Ofcers, 2016—
Statistical Tables 1–4 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ﬂeo16st.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XRH7-AAPM].
19. See Peter D. Feaver, Civil–Military Relations, 2 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 211, 214–15
(1999) (“Democratic theory is summed in the epigram that the governed should
govern . . . . It follows that, in a democracy, . . . [r]egardless of how strong the military is,
civilians are supposed to remain the political masters.”); Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra
note 14, at 1831–32 (“Of all the agencies of executive government, those that ‘police’—i.e.,
that . . . employ force—are the most threatening to . . . libert[y] . . . [y]et . . . the least
regulated . . . . It is . . . unacceptable . . . for policing to remain aloof from . . . democratic
processes . . . .”); Richard H. Kohn, How Democracies Control the Military, 8 J. Democracy
140, 140 (1997) (“Whether . . . a society controls those who possess the ultimate power of
physical coercion . . . is basic to democratic governance.”); see also United Nations Of. on
Drugs & Crime, Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight and Integrity 1 (2011),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/crimeprevention/PoliceAc
countability_Oversight_and_Integrity_10-57991_Ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9TD-QZ
JV] (“[W]here policing . . . may be undemocratic and authoritarian, eforts must be made
to enhance civilian control over the police.”).
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In other arenas, when institutions perform poorly, we replace them.
In business planning, ﬁrm structure is shaped by such economic considerations as transaction costs.20 We expect market competition to replace
worse ﬁrms with better ones and hope that corporate law will enable shareholders to replace inefective managers with more competent ones.21 In
policy design, we don’t simply ask what a given institution should do to
solve a problem. We compare the information-gathering and decisionmaking competence of such institutions as courts, administrative agencies,
and markets to determine which is best suited to address the problem.22
And of course, we expect competitive elections to replace policy decisionmakers.23 In all these settings, we view the power to replace decisionmakers
as an accountability mechanism.
So too, when the public expresses discontent with the performance of
police agencies, we should ask not only whether their work can be done
better, but whether it should be done at all, and by whom. As part of that
inquiry, this Essay examines the appeal and feasibility of disbanding police
agencies. “Disbanding” means legal dissolution of an agency—the organization ceases to exist, its expenditures cease, its jobs are eliminated.
Collective bargaining agreements governing those jobs become inoperative.24 Disbanding the police does not, however, entail any commitments
as to what happens after disbanding. It does not necessitate the abolition
or the partial or total defunding of the law enforcement function. Instead,
it may replace long-enduring police agencies with new forces, alternative
forms of community governance and mutual aid, or whatever else a
policymaker’s imagination conjures.25 Thus, disbanding does not decide

20. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 386–98 (1937).
21. See Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 15 (1993).
22. See Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law,
Economics and Public Policy 3 (1997) (“[C]hoices between markets, courts, and political
processes pervade law and public policy at all levels.”).
23. See 9 Jeremy Bentham, Constitutional Code, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham 1,
47 (1843) (“A democracy, then, has for its characteristic object and efect, the securing [of]
its members against oppression and depredation at the hands of those functionaries which
it employs . . . .”).
24. See infra notes 176–178 and accompanying text.
25. See Friedman, Disaggregating, supra note 16 (manuscript at 4) (arguing for the
need to critically examine the policing function itself and whether policing, as it is currently
conceived, advances public safety). Compare Dionne Searcey & John Eligon, Minneapolis
Will Dismantle Its Police Force, Council Members Pledge, N.Y. Times (June 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/07/us/minneapolis-police-abolish.html (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (“Nine members of the Minneapolis City Council—a veto-proof
majority—pledged . . . to dismantle the Police Department, promising to create a new
system of public safety.”), with 10 Demands of BLMCHI, Black Lives Matter Chi., https://
www.blacklivesmatterchicago.com/10-demands-of-blmchi [https://perma.cc/MFS3-4RUZ]
(last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (calling for the City of Chicago to “defund the police,” for
“immediate disinvestment” from the Chicago Police Department, and a reallocation of
those operating funds toward community resources).
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whether police work will be done, or by whom—but it does open that
question to democratic decision.
In fact, disbanding and replacing police agencies is a strategy that not
only could be, but repeatedly has been used to reform law enforcement in
the United States.26 As this Essay reveals, however, police agencies are
harder to disband than many other governing institutions. They are
entrenched, not only politically, but legally. In Minneapolis, for example,
an unelected Charter Commission blocked the City Council’s proposed
referendum to disband and replace the city’s police department, thus
illustrating one of the many structural obstacles to dismantling even a
politically unpopular police force.27
While disbanding police agencies does not achieve police abolition,
the difculty of doing so reveals something important about the abolitionist project. Policing, as we know it, is doubly entrenched. Policing practices
are entrenched in police agencies, and police agencies are entrenched in
governmental structures. Posing the problem of disbanding police agencies reveals that “the police” are not just a suite of (possibly unnecessary)
functions, or a set of (possibly pernicious) practices, but also a distinctively
unresponsive (and possibly illegitimate) legal and political institution. To
fundamentally change how public safety is achieved in our society will also
require removing police agencies from their status as autonomous public
authorities and subjecting them to democratic control. Paradoxically, however, our current lack of democratic control over police agencies is the
product of the many layers of ostensibly democratic supervision. The
dense network of state, county, and local laws governing those agencies
produces a structure democratic in form, which in practice serves to
insulate police from meaningful reforms—and also impedes disbanding.
This Essay assesses disbanding police agencies from two points of view,
framed by two questions. First, can we sufciently improve the performance of law enforcement by reforming existing agencies? If not, we have
reason to replace them. But second, assuming we have reason to replace

26. “Police agencies are . . . disbanded with appreciable regularity, although this fact
has been ignored by most in the academic policing community.” William R. King,
Organizational Failure and the Disbanding of Local Police Agencies, 60 Crime &
Delinquency 667, 668, 687 n.1 (2014) (citing disbandings of transit, housing, and school
police in New York City and police departments in Compton, California; North Lauderdale,
Florida; and Highland Park, Michigan). This study identiﬁed thirty-one dissolutions in Ohio
over a ten-year period. Id. at 672. At least ﬁve were responses to corruption or excessive or
selective enforcement. Id. at 682–683. Not counted among these thirty-one were other
instances where “locales disbanded their agency, apparently to remove a chief and problem
ofcers, and then created a new police agency stafed with personnel more to the locale’s
liking.” Id. at 685.
27. See Astead W. Herndon, How a Pledge to Dismantle the Minneapolis Police
Collapsed, N.Y. Times (Sept. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/26/us/poli
tics/minneapolis-defund-police.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated
Jan. 2, 2021); infra notes 197–210 and accompanying text.
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existing police agencies, is it feasible to do so? This question, in turn, depends on two further inquiries: Can police agencies be disbanded or substantially shrunk; and if so, how can they be replaced by something better?
Part I addresses the ﬁrst question by examining the normative and
prudential case for disbanding police agencies. It describes the toxic
interaction of three pathologies of policing: ﬁrst, the extraordinary and
unwarranted scale of the American criminal system, with the highest
incarceration rates in the world; second, the political insulation of police
agencies from democratic accountability, especially to those most afected
by their actions; and ﬁnally, both of these circumstances have helped make
policing an instrument of racial subordination, reﬂected in an African
American incarceration rate as much as six times that of whites.28 Part I
then proceeds to identify several structural obstacles to efective reform of
existing police agencies. Most such reforms rely on adding more oversight
and training while leaving in place agency structures already performing
these functions. Monitoring and sanctioning resistant organizations from
the outside require both efort and political will that are difcult to sustain.
Such eforts are likely to be systematically resisted by powerful police
unions.29 Monitoring and training must also contend with an insular rankand-ﬁle culture of solidarity, secrecy, and mistrust of the public. In the face
of these obstacles, reforms may accomplish little while provoking costly
pushback, or may win cosmetic changes in return for expanding police
agencies’ mission and resources and enhancing their legitimacy. In either
case, the high costs of reform may outweigh meager beneﬁts. Given the
pathologies of existing police forces, and the obstacles to their reform,
there is indeed reason to disband them and build new institutions.
Part II addresses the feasibility of disbanding and replacing police
agencies by examining the legal structures of the two most prevalent types
of agencies in terms of numbers of agencies and ofcers: municipal police
departments and county sherifs’ ofces.30 This review yields three observations. First, the entrenchment of local law enforcement practices is due in
part to the structural entrenchment of local law enforcement agencies. This
entrenchment is easiest to see in the ofce of the sherif, a constitutionally
established state institution, independent of county government. Second,
this structural entrenchment is often the result of political struggles
between state and local governments, driven by cultural and economic
conﬂicts, with the victors encoding political victories in law. This dynamic is
particularly important in explaining the insulation of urban police
departments. Third, the prospects for reform are further diminished by
jurisdictional overlap between police, sherifs’ ofces, and state police; and
28. See E. Ann Carson, DOJ, Bureau of Just. Stat., NCJ 253516, Prisoners in 2018, at 10
(2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p18.pdf [https://perma.cc/G845-YF4X]
(reporting that the imprisonment rates for Black adult residents and white adult residents
were 1,500 per 100,000 and 272 per 100,000 respectively).
29. See infra section I.B.2.
30. State police agencies also are brieﬂy discussed infra section II.C.3.
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among cities, counties, and states. For example, a city electorate that
disbands its police force to reduce aggressive policing practices could ﬁnd
itself more aggressively policed by a sherif’s ofce answerable to a county
electorate.
Having explicated structural impediments to both incremental reform
and wholesale replacement of police agencies, the Essay turns, in Part III,
to their strategic implications. First, these structural impediments reveal a
law enforcement exceptionalism with respect to democratic accountability
that, no less than the pathologies of policing, should be a target of reform.31 Police agencies, like the public authorities formed to bulldoze urban neighborhoods and ﬂood farming communities,32 have been designed
to operate outside of democratic controls.33 This democratic deﬁcit is
especially troubling for armed domestic security forces that, in total, outnumber all but four armies in the world.34 Second, the uniquely entrenched status of police forces did not arise by accident. Police agencies
have been structurally immunized against reform by previous generations of
reformers. This suggests that, third, where reformers win sufciently broad
support to overcome structural barriers and change practices, they should
also strive to simplify police governance to create more ﬂexible and democratic structures, leaving law enforcement exposed to further change and
thereby empowering democratic publics with continuing leverage and
inﬂuence. A necessary feature of such structural reform is to reduce veto
points by subjecting policing to one layer of authority. Fourth, that one layer
of democratic authority should be at the local level, where the human
consequences of law enforcement are felt, and where communities of
color have the greatest potential to exercise power.

31. Scholars have drawn attention to another dimension of law enforcement
exceptionalism: the inapplicability of administrative law to law enforcement agencies. See
Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 14, at 1833, 1837–48, 1889–91; Christopher
Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 91, 95, 124–27 (2016) (arguing for
an administrative rulemaking approach to police regulation). These works draw on an older
literature proposing such controls. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 423 (1974); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach
to Legal Control of the Police, 52 Tex. L. Rev. 703, 725 (1974).
32. See The Lost Towns of Pickwick, TVA, https://www.tva.com/about-tva/our-hist
ory/built-for-the-people/the-lost-towns-of-pickwick [https://perma.cc/95UF-LQTT] (last
visited Feb. 16, 2021) (recounting that the construction of Pickwick Landing Dam
“result[ed] in the partial ﬂooding of two towns, Waterloo and Riverton”); infra notes 420–
432 and accompanying text.
33. See infra sections I.A–.B.
34. See Int’l Inst. for Strategic Stud., The Military Balance 26 (2019) (noting that
Russia, at 900,000, has the fourth most active military personnel in the world).
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I. WHY DISBAND POLICE FORCES?
This Part presents an argument for disbanding police agencies,
emphasizing their resistance to incremental reform.35 Drawing on a deep
well of recent scholarship, it identiﬁes three pathologies of American
policing. It then identiﬁes a set of structural obstacles that stymie reform.
A weakness of many police reform proposals is a failure to address the
entrenchment of the policing institutions they are meant to improve. A
strategy of disentrenchment—of disbanding—is therefore attractive.
A.

Three Pathologies of Policing

Something is seriously wrong with policing in the United States. The
grim facts are now familiar. Nearly a thousand people (disproportionately
people of color) are fatally shot each year by police ofcers.36 And the
pathologies of policing extend well beyond killings: excessive force,
invasive stops, militarized terror, and more.37 We would add little to the
literature by cataloging the litany of other problems. But to understand
the case for disbanding, it is particularly important to recognize three
fundamental pathologies of policing.

35. Disbanding police agencies is compatible with, but does not entail, the more
ambitious project of abolishing punishment and policing. For explications of that project
and speciﬁc suggestions for policy reforms, see generally Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons
Obsolete? (2003) (outlining the case for prison abolition); Amna A. Akbar, Toward A
Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 405, 415 (2018) [hereinafter Akbar, Radical
Imagination] (examining the Black Lives Matter movement, advocating for “fundamental,
structural reform that . . . reconceive[s] the proper relationship between state, market, and
society” and builds power within Black communities); Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning
Abolitionist Democracy, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1613, 1616 (2019) (arguing for an abolitionist
approach to criminal justice, “where punishment is abandoned in favor of accountability
and repair”); Simonson, Power Lens, supra note 14, at 787 (providing an “account of why
[scholars and reformers] should incorporate the power lens into the array of objectives of
‘police reform’”).
36. At the time of writing, 5,489 people had been shot and killed by the police since
January 1, 2015. See Fatal Force, Wash. Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
investigations/police-shootings-database/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last
updated Jan. 27, 2021); see also Catherine Barber, Deborah Azrael, Amy Cohen, Matthew
Miller, Deonza Thymes, David Enze Wang & David Hemenway, Homicides by Police:
Comparing Counts from the National Violent Death Reporting System, Vital Statistics, and
Supplementary Homicide Reports, 106 Am. J. Pub. Health 922, 924 (2016) (ﬁnding ethnic
disparities of eight to one in police killings); Jefrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and
Reasonableness in Police Killings, 100 B.U. L. Rev. 951, 960–61 (2020) (ﬁnding that, even
where there are no circumstances that would render a shooting objectively reasonable for
Fourth Amendment purposes, Black suspects are more than twice as likely than other
suspects to be killed by police); Justin M. Feldman, Roland Fryer Is Wrong: There Is Racial
Bias in Shootings by Police, Scholars at Harv.: Justin Feldman Blog (July 12, 2016), http://
scholar.harvard.edu/jfeldman/blog/roland-fryer-wrong-there-racial-bias-shootings-police
[https://perma.cc/ZRE5-SSRT] (ﬁnding that in Houston, Blacks were nearly ﬁve times
more likely than whites to be shot by police).
37. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 14, at 1829–31.

1338

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:4

First, the sheer scale of the American criminal system is unlike any
other in history. The United States incarcerates its inhabitants at a rate
that is unprecedented comparatively38 and has few historical parallels.39
Although it has declined in recent years, the U.S. incarceration rate
remains the highest in the world.40 As Professor Dylan Rodríguez has
recently observed, that rate (which peaked at 1,000 per 100,000 people in
2008) is matched in recent history only by those of “apartheid South
Africa, the Gulag-era Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation during the
immediate post–Soviet Union years.”41
This statistic is largely, but not exclusively, a racialized one.42 If every
nonwhite inmate were released from prison immediately, the United
States’ rate of incarceration would still vastly exceed that of any Western
European country.43 Furthermore, the growth in the United States incarceration rate appears to track increased class disparities that have resulted
from reduced labor market opportunities, high concentrations of poverty
in urban neighborhoods, and the deterioration of social services.44
Beyond incarceration rates, the policing apparatus is itself massive.45
Professor Amna Akbar has recently argued that the scale of policing—
including its size and power—renders counterproductive any incremental
38. See Comm. on Causes & Consequences of High Rates of Incarceration, Nat’l Rsch.
Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and
Consequences 68 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014).
39. See Dylan Rodríguez, Abolition as Praxis of Human Being: A Foreword, 132 Harv.
L. Rev. 1575, 1584 (2019).
40. See John Gramlich, Black Imprisonment Rate in the U.S. Has Fallen by a Third
Since 2006, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (May 6, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05
/06/share-of-black-white-hispanic-americans-in-prison-2018-vs-2006 [https://perma.cc/ET
W3-SYDA].
41. Rodríguez, supra note 39, at 1584 (footnotes omitted).
42. See infra notes 57–64 and accompanying text.
43. See Ram Subramanian, Kristine Riley & Chris Mai, Vera Inst. of Just., Divided
Justice: Trends in Black and White Jail Incarceration, 1990–2013, at 8 (2018) (observing
that white jail incarceration rates grew across all regions and jurisdiction types during the
time period studied). Compare Carson, supra note 28, at 9 tbl.5 (noting that the
imprisonment rate of sentenced white prisoners is 218 per 100,000), with Roy Walmsley,
Inst. for Crim. Pol’y Rsch., World Prison Population List 11 tbl.4 (12th ed. 2018),
https://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/ﬁles/resources/downloads/wppl_12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UBH-B5DZ] (noting the highest incarceration rate in Western Europe
is Luxembourg’s 107 people per 100,000).
44. See John Clegg & Adaner Usmani, The Economic Origins of Mass Incarceration,
Catalyst (2019), https://catalyst-journal.com/vol3/no3/the-economic-origins-of-massincarceration [https://perma.cc/YTG9-T68C]. This explanation is consistent with theories
that trace mass incarceration to structural racism. See id. (“American slavery and . . . Jim
Crow delayed the proletarianization of African Americans, with the result that they arrived
in Northern cities after the ﬁrst wave of . . . industrialization, in urban environments in
which pivotal, scarce resources (jobs and housing) were hoarded by the ﬁrst and second
generations of established white ethnics.”); see also Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag:
Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California 7–11 (2007).
45. See supra notes 16–18.
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reforms that require investments in police forces.46 Modern policing in the
United States is also far more intrusive in scope and substance than could
have been contemplated in prior centuries. Progressive Era reforms
enabled police departments to grow their bureaucracies independently of
meaningful political checks.47 The rise of automobile culture gave police
a new and expanding function and helped transform policing into an
active process of stops and surveillance.48 Beginning in the 1960s, the scale
of urban policing grew alongside the War on Crime.49 As law enforcement
bureaucracies continued to expand, while social services shrank, police
and prisons have, as Akbar observes, become “a primary mode of the
state’s presence, especially in the lives of poor and working-class people of
color.”50
Second, police departments in the United States operate outside of
traditional mechanisms of democratic accountability. As a formal matter,
sherifs and municipal police chiefs continue to be directly or indirectly
accountable to the electorate.51 In practice, however, police departments
operate in a “democratic vacuum.”52 Professor Markus Dubber has argued
that the role of American police reﬂects a tradition of patriarchal
governance in deep tension with American ideals of self-governance.53
This tension increased as police departments evolved into bureaucratic
institutions, intentionally insulated from political inﬂuence.54 Unlike
other agencies, police departments are rarely constrained by legislation or
regulations subject to public input.55 This vast and unregulated discretion
46. See Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 Calif. L. Rev.
1781, 1782–88 (2020) [hereinafter Akbar, Abolitionist Horizon] (addressing the scale of
policing as a cause for and target of abolitionist activism).
47. See infra notes 270–280 and accompanying text.
48. See Sarah A. Seo, Policing the Open Road: How Cars Transformed American
Freedom 7–20 (2019).
49. See Jonathan Simon, Is Mass Incarceration History?, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1077, 1101
(2017) (reviewing Hinton, supra note 7).
50. See Wacquant, supra note 7, at 41 (“Over the past three decades . . . America
has . . . gradual[ly] replace[d] . . . a (semi-) welfare state by a police and penal state for
which the criminalization of marginality and the punitive containment of dispossessed
categories serve as social policy . . . .”); Akbar, Abolitionist Horizon, supra note 46, at 1822.
51. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 14, at 1858–65 (describing the history
of police accountability throughout the twentieth century); infra notes 278, 288 and
accompanying text.
52. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 14, at 1835; see also Erik Luna, Transparent
Policing, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1107, 1111–17 (2000) [hereinafter Luna, Transparent Policing]
(explaining that “hidden episodes” of police misconduct avoid public accountability).
53. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the Foundations of
American Government 81–82 (2005). For a more sanguine association of the police power
with local self-governance, see William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation
in Nineteenth Century America 9–10, 51–82 (1996).
54. See infra section II.A.2.
55. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 14, at 1837–54 (“Compared to the
sprawling administrative codes that detail every aspect of agency practice, laws governing
the police are notably sparce—if they exist at all.”).
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means that politicians will rarely be held accountable for police misconduct and that the electorate will have difculty meaningfully assessing or
debating police practices.56
Third, whether by design or by happenstance, American policing
contributes to the continued subordination of Black and brown people in
the United States.57 People of color are more likely to be burdened by
excessive ﬁnes and fees.58 Black people in poor neighborhoods are far
more likely than others to be stopped by police.59 Black and brown people
are more likely to be subjected to excessive force and killed by the police.60
These inequalities of enforcement create a pool of potential defendants
that prosecutors can selectively charge in ways that create grotesque racial
disparities in our prisons.61 Moreover, Professors Bruce Western and
Christopher Muller observe that “inequalities of race and class combine to
produce astonishing rates of penal conﬁnement among Black men with
little schooling.”62 And while the rate of Black imprisonment in the United

56. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551, 657 (1997); Luna,
Transparent Policing, supra note 52, at 1117.
57. See Simonson, Power Lens, supra note 14, at 805–06 (explicating the concept of
“race-class subjugated communities” in legal scholarship). See generally Joe Soss & Vesla
Weaver, Police Are Our Government: Politics, Political Science, and the Policing of Race–
Class Subjugated Communities, 20 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 565, 565–67 (2017) (arguing that
policing helps construct “race-class subjugated communities”); Radley Balko, Opinion,
There’s Overwhelming Evidence that the Criminal Justice System Is Racist. Here’s the
Proof., Wash. Post (June 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/
opinions/systemic-racism-police-evidence-criminal-justice-system (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (identifying racial disparities in policing).
58. See Brandon L. Garrett, Wealth, Equal Protection, and Due Process, 61 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 397, 449 (2019).
59. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (ﬁnding,
based on a study of 4.4 million stops made in New York City, that eighty-three percent of
people stopped were either Black or Hispanic); Jefrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following
the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 51,
55–58 (2015) (discussing how police ofcers “have developed recurring narratives or scripts
of suspicion to satisfy administrative review of their actions and . . . are [also] more likely to
view a minority citizen as suspicious based on nonbehavioral cues”); see also Charles R. Epp,
Steven Maynard-Moody & Donald Haider-Markel, Pulled Over: How Police Stops Deﬁne
Race and Citizenship 3 (2014) (“[I]t is well established that racial minorities are more likely
than whites to be stopped by the police. . . . [R]acial minorities are questioned, handcufed,
and searched at dramatically higher rates than whites are . . . .”).
60. See Balko, supra note 57 (summarizing studies on police shootings).
61. See Carson, supra note 28, at 9 tbl.5 (reporting that the rate of sentenced Black
prisoners is 1,134 per 100,000 compared to 218 sentenced white prisoners per 100,000);
John F. Pfaf, Locked In: The True Causes of Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform
145–47 (2017) (arguing that racial disparity has been shaped by prosecutorial decisions).
62. Bruce Western & Christopher Muller, Mass Incarceration, Macrosociology, and the
Poor, 647 Ann. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 166, 166 (2013) (observing that the “[c]hances that a
black man with no college education would serve time in prison were about 12 percent in
the late 1970s, compared to 35 percent today”).
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States has declined in recent years,63 it still dwarfs the total imprisonment
rate of any other country.64
These disparate harms reﬂect a mode of policing governance that is
experienced diferently by poor people of color than by others.65 For
example, the War on Drugs has shaped the lives of poor communities of
color by expanding state police budgets (including through federal grants
and asset forfeiture) in an era when other social services were being
slashed.66 These budgetary expansions gave rise to specialized narcotics
units in local police departments that were given free rein in poor
communities of color.67 During this period, resources were diverted from
mental health and other social services into the budgets of prisons and
police departments.68 While the drug war may not have been directly responsible for mass incarceration,69 it damaged the economic opportunities
of poor people of color (including through collateral consequences in the
labor and housing markets),70 and “estranged” communities of color from
institutions ostensibly there to protect them.71 Misdemeanor enforcement
63. See Gramlich, supra note 40.
64. Compare Carson, supra note 28, at 1 (reporting that the imprisonment rate of
sentenced Black prisoners is 1,134 per 100,000 Black residents), with Walmsley, supra note
43, at 2 (reporting that El Salvador, which is second to the United States in its incarceration
rate, imprisons 604 people per 100,000 residents).
65. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime
Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear 18–20 (2007) (arguing
that crime politics does not exclusively afect the poor and African Americans but “actively
reshapes how power is exercised throughout hierarchies of class, race, ethnicity, and
gender”).
66. See Erik Luna, Drug War and Peace, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 813, 837 (2016) (noting
the dependence of police departments on federal drug war grants); David W. Rasmussen &
Bruce L. Benson, Rationalizing Drug Policy Under Federalism, 30 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 679,
717 (2003) (“Research indicates that police department discretionary budgets rise when
they seize assets and that departments respond to this incentive by increasing drug arrests
relative to arrests for other ofenses.”).
67. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement,
126 Yale L.J. 2054, 2118 (2017) [hereinafter Bell, Legal Estrangement].
68. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth
of Natural Order 221–39 (2011).
69. See Pfaf, supra note 61, at 13 (“[O]nly about 16 percent of state prisoners are
serving time on drug charges . . . .”). Professor John Pfaf argues that convictions for violent
crimes drove the explosion in prison population. See id. But Pfaf acknowledges that prior
convictions for drug ofenses are likely to shape charging decisions for violent ofenses. See
id. at 42–43. Also, most inmates serving time in or awaiting trial at local jails are being held
in connection with nonviolent ofenses. See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass
Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, Prison Pol’y Initiative (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.
prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/2ZAL-CQAJ] (reporting that of
approximately 746,000 people in local jails, 149,000 were detained on violent charges and
another 34,000 were sentenced for violent ofenses).
70. See Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 Mich.
L. Rev. 259, 280 (2018).
71. See Bell, Legal Estrangement, supra note 67, at 2083 (deﬁning legal
estrangement).

1342

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:4

is another arena of subordination, forcing targeted populations to endure
procedural hassle and comply with arcane rules, and the consequences of
misdemeanor arrest for the poor can mean the loss of jobs and housing.72
Much police work, such as mental health intervention and low-level
dispute resolution, is outside the sphere of law enforcement altogether.73
These noncriminal aspects of policing can also reinforce patterns of segregation.74 Abolitionists have traced the origins of the policing system of
the American South to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century slave patrols75
and argued that the social control of communities of color has long been
a central focus of American policing.76 In this respect, Professor Paul
Butler argues that the system is working the way it’s supposed to.77 Regardless of whether one accepts this narrative, there is a wide consensus that
trust has broken down between police departments and poor communities
of color.78
By themselves, these pathologies of policing do not establish disbanding as the appropriate remedy. Consider that in neighborhoods with concentrations of impoverished people of color, overpolicing of nonviolent
crime often coexists with the underpolicing of violent crimes.79 These

72. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanorland: Criminal Courts and Social Control
in an Age of Broken Windows Policing 267 (2019) (“The residents [of poor and minority]
communities are the ones who come to have criminal records that hinder their employment
and housing prospects . . . .”).
73. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
74. See Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 650, 702–03
(2020) (“When a neighbor calls the police on another neighbor to report a fairly innocuous
infraction, such as noisiness, or an incident [of] . . . intimate partner violence, it can set of
a chain of events that leads to an eviction . . . exact[ing] an additional, collective harm of
perpetuating segregation.”).
75. See Vitale, supra note 4, at 95–100 (examining links between slave patrols and
subsequent policing institutions); Akbar, Radical Imagination, supra note 35, at 447–60
(drawing connections between slavery abolition and punishment abolition). See generally
Laurence Ralph, The Logic of the Slave Patrol: The Fantasy of Black Predatory Violence
and the Use of Force by the Police, Palgrave Commc’ns, Oct. 2019, at 1 (providing an
ethnographic account of African American perceptions of these linkages in contemporary
Chicago).
76. See Zack Beauchamp, What the Police Really Believe, Vox (July 7, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/7/7/21293259/police-racism-violenceideology-george-floyd (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
77. See Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of
Criminal Justice Reform, 104 Geo. L.J. 1419, 1421–26 (2016) [hereinafter Butler, The
System] (“The Court has . . . creat[ed] a system where racially unjust police conduct is both
lawful and how the system is supposed to work.”).
78. See, e.g., Bell, Legal Estrangement, supra note 67, at 2058 (noting that many
scholars argue that “people of color and residents of high-poverty communities do not trust
the police”).
79. Jefrey Fagan & Daniel Richman, Understanding Recent Spikes and Longer Trends
in American Murders, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 1235, 1278–79 (2017) (noting that residents of
neighborhoods with high homicide rates “experience policing as detached from serious
crime and aimed at the wrong behaviors and the wrong people”); Alexandra Natapof,
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phenomena are mutually reinforcing. Mistrust of the police deters people
from cooperating with them to solve murders and violent crimes.80 And
community resistance to overpolicing often prompts police ofcers to
abandon their responsibilities toward those communities.81 Some Blackled social movements have responded to this dynamic by calling for
increased policing,82 while others have advocated for abolition.83
There is a wide consensus, however, that some reform is necessary.
Unfortunately, the institutional context of American policing ensures that
most reforms are bound to fail.
B.

Structural Obstacles to Police Reform

The case for disbanding police forces is rooted in four structural
obstacles that often doom incremental reforms to failure. First, the current
enthusiasm for police reform notwithstanding, lack of political will is a persistent barrier to meaningful reform. Second, police unions have proven
successful not only in contracting around accountability but also in using
the political process to block reform. Third, the culture of policing itself
serves as a barrier to reducing police violence. And fourth, any reforms
that can overcome these structural obstacles will involve signiﬁcant
tradeofs that could worsen the pathologies of policing in some respects.
1. Lack of Political Will. — The current political moment is exceptional in terms of the political energy behind police reform. But if history
serves as a guide, this political energy may be short lived.84 Consider, for
example, the limited success of federal consent decrees. When the political will exists, policing is often amenable to state and federal oversight
through litigation and judicial supervision.85 In some contexts, consent
Underenforcement, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1715, 1724–27 (2006) (analyzing ofcial neglect of
serious crime in urban neighborhoods inhabited by people of color).
80. See Fagan & Richman, supra note 79, at 1248.
81. See id.
82. See James Forman, Jr., Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black
America 11 (2017) (noting that Black ofcials have advocated for “tough-on-crime measures
in race-conscious terms” and “expanded police forces and courts—state resources they had
historically been denied”); Michael Javen Fortner, Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller
Drug Laws and the Politics of Punishment 62 (2015) (describing African American support
for increased policing in the latter half of the twentieth century); John Rappaport, Some
Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 787–91 (2020)
(surveying scholarship documenting Black support for punitive crime policies).
83. See Akbar, Abolitionist Horizon, supra note 46, at 1800–02.
84. Indeed, there is strong evidence that support for policing reform is already waning
among white Americans. See Michael Tesler, Support for Black Lives Matter Surged During
Protests, But Is Waning Among White Americans, FiveThirtyEight (Aug. 19, 2020), https://
ﬁvethirtyeight.com/features/support-for-black-lives-matter-surged-during-protests-but-is-wa
ning-among-white-americans [https://perma.cc/8KWG-Z7ED].
85. See K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of
Community Control, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 679, 685 (2020); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform
Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 1343, 1396–406 (2015)
[hereinafter Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation]; see also Rachel A. Harmon, Federal
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decrees appear to reduce incidents of civil rights violations.86 But federal
enforcement depends on politicized discretion. On assuming ofce, the
Trump administration announced that it would no longer use the DOJ’s
authority to investigate and bring lawsuits against local police departments
for constitutional violations.87 Although state attorneys generally have
sought to ﬁll the void, they are hobbled by federal standing limitations and
other constraints.88
But even previous administrations have made nationwide police
reform at best a minor part of their policy agenda. Before the Trump era,
the DOJ investigated about three police departments per year on
average.89 The Obama Administration, which prioritized police oversight
to a greater degree than any other recent administration, 90 opened only
thirty-six investigations,91 in a nation with almost 18,000 state and local
police agencies.92 Some treat this limitation as one of capacity: After all,
the budget of the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division is dwarfed by that of other
units in the agency.93 Yet, for a government with virtually unlimited
resources, lack of capacity and lack of political will are one and the same.94
Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 870, 953 (2015) [hereinafter
Harmon, Real Costs of Policing] (discussing how DOJ settlements with local police
departments are “designed to promote . . . departmental accountability to the public” but
acknowledging that “federal eforts to improve local policing can undermine the political
checks that ordinarily ensure that . . . it is responsive to community concerns”).
86. See, e.g., Zachary A. Powell, Michele Bisaccia Meitl & John L. Worrall, Police
Consent Decrees and Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation, 16 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 575,
577 (2017) (“DOJ consent decrees are associated with modest reductions in . . . civil rights
violations . . . .”); Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 85, at 1397 (arguing that
structural reform litigation is “uniquely successful in part because it forces municipalities to
prioritize investments into police reform over other municipal goals”).
87. See Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, State Attorneys General as Agents of Police
Reform, 69 Duke L.J. 999, 1005–06 & nn.30–31 (2020).
88. See id. at 1033–50 (analyzing the use of parens patriae doctrine to allow state
attorneys general to sue in federal courts and concluding that “[e]xisting laws are largely
inadequate to control misconduct in local police departments”).
89. See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 85, at 1370–71.
90. See, e.g., President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 1, 46 (2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/
taskforce/taskforce_ﬁnalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2NB-TLQQ] (calling for greater
cooperation between communities and the police agencies that serve them in order to
promote public trust and legitimacy); Developments in the Law: Policing, 128 Harv. L. Rev.
1706, 1709 (2015) (noting that the President’s Task Force was the “ﬁrst national commission
on systemic policing reform in more than ﬁfty years”).
91. Patel, supra note 14, at 794–95 (stating, based on DOJ data that appear to no longer
be available on its website, that the Special Litigation Section under Obama opened thirtysix investigations).
92. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 85, at 1415 (“Another
potential drawback of § 14141 is that the federal government simply lacks the resources
necessary for aggressive enforcement.”).
94. Indeed, the operational reliance of federal law enforcement on local police
agencies suggests that the Civil Rights Division’s diminished capacity is by design. See Daniel
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But even the most vigorous federal enforcement will fail in the
absence of political will at the local and state levels. As Professor Stephen
Rushin observes, there are serious questions as to whether the reforms
made during federal interventions are sustainable after monitoring ends.95
Absent support from police chiefs and other local leaders, structural
reform litigation is unlikely to be successful.96 But this support comes at a
high price to local leadership. Local municipalities must bear most of the
high costs of complying with federal consent decrees,97 requiring them to
slash budgets or raise taxes.98 This, in turn, can lead to signiﬁcant public
backlash against any police reforms.99
At the state level, support for policing reform often appears to be a
losing position. Reformers had cause to celebrate when the State of New
York passed legislation that banned the use of chokeholds and eliminated
barriers to cities releasing police disciplinary records.100 But these
legislative reforms had languished for years before the recent protests
prompted state ofcials to enact the law.101 Such legislative inertia comes
as little surprise. The same political incentives that push legislators toward
increasingly punitive results push them away from regulating police.102
Moreover, legislation at the state and county levels is unlikely to reﬂect the
interests of urban-dwelling African Americans who face the greatest risk of
police brutality.103 Professor Monica Bell has argued that, with respect to
criminal justice reform, “African Americans—particularly if they live in
high-poverty communities—have relatively little say in who their representatives are or in the legislation that their representatives ultimately

Richman & Sarah A. Seo, How Federalism Built the FBI, Sustained Local Police, and Left
Out the States, 17 Stan. J.C.R. & C.L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2–3),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3714325 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“The working
relationship of mutual exchange, or collaborative federalism, rendered the federal
government largely unwilling to hold the police accountable for how they performed their
jobs.”).
95. See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 85, at 1410–12.
96. See id. at 1417–18.
97. See id. at 1408–09.
98. See id. at 1409.
99. Id.
100. See Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Jefrey C. Mays & Ashley Southall, Defying Police Unions,
New York Lawmakers Ban Chokeholds, N.Y. Times (June 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/06/08/nyregion/ﬂoyd-protests-police-reform.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
101. See id.
102. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev.
505, 509–12 (2001) (examining how political incentives contribute to expanded discretion
for prosecutors and police ofcers).
103. See William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice 7 (2011)
[hereinafter Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice] (describing how demographic
changes have “limited the [voting] power of residents of poor city neighborhoods—the
neighborhoods where levels of criminal violence are highest”).
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pass.”104 Even increased democratic control over legislatures will not
necessarily lead to reduced support for police. As Professor John
Rappaport observes in his systematic critique of a scholarly manifesto for
“democratizing” criminal justice,105 there is considerable evidence that lay
people have more punitive attitudes than elites.106 Moreover, it is a matter
of controversy whether, under current electoral structures, greater African
American enfranchisement will lead to less punitive outcomes.107
2. Police Unions. — A related structural obstacle to police reform is
that it often requires the cooperation of police unions that are hostile to
reform and skilled at preventing it.108 As Professors Catherine Fisk and L.
Song Richardson explain, rank-and-ﬁle police ofcers fear they will be subjected to unfair discipline by departmental bureaucracies that they view as
capricious, unpredictable, and punitive.109 Rank-and-ﬁle ofcers therefore
rely on their unions to resist any police reforms that would expose them
to such discipline. And these unions are efective.110 Recently compiled
data on collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) conﬁrms long-held
assumptions that police unions are obstacles to accountability.111
104. Bell, Legal Estrangement, supra note 67, at 2142–44 (questioning the likely efcacy
of administrative solutions to regulate police through democratically informed
rulemaking).
105. See Rappaport, supra note 82; cf. Joshua Kleinfeld, Laura I. Appleman, Richard A.
Bierschbach, Kenworthey Bilz, Josh Bowers, John Braithwaite, Robert P. Burns, R A Duf,
Albert W. Dzur, Thomas F. Geraghty, Adriaan Lanni, Marah Stith McLeod, Janice Nadler,
Anthony O’Rourke, Paul H. Robinson, Jonathan Simon, Jocelyn Simonson, Tom R. Tyler &
Ekow N. Yankah, White Paper of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1693,
1699–1700 (2017). One of the coauthors of this Essay was also a coauthor of the “White
Paper,” and supports many but not all of its recommendations. See id. at 1695 (“[T]he
policy proposals below do not reﬂect and should not be taken to reﬂect any individual
author’s views in full.”).
106. See Rappaport, supra note 82, at 759–73.
107. See Forman, supra note 82, at 9 (noting that sixty-four percent of African
Americans surveyed believed that courts were not harsh enough on criminals); Rappaport,
supra note 82, at 787–91 (arguing that “under existing structural constraints, one should
not too quickly predict that, if given greater control over criminal justice policy, black
Americans will necessarily temper it”).
108. See Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
712, 720 (2017) (noting the “history of police rank-and-ﬁle resistance to imposition of
reforms without their input”); see also Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110
Mich. L. Rev. 761, 798–99 (2012) (discussing the use of collective bargaining to block police
reforms); Aziz Z. Huq, Fourth Amendment Gloss, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 701, 743 (2019)
(noting that police unions are associated with more coercive policing).
109. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 108, at 726.
110. See id. at 726–28, 756 (describing how union representatives for large departments
could control a “multimillion-dollar budget” which “gives them enormous power to
inﬂuence public policy” through political donations).
111. See Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 Duke L.J. 1191, at apps. A & B
(2017) [hereinafter Rushin, Police Union Contracts]; George Joseph, Leaked Police Files
Contain Guarantees Disciplinary Records Will Be Kept Secret, Guardian (Feb. 7, 2016),
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/07/leaked-police-ﬁles-contain-guarantees-disciplinary-records-will-be-kept-secret [https://perma.cc/X69J-QCSB]; Fair Police
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To begin, there appears to be a strong correlation between the collective bargaining power of a police workforce and the incidence of violent
misconduct among its members.112 This correlation is unsurprising. As
Fisk and Richardson have observed, several aspects of police contracts are
particularly problematic.113 Most contracts slow down misconduct investigations through protections, such as those provided by a Law Enforcement
Ofcers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBOR).114 Police contracts also shield disciplinary records from the public, making it difcult to hold ofcers accountable for misconduct.115 Some CBAs limit civilian oversight.116 Many also
require that rank-and-ﬁle members sit on disciplinary hearing boards, rendering it more difcult to sanction ofcers for wrongdoing.117
Beyond their collective bargaining power, police unions are well
positioned to leverage the political process to block reforms.118 At the state
and local levels, police unions have successfully promoted legislation that
shields ofcers from accountability and have blocked even uncontroversial
reforms.119 In some states—including Minnesota, where George Floyd and
Philando Castile were killed—LEOBORS are codiﬁed by statute.120 Part of
this success owes to the uncharacteristically close relationships that police
unions have with Republican as well as Democratic politicians.121 Thus,
even in states that have dismantled protections for public sector unions,
the pensions and prerogatives of police unions have gone untouched.122
When police unions do not oppose reform, their bargaining strength
diverts resources from social services that could serve as alternatives to

Contracts, Campaign Zero, https://www.joincampaignzero.org/contracts [https://perma.
cc/Y4EF-LAV8] (last visited Jan. 30, 2020).
112. See Dhammika Dharmapala, Richard H. McAdams & John Rappaport, Collective
Bargaining Rights and Police Misconduct: Evidence from Florida, J.L. Econ. & Org.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 25–27, 30), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3095217 (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that, following a decision conferring collective
bargaining rights on sherifs’ deputies, violent incidents of misconduct rose substantially in
sherifs’ ofces relative to police departments that did not obtain such rights).
113. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 108, at 750–55.
114. See Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1200–02 (2016)
(arguing that LEOBORs provide protections that should extend to all criminal suspects).
115. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 108, at 751–52.
116. See id. at 753.
117. See id. at 753–54.
118. See id. at 744–45.
119. See, e.g., Ferré-Sadurní et al., supra note 100 (describing the role of police unions
in blocking legislation that bans chokeholds and preserving legislation that prevents the
disclosure of disciplinary records).
120. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 626.89 (2020).
121. See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, What’s Wrong with Police Unions?, 120 Colum. L. Rev.
1333, 1352 (2020) [hereinafter Levin, Police Unions] (describing the close relationship
between the Fraternal Order of Police and Trump).
122. See id. at 1357–58.
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policing.123 The core function of police unions is to bargain for salaries,
and they perform this function well. For example, the average starting
salary for law enforcement ofcers is around thirty-eight percent higher in
unionized departments than in non-unionized ones.124 Moreover, given
their uncharacteristic inﬂuence over GOP politics, police unions have an
edge over other public sector unions that Republicans have targeted.125
As Professor Ben Levin has argued, police unions sometimes may be
scapegoats for politicians who are disinclined to support police reform or
invest in social service alternatives to policing.126 As a descriptive matter,
however, Levin’s observation merely identiﬁes another way that union
inﬂuence and lack of political will can work in tandem as structural
obstacles to reform. The bargaining strength of police unions is part of the
context explaining Professor Michelle Alexander’s observation that “poor
African Americans are not given the option of great schools, community
investment, and job training. Instead, they are ofered police and prisons.
If the only choice that is ofered blacks is rampant crime or more prisons,
the predictable (and understandable) answer will be ‘more prisons.’”127
3. Rank-and-File Culture. — If police unions are the faithful agents
they seem,128 their attitudes may difer little from attitudes of police.129
Thus, public expressions of belligerence toward protestors by police union
leadership accord with a well-documented culture of hostility on the part
of rank-and-ﬁle ofcers toward external challenges.130 Several classic
studies describe the culture of rank-and-ﬁle policing as one of violence and

123. Cf. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 108, at 759–75 (discussing examples of unionbacked reform).
124. See Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 111, at 1203–05.
125. See William E. Forbath, The Distributive Constitution and Workers’ Rights, 72
Ohio St. L.J. 1115, 1140 & n.98 (2011); Levin, Police Unions, supra note 121, at 1357–58.
126. See Levin, Police Unions, supra note 121, at 1357–58, 1399–98 (noting that
reducing problems with policing and the carceral system at large to police unions “would
efectively let politicians of the hook”).
127. See Alexander, supra note 4, at 210.
128. See Monique Marks, Police Unions and Their Inﬂuence: Subculture or CounterCulture?, in Police Occupational Culture: New Debates and Directions 229, 243 (Megan
O’Neill, Monique Marks & Anne-Marie Singh eds., 2007) (“[U]nion leaders know that to
hold onto their positions they have to retain the support of their members.”).
129. See Levin, Police Unions, supra note 121, at 1338 (noting that criticisms of police
unions—in that “they prioritize the interests of their members over the interests of the
public at large”—are compelling); Marks, supra note 128, at 231 (“[P]olice unionists . . .
take their bearings, both structurally and culturally, from within the police organisation.”).
130. See Gregory Pratt & Jeremy Gorner, Trump Expected to Send New Federal Force
to Chicago This Week to Battle Violence, but Plan’s Full Scope Is a Question Mark, Chi.
Trib. (July 20, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-chicagopolice-dhs-deployment-20200720-dftu5ychwbcxtg4ltarh5qnwma-story.html (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review); Open Letter from Ed Mullins, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n, Facebook
(June 2, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/sbanypd/posts/3016295705125288 [https://
perma.cc/PTU3-EKF9].

2021]

DISBANDING POLICE AGENCIES

1349

hostility toward those who seek to check it.131 Updating this literature,
Professor Barbara Armacost has shown how the organizational structures
of modern police departments incentivize aggressive policing while
facilitating systemic misconduct.132 Challengers of this characterization
argue that a few ofcers account for much of police abuse.133 Regardless,
there is little doubt that a culture of silence pervades rank-and-ﬁle
policing.
Rank-and-ﬁle police ofcers often regard department bureaucracy as
illegitimate, unpredictable, and punitive.134 They see themselves as
convenient scapegoats when aggressive policies—such as stop-and-frisk—
prove unpopular, and police management and elected ofcials wish to
disavow them.135 This helps explain rank-and-ﬁle police ofcers’ hostility
toward political initiatives designed to improve their interactions with
citizens. Further, suspicion of bureaucracy and hostility to democratic
oversight give rise to a rank-and-ﬁle police culture marked by a “rare
degree of camaraderie and group loyalty,”136 a tolerance of misconduct,
and an intolerance of tattlers.137 Thus, ofcers are reluctant to testify
against colleagues and may lie in support of them.138 This is not to claim
131. See William A. Westley, Violence and the Police: A Sociological Study of Law,
Custom, and Morality 110–21 (1970) (“[T]he police become a close, social group, in which
collective action is organized for self-protection and an attack on the outside world.”); Kami
Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the
Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 489, 496–
97 (2008) (“The culture of police violence is tightly woven into the institutional fabric of
the police organization itself.”); David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 Mich. L.
Rev. 1699, 1731–36 (2005) [hereinafter Sklansky, Police and Democracy] (surveying classic
studies of the group psychology of policing).
132. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 453, 455–57, 545–46 (2004) (“Punishing individual cops will not cure the
problem of police violence if systemic features of the police organization permit, sanction,
or even encourage the ofcers’ violent behavior.”).
133. See David Alan Sklansky, Seeing Blue: Police Reform, Occupational Culture, and
Cognitive Burn-In, in Police Occupational Culture: New Debates and Directions, supra note
128, at 19, 29 [hereinafter Sklansky, Seeing Blue] (“There is growing recognition that a
small subgroup of ofcers accounts for a large share of police abuse . . . .”).
134. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 108, at 727.
135. We are grateful to Professor Dan Richman for this point.
136. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 108, at 727 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Jerome H. Skolnick & Hames J. Fyfe, Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use
of Force 122 (1993)).
137. See Hans Toch, Police Ofcers as Change Agents in Police Reform, in Police
Reform from the Bottom Up: Ofcers and Their Unions as Agents of Change 27, 28
(Monique Marks & David Sklansky eds., 2012).
138. See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias
and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 233, 256 (1998);
Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge
the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. Chi. Legal F. 213, 215–17 (describing
accounts of retaliation and detailing an incident where the statements of ﬁve police ofcers
were inconsistent with video footage of the event in question); Levin, Police Unions, supra
note 121, at 1340 n.29.
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that police culture is static and uniform but that it is often a barrier to
reform.139
The phenomenon of “de-policing” further illustrates how rank-andﬁle culture can stymie reforms. Economists Tanaya Devi and Roland Fryer
found that when state and federal investigations and consent decrees are
prompted by a “viral” incident of deadly force, they cause statistically
signiﬁcant increases in homicide and violent crime.140 They hypothesize
that when departments are investigated following a violent crime, police
respond with an abrupt decrease in policing activity.141 Some might infer
that law enforcement becomes less aggressive out of fear for their safety
when forced to operate under more constraints.142 But Devi and Fryer’s
ﬁnding—that consent decrees lead to decreases in violent crime and
homicide when they are not prompted by a viral incident—belies this
inference.143 A better framing is that when police are criticized by the public
they police, they close ranks and leave that public unprotected. In short, it
is democratic supervision that police culture ﬁnds particularly intolerable.
It follows that public outrage sufcient to overcome the political-will
problem may exacerbate the police-culture and police-union problems.
4. Endogenous Policy Tradeofs. — The structural obstacles thus far
addressed—lack of political will, police unions, and police culture—
ensure that ambitious reform proposals are unlikely to be implemented
and even less likely to succeed. Yet some reform proposals overcome these
obstacles to become policy. And some of these, on the margins, reduce
police violence.
That a policy is only marginally helpful is no reason to condemn it.
But many such policies will also have unintended consequences that
worsen the pathologies of policing. One must consider these tradeofs and
whether they can be mitigated. For those policies that can overcome
structural obstacles to reform, the costs may outweigh the meager beneﬁts.
Consider, for example, the costs of attempting to establish meaningful civilian oversight in Cincinnati. Like many cities, Cincinnati had a civil-

139. Cf. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 108, at 776–97 (proposing a minority unionism
model of police representation designed to give voice to alternative rank-and-ﬁle points of
view).
140. Tanaya Devi & Roland G. Fryer Jr., Policing the Police: The Impact of “Pattern-orPractice” Investigations on Crime 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27324,
2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27324 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
141. Id. at 2–7.
142. See Stephen Rushin & Grifn Edwards, De-Policing, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 721, 736–
37 (2017) (“Another derivation of the de-policing hypothesis alleges that the introduction
of externally mandated legal regulation causes police to be less aggressive, thereby
emboldening criminals and increasing crime.”); Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation,
supra note 85, at 1412–15 (“Perhaps the most common argument made by de-policing
advocates is that [structural reform litigation] will decrease police aggressiveness.”).
143. Devi & Fryer, supra note 140, at 4.
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ian oversight board that lacked the resources to conduct its own investigations and was notoriously inefective.144 A high-proﬁle shooting resulted in
a rare federal consent decree that required the establishment of the
Citizen Complaint Authority, designed to operate independently of the
police department.145 The contentious political context of this reform,
however, appears to have led police ofcers to decrease their policing of
violent crime, leading to a rise in homicide rates in poor neighborhoods
of color.146 In time, the consent decree expired and the Citizen Complaint
Authority became underfunded, ignored, and inefective.147
Perhaps, one might argue, the beneﬁcial efects of the consent decree
should be celebrated even if it increased violent crime. But there are
additional costs to establishing a toothless civilian oversight board that one
must consider. For example, the vast majority of major metropolitan
police forces have some type of civilian oversight body.148 Yet few such
organizations serve as robust accountability mechanisms for the police.149
According to a report sponsored by DOJ’s Ofce of Community Oriented
Policing Services (COPS), these oversight bodies have failed to foster
community trust in police departments.150 To be sure, it is theoretically
144. See Sharon Coolidge, Cincinnati’s Citizen Complaint Authority: The Director
Quit, It’s Underfunded & It’s Behind on Cases. Now What?, Cincinnati Enquirer (June 8,
2020), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2020/06/08/cincinnatis-police-oversightboard-short-stafed-behind-cases/5317932002 [https://perma.cc/7FYW-6XZU]; Stephen
Manning, Police Review Boards Not Always Efective, Associated Press (Aug. 19, 2001),
https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/206fbf2-da5d-47b1-9205-103d1bb8926d/?context=
1530671 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“Cincinnati . . . has a part-time board with
no investigators.”).
145. See Memorandum of Agreement Between the DOJ, the City of Cincinnati, Ohio &
the Cincinnati Police Dep’t ¶¶ 35–56 (Apr. 12, 2002), https://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/PN-OH-0006-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZMV3-WL5K]; Coolidge, supra
note 144; James Pilcher, Cincinnati Agency that Polices the Police Could Get More Funding,
WKRC (June 8, 2020), https://local12.com/news/local/cincinnati-citizens-complaintauthority-to-get-bigger-budget-more-investigators [https://perma.cc/6X483RG8] (discussing the history and structure of the agency).
146. See Devi & Fryer, supra note 140, at 18–19 (ﬁnding an increase in Cincinnati
homicide rates following the announcement of an investigation).
147. See Coolidge, supra note 144.
148. See Darrel W. Stephens, Ellen Scrivner & Josie F. Cambareri, Civilian Oversight of
the Police in Major Cities 27 (2018), https://www.majorcitieschiefs.com/pdf/news/civilian
_oversight_of_the_police_in_major_cities.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6KB-YLRN] (“Seventynine percent of the [Major Cities Chiefs Association] agencies that responded to our survey
indicated they have some type of civilian oversight body in their community.”).
149. Udi Ofer, Getting It Right: Building Efective Civilian Review Boards to Oversee
Police, 46 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1033, 1034 (2016) (“[G]overnmental agencies with the
jurisdiction to oversee police departments[,] . . . including . . . civilian review boards[,] . . .
have too often failed when it comes to overseeing police departments.”); Samuel Walker,
Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of Democracy, 2016 U. Chi.
Legal F. 615, 635 (explaining that structural weaknesses of civilian oversight boards permit
“only . . . very limited . . . citizen participation in policing”).
150. Stephens et al., supra note 148, at 27 (“The question for police is how to engage
the community in a way that helps close the gaps that exist between White community
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possible—and an aim of many activist movements—to implement robust
civilian oversight boards with sufcient authority to positively inﬂuence
law enforcement.151 But a weak civilian oversight board may be worse than
none.
Even when a reform builds community trust, the gains come at a cost.
For example, one of the most efective reform strategies is rooted in the
procedural justice work of scholars including Professors Tracey Meares
and Tom Tyler.152 This framework focuses on four factors grounding
public acceptance of authority as legitimate: (1) “participation”—whether
people can explain their situation to authorities; (2) “fairness”—whether
the decisionmaker is neutral, objective, consistent, and transparent; (3)
“treat[ment]”—whether legal authorities are rights-respecting and treat
people with dignity; and (4) “motivations”—whether legal authorities are
sincere and well intentioned.153 Accordingly, procedural justice reforms
focus on training police ofcers to act in ways that enhance public
perceptions of their legitimacy.154 There is growing evidence that such
training succeeds in reducing both civilian complaints and uses of force
against civilians.155
Critics have argued, however, that the procedural justice framework
may increase the efciency of policing as a technology of surveillance and
social control of poor communities of color, without reducing its harm.156
The result may be a vicious cycle of measured “success” justifying ever
higher investment in policing. Procedural justice is ultimately a theory of
compliance. By teaching techniques that increase compliance, this
members and racial minorities in conﬁdence and accountability . . . . The steps that have
been taken . . . have not had much efect on conﬁdence and perceptions of
accountability.”).
151. See Simonson, Power Lens, supra note 14, at 813–16 (documenting such eforts in
several cities, including Chicago, Los Angeles, Nashville, and Washington, D.C.).
152. See Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Diference Between Lawful or
Efective Policing and Rightful Policing—And Why It Matters, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1865,
1873–76 (2013) (deﬁning “rightful policing”).
153. See id.
154. See id.; Tracey L. Meares, The Path Forward: Improving the Dynamics of Police–
Community Relationships to Achieve Efective Law Enforcement Policies, 117 Colum. L.
Rev. 1355, 1362–63 (2017); Simonson, Power Lens, supra note 14, at 797–99 (citing seminal
procedural justice scholarship).
155. George Wood, Tom R. Tyler & Andrew V. Papachristos, Procedural Justice
Training Reduces Police Use of Force and Complaints Against Ofcers, 117 Proc. Nat’l
Acad. Scis. U.S. 9815, 9815 (2020).
156. See Bell, Legal Estrangement, supra note 67, at 2059–64 (“Deploying legitimacy
theory and procedural justice . . . might even imply . . . that the problem of policing is better
understood as a result of African American criminality than as a badge and incident of raceand class-based subjugation.”); Butler, The System, supra note 77, at 1467–68 (“The
problem with reform that is focused on improving perceptions about the police is that it
can cloak aggressive policing in enhanced legitimacy, and it has the potential to blunt the
momentum for rising up against overcriminalization, wealth inequality, and white
supremacy.”); McLeod, supra note 35, at 1644 (arguing that the procedural justice
approach focuses on a feeling of fairness rather than substantive justice).
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framework better enables police ofcers to dominate the people they
police. As Professor Eric Miller argues, such “good cop” tactics can subvert
constitutional rights.157 By pretending to value a civilian’s experience, an
ofcer can persuade the person to act against their own interests.158 By
pacifying those who are wrongfully policed, procedural justice techniques
can arguably make policing a more efective technique of racial
subordination.159
This tradeof problem extends to other evidence-based measures.
Thus, there is widespread national support for the use of body-worn
cameras as a tool of police accountability.160 But some activists and scholars
have cautioned against their uncritical embrace.161 First, the gains from
body-worn cameras appear to be lower than initially expected. Leave aside
the problem that body cameras are frequently turned of when police
ofcers engage in misconduct.162 Even when turned on, body cameras
have failed to result in police accountability.163 The recent killing of
George Floyd further suggests that body-worn cameras, when worn, may
not deter police misconduct. Balanced against these gains are signiﬁcant
costs. Perspective bias and “motivated cognition” may construct footage
taken from an ofcer’s viewpoint as proof the ofcer was justiﬁed in

157. Eric J. Miller, Encountering Resistance: Contesting Policing and Procedural
Justice, 2016 U. Chi. Legal F. 295, 344.
158. See id.
159. See Bell, Legal Estrangement, supra note 67, at 2061 (discussing how police reform
eforts focused on increasing compliance may reinforce racial subjugation).
160. See Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record
the Police, 104 Geo. L.J. 1559, 1565–66 (2016) [hereinafter Simonson, Beyond Body
Cameras] (noting the consensus and describing the wave of jurisdictions that required the
use of body cameras); Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 1363,
1366–67 (2018) (describing the policy consensus around body-worn cameras and assessing
their costs and beneﬁts).
161. See Akbar, Radical Imagination, supra note 35, at 465–66 (noting a concern of
advocates “that body cameras do not meaningfully address the power diferential between
police and the policed”); Marianne Kaba, Opinion, Police “Reforms” You Should Always
Oppose, Truthout (Dec. 7, 2014), https://truthout.org/articles/police-reforms-you-shouldalways-oppose [https://perma.cc/BG9S-LE35] [hereinafter Kaba, Police Reforms] (urging
resistance to any reforms that are “primarily technology focused”); Reformist Reforms vs.
Abolitionist Steps in Policing, Critical Resistance, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
59ead8f9692ebee25b72f17f/t/5b65cd58758d46d34254f22c/1533398363539/CR_NoCops
_reform_vs_abolition_CRside.pdf [https://perma.cc/JC42-VNWW] [hereinafter Reformist
Reforms] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (critiquing body-worn cameras).
162. See Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras, supra note 160, at 1567 (noting that a
failure to turn on “body-worn cameras may be commonplace in some police departments”).
163. See Akbar, Abolitionist Horizon, supra note 46, at 1810–11 (“A recent study was
unable to ﬁnd that body cameras had ‘any statistically signiﬁcant efects’ on ‘documented
uses of force and civilian complaints.’” (quoting David Yokum, Anita Ravishankar &
Alexander Coppock, Evaluating the Efects of Police Body-Worn Cameras: A Randomized
Controlled Trial 22 (2017), https://bwc.thelab.dc.gov/TheLabDC_MPD_BWC_Working_
Paper_10.20.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/57XG-NFH2])).
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harming a civilian.164 In addition, activists and scholars have noted that the
widespread use of body cameras serves to increase technological
surveillance of poor communities of color.165
Even police training—the lodestar of many popular reform
measures—may have lower gains and higher costs than often assumed.
With the exception of procedural justice training, it is questionable
whether many popular “reform” based trainings are efective on their own
terms.166 For example, in the wake of the Ferguson protests, many police
departments implemented diversity and implicit bias trainings—including
the Minneapolis Police Department, whose ofcers killed George Floyd.167
But there is mounting evidence that such trainings are inefective at
solving the problem of racialized police violence.168
Even when police training succeeds on its own terms, the costs may
be signiﬁcant. Abolitionist activists, for example, argue that the assumption that violence is caused by poor training obscures the violence
inherent in the police function of coercive social control. Professional development programs can exacerbate mission-creep by justifying assigning
additional functions to police.169 The supposed professionalism instilled
by police training can lead courts to overdelegate discretionary authority

164. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hofman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You
Going to Believe: Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev.
837, 838–41 (2009); Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras, supra note 160, at 1566; German
Lopez, The Failure of Police Body Cameras, Vox (July 21, 2017), https://www.vox.com/
policy-and-politics/2017/7/21/15983842/police-body-cameras-failures (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing the Philando Castile case).
165. See Kami N. Chavis, Body-Worn Cameras: Exploring the Unintentional
Consequences of Technological Advances and Ensuring a Role for Community
Consultation, 51 Wake Forest L. Rev. 985, 988 (2016); Mary Anne Franks, Democratic
Surveillance, 30 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 425, 476 (2017).
166. See supra notes 152–155 and accompanying text.
167. See DOJ, Civ. Rts. Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department
94–95 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/opa/press-releases/attachments
/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA5C-NU9G]
(recommending training on “recognizing and confronting implicit bias and cultural
responsiveness”); We Asked 155 Police Departments About Their Racial Bias Training.
Here’s What They Told Us., CBS News (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
racial-bias-training-de-escalation-training-policing-in-america (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting that sixty-nine percent of urban police departments have implicit bias
training, including Minneapolis).
168. See Patrick S. Forscher, Calvin K. Lai, Jordan R. Axt, Charles R. Ebersole, Michelle
Herman, Patricia G. Devine & Brian A. Nosek, A Meta-Analysis of Procedures to Change
Implicit Measures, 117 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 522, 522 (2019) (ﬁnding that implicit
bias trainings do not change explicit measures of behavior); Robert J. Smith, Reducing
Racially Disparate Policing Outcomes: Is Implicit Bias Training the Answer?, 37 U. Haw. L.
Rev. 295, 306 (2015) (explaining that implicit bias training is unlikely to reduce incidents
of lethal force).
169. See Reformist Reforms, supra note 161 (critiquing training reforms).
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to law enforcement and thereby distort constitutional doctrine.170 Thus,
training can increase the prestige of police and free them from oversight
without improving police behavior.
Finally, any police reform—no matter how efective—may help
entrench dysfunctional police bureaucracies by increasing their budgets.171 For example, since 1994, the DOJ’s COPS program has distributed
fourteen billion dollars to local police departments to advance “community policing” initiatives designed to “build[] trust and mutual respect
between police and communities.”172 In practice, however, communitypolicing initiatives have had little actual impact.173 Professor Rachel
Harmon has argued that many federal funding programs for local police
departments have resulted in more harmful policing practices,174 which
are often left unmeasured.175
This is not to suggest that no police reforms are worthwhile. For
example, all things considered, a police department that embraces procedural justice may be preferable to one that does not. And perhaps federal
grants to achieve it are worth the consequences of increasing those
departments’ budgets. Even when the costs are acceptable, however, the
obstacles to reform ensure they will be difcult to mitigate. Such marginal
improvements are unequal to the crisis in American policing.
C.

The Case for Disbanding

The foregoing analysis suggests the problem with incremental police
reforms is not their substance. Rather, it is the policing institutions they
seek to reform. These institutions help create the structural obstacles—
political deadlock, organized resistance, and cultural hostility—that block

170. Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 Harv. L. Rev.
1995, 2078 (2017); Anthony O’Rourke, Structural Overdelegation in Criminal Procedure,
103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 407, 410 (2013).
171. This concern is central to the abolitionist critique of police reform. See Kaba,
Police Reforms, supra note 161 (“Are the proposed reforms allocating more money to the
police? . . . Are the proposed reforms advocating for MORE police and policing . . . ? If yes,
then you should oppose them.”).
172. About the COPS Ofce, COPS, https://cops.usdoj.gov/aboutcops [https://
perma.cc/TP7M-QW8B] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021); see also Brian A. Reaves, DOJ, Bureau
of Just. Stat., NCJ 248677, Local Police Departments, 2013: Personnel, Policies, and Practices
8 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF3PMHT8] (examining the rise in mission statements with a community-policing component
between 2003 and 2013).
173. See Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Ofcers,
51 Wake Forest L. Rev. 611, 628–30 (2016) (noting that given “[t]he absence of a functional
deﬁnition of community policing[,] . . . failures of implementation are inevitable”).
174. See Harmon, Real Costs of Policing, supra note 85, at 892 (“[Some] federal
programs . . . encourage especially harmful policing practices, and they are not designed or
evaluated with attention to these harms.”).
175. See id. at 897–900.
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meaningful reforms. Any reform proposal that can overcome these obstacles is likely to do so by appealing to the vested interests of police unions
and police management in expanding the footprint of policing. The
problem is thus the political entrenchment of policing institutions. The
solution to such a problem is not to develop more creative reform
solutions. Instead, it is to disentrench the institutions by disbanding them.
Disbanding is not an end in itself, but a mechanism for achieving
other aims by removing the structural obstacles that frustrate them. To
begin, consider the advantages and limits of eliminating police unions.
Just as corporate reorganization can be used to terminate collective
bargaining agreements and weaken labor unions,176 disbanding can and
has been used to weaken police unions.177 By terminating collective
bargaining agreements, one can eliminate police unions as an obstacle to
reform. Many of the union safeguards that perpetuate rank-and-ﬁle
culture—including seniority rules and union leadership prerogatives—are
also eliminated.178 Merely eliminating police unions, however, is unlikely
to accomplish the goal of transforming rank-and-ﬁle culture, which is the
product of the institutional design of police departments themselves.179
Nor will eliminating police unions reshape other incentives that leave
politicians unwilling to engage in serious police reform.180
Yet disbanding police departments eliminates not only police unions
but also the institutional arrangements that give rise to a rank-and-ﬁle
police culture hostile to reform.181 Disbanding police departments can
also permit lawmakers to redesign law enforcement institutions in ways
that make them more accountable to elected ofcials and to the

176. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2018); Babette A. Ceccotti, Lost in Transformation: The
Disappearance of Labor Policies in Applying Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 15 Am.
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 415, 417 (2007) (“[T]he strategic use of bankruptcy . . . [can] bring
about broad changes to a business, . . . including the rejection of collective bargaining
agreements, the reduction or elimination of retiree health obligations and transactions to
downsize the business . . . or facilitate other operational changes to lower labor costs.”).
177. Joseph Goldstein & Kevin Armstrong, Could This City Hold the Key to the Future
of Policing in America?, N.Y. Times (July 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/12
/nyregion/camden-police.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing the
disbanding of the Camden Police Department as “a political power play meant to break the
police ofcers’ union”).
178. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 108, at 769 (“Today, statements and actions by
police unions and rank-and-ﬁle ofcers continue to lend support to the view that police
rank-and-ﬁle share a monolithic occupational mindset and subculture of paranoia,
insularity, and intolerance.”).
179. See Sklansky, Seeing Blue, supra note 133, at 28–30.
180. See Levin, Police Unions, supra note 121, at 1399–400 (“[A] critique of police
unions that isn’t coupled with a deeper critique of governance would do little to shift the
balance of power . . . .”).
181. See Sklansky, Seeing Blue, supra note 133, at 30–34 (discussing the relationship
between institutional design and rank-and-ﬁle police culture).
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communities they police.182 Moreover, by altering rank-and-ﬁle culture,
disbanding police departments could arguably reshape the political
preferences of a large and inﬂuential population of public sector workers.
Disbanding the police thus has the potential to eliminate structural
obstacles that currently shape law enforcement politics.
Disbanding is thus a tool that can be used to many diferent ends. By
attacking the structural obstacles to reform, disbanding the police could
facilitate reforms that are now politically unimaginable. For abolitionists,
the ultimate goal is to end policing as we know it and reinvest in alternative
regulatory frameworks with greater community control.183 But less radical
proposals to “defund the police” and invest in other services or community
development are also likely to involve disbanding departments to start
afresh. Thus, the Minneapolis city council’s proposed charter amendment
would have disbanded the city’s police force and established a
“Department of Community Safety and Violence Prevention” with a law
enforcement division under its control.184 More modestly, some scholars
and reformers have called for disaggregating the policing function, transferring many—–but not all—–responsibilities to social workers and other
actors.185 The city of Berkeley, for example, is considering a proposal to
shift responsibility for trafc enforcement from armed police ofcers to
unarmed city workers.186 Even some police leaders have voiced support for
narrowing the mission of police.187 Done to any meaningful degree,
however, the task of disaggregating the policing function may require
disbanding in order to eliminate surplus policing jobs and circumvent
union protections governing conditions of employment.188
182. See infra notes 274–280 and accompanying text (discussing reform-era eforts to
insulate police departments from political pressures).
183. See Kaba, Police Reforms, supra note 161; see also, e.g., MPD150, Enough is
Enough: A 150 Year Performance Review of the Minneapolis Police Department 25–31
(2017), https://www.mpd150.com/wp-content/themes/mpd150/assets/mpd150_report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8WXQ-EX7U] (presenting a comprehensive abolitionist agenda for
the Minneapolis Police Department).
184. See Searcey & Eligon, supra note 25; City Council Advances Proposed Ballot
Measure Asking Voters to Create a New Department of Community Safety and Violence
Prevention, City of Minneapolis (June 26, 2020), http://news.minneapolismn.
gov/2020/06/26/city-council-advances-proposed-ballot-measure-asking-voters-to-create-anew-department-of-community-safety-and-violence-prevention (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
185. See Friedman, Disaggregating, supra note 16 (manuscript at 62–63).
186. See AP, Berkeley Considers Removing Police from Trafc Enforcement, L.A.
Times (July 14, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-07-14/berkeleyconsiders-removing-police-from-trafc-enforcement (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
187. Brady Dennis, Mark Berman & Elahe Izadi, Dallas Police Chief Says ‘We’re Asking
Cops to Do Too Much in This Country’, Wash. Post (July 11, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/07/11/grief-and-anger-continue-after-dallas-attacks
-and-police-shootings-as-debate-rages-over-policing (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
188. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 108, at 716–20 (noting that police unions, as
currently constituted, represent a signiﬁcant barrier to the implementation of reform).
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Disbanding can also be a tool for reforms that progressives will ﬁnd
politically objectionable. By destabilizing current political coalitions,
disbanding police forces will make law enforcement politics more hotly
contested, including by those who favor punitive policies.189 In 2011, for
example, the Camden Police Department was disbanded under
Republican Governor Chris Christie, and control over policing in the
majority-minority city was ceded to the majority-white county.190 As this
example shows, disbanding can also be a tool for politicians hostile to organized labor. Given the antistatist dimensions of the project, one can expect
new political constituencies calling to disband police departments.191 The
uncertain politics of disbanding are certainly cause for caution. Given the
severity and entrenchment of America’s policing pathologies, however,
disbanding may be worth these risks.
Of course, any proposal to disband the police must grapple with the
very political obstacles that frustrate incremental police reforms. The key
diference, however, is that incremental police reforms require continued
political support to remain intact and efective. When that political support wanes, the reform will fall by the wayside, while the concessions made
to achieve it may persist.192 For example, some recent scholarship argues
for the creation of democratically accountable police rulemaking in order
to strengthen public control over police departments.193 But these scholars
also recognize that there are serious public choice obstacles to the sort of
legislation necessary to achieve this goal. Even if these obstacles are overcome, police agencies will require sustained, external political or regulatory pressure if they are to meaningfully comply with public rulemaking
requirements.194 Yet, like a civilian complaint agency imposed after a
consent decree, any institutions providing such external oversight are
vulnerable to neglect once political support for reform wanes.195 By contrast, disbanding advocates could take advantage of a temporary change in
189. See Rappaport, supra note 82, at 714 (explaining that the general consensus
among scholars is that “reformers must curb the inﬂuence of bureaucrats and redirect
power to local communities”).
190. Goldstein & Armstrong, supra note 177.
191. See, e.g., Harry Bruinius, Why Libertarians Are Joining BLM Calls to Defund
Police, Christian Sci. Monitor (July 16, 2020), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/
2020/0716/Why-libertarians-are-joining-BLM-calls-to-defund-police [https://perma.cc/K
H6Y-UAQP] (reporting that a self-described “hardcore libertarian” Republican candidate
for the New Hampshire state senate is running on the platform of defunding the police).
192. See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.
193. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 14, at 1879–81 (“[O]pening
rulemaking to local community participation will bring voices into the process that may have
had no outlet thus far.”); Slobogin, supra note 31, at 134–37 (discussing the application of
administrative law principles, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, to police agencies).
In a subsequent article, Professor Maria Ponomarenko addresses the considerable limits of
such an approach, both in terms of feasibility and likely efectiveness. See Maria
Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking, 114 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 15–20 (2019).
194. Ponomarenko, supra note 193, at 15–44.
195. See supra notes 144–147 and accompanying text.
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the policy equilibrium to push for reforms that could permanently change
the institutional landscape for political contestation over policing.196
Yet even if disbanding had broad support, legal impediments would
make it very difcult. Disbanding requires political wins at several diferent
levels of government. And jurisdictional overlap means the dissolution of
one police force may shift authority to other entrenched law enforcement
institutions. This Essay takes up these questions in Part II. For now, it
sufces to say that a strategy of disbanding police forces is no less realistic
than the hope of achieving incremental reforms adequate to cure the
pathologies of American policing, and its beneﬁts are more sustainable
over time.
II. THE LAW OF RESTRUCTURING POLICING
Ending pathological law enforcement practices may require the
wholesale restructuring of law enforcement agencies by means of disbanding. But as this Part explains, the political obstacles to reform are
compounded by legal obstacles to restructuring. We make three claims.
First, the entrenchment of local law enforcement practices is due in part
to the structural entrenchment of local law enforcement agencies. Second,
this structural entrenchment results from legally encoding the outcomes
of protracted political battles between state and local governments. In
presenting these claims, we separately examine the distinct development
and legal structure of police departments and sherifs’ ofces, showing
how both have become similarly entrenched. Distinguishing municipal
police and county sherifs also lays the foundations for our third claim:
that prospects for radical reforms are limited by institutional relationships
among police departments and sherifs’ ofces, and cities and counties.
Overall, the legal structure of local law enforcement agencies proliferates
decisionmakers who can veto structural reform while empowering these
agencies at the expense of the local residents who they are meant to
protect and to serve.
A.

Police Departments

The laws governing the organization and operations of local police
departments confound popular perceptions of police forces as creatures
and instruments of city governments. In reality, local leaders often lack
legal authority to disband or restructure their police departments. Here,
we outline the multiple sources of law deﬁning the modern police department and show how this complexity impedes structural reform. We then

196. See generally Frank R. Baumgartner & Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in
American Politics 10 (2d ed. 2009) (setting forth a “punctuated equilibria” theory of policy
change by which “long periods of relative stability or incrementalism” are “interrupted by
short bursts of dramatic change” that “alter forever the prevailing arrangements in a policy
system”).
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show that the difculty of structural reform arose by design, as a result of
strategic choices by earlier reformers to lock in their reforms.
1. Law. — The vast majority of police departments in the United
States are political subdivisions of city governments. But the legal sources
that underlie their structure and organization include a mix of city ordinances, municipal charters, state law, and state constitutional provisions.
These myriad laws at multiple levels limit the authority over police departments of not only local ofcials but also the state. These limits may prevent
disbanding or require that any replacement replicate its predecessor. At
the very least, they reveal that the disbanding of police agencies cannot be
accomplished through unilateral, uncoordinated action at the state or
local level.
Limits on municipal authority can be found at both state and local
levels. Municipal charters are important local impediments.197 Most
municipal police departments are established pursuant to a charter provision.198 Chapter 18 of the New York City charter, for example, not only
speciﬁes the existence of a police department199 but also deﬁnes its
leadership structure200 along with its duties and responsibilities, from
keeping the peace and removing nuisances to “suppressing riots, mobs
and insurrections” and inspecting businesses and places of amusement.201
The Minneapolis City charter contains a similar requirement that the city
council “must establish, organize, and otherwise provide for . . . a police
department,”202 and requires the city to hire at least seventeen departmental employees for every 10,000 residents.203
Depending on how the charter language is worded and the kind of
restructuring that is being pursued, city ofcials may be able to argue that
disbanding and replacing the existing police department satisfy their charter duty to establish a police department. Yet given the detailed deﬁnition
of the responsibilities of the police in most charters, it is more likely that
197. See Nat’l Mun. League, Model City Charter § 4.01 cmt. (6th ed. 1964) (explaining
that typical city charters will include a provision for a police force); Nestor Davidson, Local
Constitutions, 100 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1–5), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3461745 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“[C]harters can grant local
governments powers and immunities from oversight not shared by non-charter
municipalities . . . . [They] structure public institutions and allocate authority within local
governments as well as between municipalities and their residents.”).
198. See Nat’l Mun. League, supra note 197, § 45:9 (“The ofce of police ofcer or
police patrol ofcer was unknown at common law, and wherever such ofce or place exists
it is the creation of statute or municipal charter or ordinance.”).
199. See N.Y.C., N.Y., Charter § 431 (2021) (“There shall be a police department the
head of which shall be the police commissioner who shall be appointed by the mayor and
shall, unless sooner removed, hold ofce for a term of ﬁve years.”).
200. See id. §§ 431–432 (specifying, among other things, that there is to be one police
commissioner and seven deputies).
201. See id. § 435(a).
202. See Minneapolis, Minn., Charter § 7.2(a)(11) (2021).
203. See id. § 7.3(c).
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radical reforms will require a charter amendment. Such charter amendments are far more difcult to adopt than mayoral orders or city
ordinances.204 Moreover, because municipal charters are granted to cities
by the state, state law usually deﬁnes the process for amending charters
and sometimes sets substantive limits.205 Cities can sometimes initiate the
amendment process themselves, either through the city council, a citizen’s
petition, or the establishment of a charter reform commission.206 In most
such cases, a ﬁnal referendum vote by the residents of the city is also
required before the amendments can be made.207 And, as the recent
developments in Minneapolis illustrate, unelected charter commissions
can thwart the will of elected city ofcials to put charter amendments to a
referendum.208 In the ﬁve states where cities are not authorized to adopt
charters, their structure and power is deﬁned entirely by state law that can
only be amended by the state.209 Moreover, in nearly all states, municipal
charter provisions must comply with applicable state law.210
This brings us then to the second way in which local authority over
police disbanding and reform is limited: provisions of state law. Despite
their legal status as municipal subdivisions, many police departments were
originally created by state law. Moreover, some police departments are
entirely controlled by the state. The Kansas City Police Department is one
such example,211 and the city of St. Louis only regained control of its police
department from the state in 2012.212 Even in the majority of states where
police departments are municipal subdivisions, however, state laws
proliferate with respect to policing. In some cases, these state laws may
prevent cities from making the charter reforms necessary to disband their
204. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 410.12 (2019) (outlining the process required to amend a
city charter). For more information on amending city charters, see 2A Eugene McQuillin,
A Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations § 9:26 (3d ed. 2005).
205. See Minn. Stat. § 410.12. In many states, municipalities can only adopt charters that
organize their city in accordance to a speciﬁc menu of possible models (e.g., council-mayor,
council-manager, etc.). See 2A McQuillin, supra note 204, § 9:7.
206. See 2A McQuillin, supra note 204, § 9:29 (discussing various states’ procedures for
direct amendment of city charters); see also Davidson, supra note 197 (manuscript at 15–
16).
207. See Davidson, supra note 197 (manuscript at 13).
208. See Herndon, supra note 27.
209. See Davidson, supra note 197 (manuscript at 13).
210. See id. (manuscript at 45–46); see also Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U.
L. Rev. 1113, 1124–-27 (2007). Some states exempt municipal charters from state
preemption in matters of “municipal afairs.” See, e.g., Traders Sports, Inc. v. City of San
Leandro, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 683 (1st Dist. 2001).
211. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 84.350 (West 2020) (establishing the board of police
commissioners for Kansas City and any other city with a population between 300,000 and
700,000 people); id. § 84.360 (“The governor of the state of Missouri, by and with the
consent of the senate, shall appoint the four commissioners provided for in section
84.350 . . . .”).
212. See id § 84.010 (establishing the St. Louis police force, repealed by an initiative
petition in 2012).
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police departments entirely. In others, they may allow disbanding but limit
what cities can put in their place.
State laws on policing vary from state to state. But they have become
increasingly common, and many were enacted at the request of police
unions in order to circumvent local laws.213 State laws regulate the
recruitment, compensation, promotion, and ﬁring of police ofcers—
from civil service and pension requirements to mandated disciplinary
procedures and bans on municipal residency requirements.214 State laws
also govern the relationship between police departments and local
residents.215 Some states limit the power of civilian review boards.216 And
most states immunize police ofcers against state legal liability—
sometimes more completely than they immunize cities themselves, while
requiring cities to indemnify ofcers against federal civil rights liability.217
Increasingly, states pass laws requiring police departments to assume
speciﬁc duties and responsibilities. Many states now require police ofcers
to be present at all schools irrespective of the judgment of local school
boards.218 Local “sanctuary” policies limiting police involvement in federal
immigration enforcement have provoked “anti-sanctuary” legislation
mandating their participation.219
It is still too early to tell whether state laws on policing apply only to
existing police departments or also require municipalities to have police
departments. But even if disbanding is allowed, such laws place signiﬁcant
constraints on the kinds of alternative policing models a city might
implement. More importantly, the prevalence of state laws on policing
suggests that radical reform eforts at the local level may be subject to state
preemption. After all, we are currently in an era of expanding and
213. See, e.g., Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 111, at 1216 n.119 (listing
examples of police union-initiated state legislation); Mike Riggs, Why Firing a Bad Cop Is
Damn Near Impossible, Reason (Oct. 19, 2012), https://reason.com/2012/10/19/howspecial-rights-for-law-enforcement-m (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on
police unions lobbying state legislatures to pass “law enforcement bill of rights”).
214. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-147 (West 2020) (regulating procedures and
causes for dismissal of a police ofcer); id. § 40A:14-122.1 (prohibiting municipalities from
imposing residency requirements on ofcers for hiring or promotions).
215. See H.B. 771, 2015 Leg., 435th Sess. (Md. 2015) (requiring the city of Baltimore
police department to engage in various “community policing” practices).
216. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 112.532 (2020) (deﬁning the rights of police ofcers under
investigation and placing limits on permissible methods of investigation); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 590.653 (allowing for the creation of civilian review boards, while limiting what types of
evidence they can consider). For an example of how state law can quash the powers of
civilian review boards, see D’Agastino v. City of Miami, 220 So. 3d 410, 427–28 (Fla. 2017).
217. See, e.g., Gaca v. City of Chicago, 103 N.E.2d 617, 619 (Ill. 1952) (upholding a state
law requiring the indemniﬁcation of police ofcers in cities over 500,000 people). The law
is still in force. 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1-4-6 (West 2020).
218. See, e.g., S.B. 8. 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2020) (requiring schools to have an
armed police ofcer present).
219. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Rick Su & Rose Cuison Villazor, Anti-Sanctuary and
Immigration Localism, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 837, 848–50 (2019).
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escalating state preemption of local authority, due in large part to growing
partisan splits between cities and states and the willingness of cities to
tackle controversial policy issues.220 Many state laws on policing were
enacted as eforts to preempt local policies, such as residency requirements and civilian review boards.221 In response to local disband-andreform eforts, states might preempt such eforts entirely. They might pass
laws reinstituting police departments that have been disbanded or reconstituting them as agencies of the state. In fact, even the threat of state
preemption may chill action by cautious city ofcials.
All of this might suggest that radical-reform advocates should turn
their attention away from local leaders and instead focus on the state.
Cities, after all, are creatures of the state.222 They draw their legal authority
from state delegations.223 Indeed, it is ordinarily understood that just as
states are empowered to create cities as legal entities, they are also
empowered to dissolve them as they see ﬁt.224 This is not to say that
convincing a state legislature to pursue disband or reform eforts would be
easy. Nonetheless, if states are entitled to dissolve cities, certainly they have
the power to disband their police departments. And this would not be the
ﬁrst time that states have pursued this route. The nineteenth century saw
many municipal police departments disbanded by state legislature, with
state-run police forces instituted in their place.225

220. See generally Richard Brifault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 Stan. L.
Rev. 1995, 1997 (2018) [hereinafter Brifault, The Challenge] (“[T]he real action today is
the new preemption: sweeping state laws that clearly, intentionally, extensively, and at times
punitively bar local eforts to address a host of local problems.”); Richard C. Schragger, The
Attack on American Cities, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 1163, 1165 (2018) (arguing that in passing broad
preemptive state legislation, “state legislatures have been motivated by hostility to local
regulation”).
221. See, e.g., D’Agastino, 220 So.3d at 425-27 (recognizing that Florida’s Police Bill of
Rights prohibits civilian review boards from imposing disciplinary actions and holding that
this law also preempts such boards from issuing subpoenas to compel police ofcers to
testify for investigative purposes); Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. v. City of Rochester,
No. E2019008543, 2020 WL 8028606, at *18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 7, 2020) (holding that state
law prohibits the Rochester Police Accountability Board from conducting hearings or
disciplining police ofcers); Brifault, The Challenge, supra note 220, at 2006–07 (detailing
a case where the Arizona state government challenged a local ordinance, which regulated
police disposal of seized ﬁrearms, as preempted by state law); Will Cushman, Many Police
Ofcers in Wisconsin Live Outside the Cities Where They Serve, WisContext (July 9, 2020),
https://www.wiscontext.org/many-police-ofcers-wisconsin-live-outside-cities-where-theyserve (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that many states have moved away
from residency requirements and noting that recent Wisconsin state legislation preempts
local governments’ ability to impose such a requirement).
222. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (“Municipal
corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for
exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be intrusted to them.”).
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See infra notes 248–254 and accompanying text.
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But despite this history, it is not clear all states are similarly
empowered today because a majority of states have adopted constitutional
provisions limiting their ability to intervene in local afairs—especially with
respect to the structure and organization of local governments.226
Some relate to the ability of states to target a single or small subset of
cities through state law. Often referred to as bans on “special legislation,”
these provisions are intended to limit state legislatures to laws applicable
throughout the state.227 Nearly every state has adopted such a prohibition
into their state constitutions.228 These provisions limit the ability of the
state to disband police departments in a speciﬁc city, although disbanding
across the state may be possible. Moreover, courts in many states have
allowed the state to circumvent the ban on special legislation by passing
“general” laws that apply to “classes” that include only one or two cities.
For example, Missouri took over police departments in Kansas City and St.
Louis by passing a law applicable to cities with populations over 500,000.229
Similarly, St. Louis regained control of its police department in 2012 by a
law afecting only “cit[ies] not within a county.”230 Nonetheless, other
states have more rigorously enforced bans on special legislation.231
Other constitutional provisions protecting municipal governments
from state interference were adopted in response to the home-rule
movement at the turn of the twentieth century.232 In some states, these
protections are set forth in the constitution.233 In other states, such as
Ohio, state courts have interpreted constitutional provisions granting local
226. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1115–17
(1980) (noting that while a number of constitutional measures were taken to protect the
autonomy of local governments, they have not been very successful); Kenneth E.
Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 Wm. & M L. Rev. 269, 273–
74, 277–78 (1968) (listing states that have some form of home rule).
227. City of Asheville v. State, 665 S.E.2d 103, 121–22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (describing
the contours of North Carolina’s constitutional ban on special or local laws).
228. See Richard Brifault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1990) [hereinafter Brifault, Our Localism] (remarking that,
after the Civil War, a wave of state constitutional revisions prohibiting the enactment of
special legislation took place); Frug, supra note 226, at 1116 (“One of the most common
constitutional amendments was a restriction on state power that gave a state authority to
pass only ‘general’ and not ‘special’ or local legislation.”).
229. See Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 82.470–82.817 (West 2020) (statutes applying to cities over
500,000 people); id. §§ 86.010–86.193 (statutes governing police departments and
personnel in cities over 500,000).
230. Id. § 84.344.
231. See, e.g., State ex rel. Knisely v. Jones, 64 N.E. 424, 425 (Ohio 1902) (striking down
an Ohio act as special legislation); James F. Richardson, Urban Police in the United States
45 (1974) (detailing the intense dispute whereby an Ohio mayor sought a court-enforced
invalidation of the special laws at issue); cf. City of Asheville v. State, 794 S.E.2d 759, 772–73
(N.C. 2016) (rejecting state takeover of municipal waterworks as special legislation).
232. See Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Citizenship in a Global Age 78–82 (2020); David J.
Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2255, 2292 (2003).
233. See, e.g., Mo. Const. art. VI, § 22.
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control over “matters of local self-government” to prohibit the state from
regulating the “internal government of a municipality, such as . . . the powers, duties, and functions of . . . municipal ofcers.”234 As a result, Ohio's
Supreme Court struck down eforts by the state's legislature to regulate
how a city selects its police chief235 and repeatedly explained that “[t]he
organization and regulation of its police force . . . are within a municipality’s powers of local self-government.”236
This is not to say that states cannot overcome these limitations. Bans
on special legislation may limit or prevent state laws that target a speciﬁc
police department for disbanding, but some states allow the legislature to
overcome that ban if there is a compelling state interest and a reasonable
ground for treating a locality diferently than others.237 Structural homerule protections have been used in states like Ohio to resist state eforts to
micromanage personnel matters with respect to policing238 but might
perhaps apply diferently to wholesale restructuring of law enforcement
responsibilities. More importantly, while the vast majority of states have
adopted bans on special legislation and home rule,239 only a few state
courts have considered the efect of these limits on state eforts to
restructure municipal police departments. Thus, even if some states can
circumvent special legislation and home rule concerns to disband and
reform municipal police departments, it is not clear they can do so
unilaterally.
In short, when it comes to municipal police, disband-and-reform
eforts will likely require coordination at both the state and local levels.
Legal limitations on both state and local actors mean that neither are likely
to be able to implement such reforms unilaterally, even less so in the face
of active resistance at either level. Even with cooperation and coordination, reformers may need to navigate a number of diferent legal processes, from charter reforms to constitutional amendments. All of this is to
say that radically restructuring a police agency is procedurally complex.

234. See, e.g., Lorain St. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 148 N.E. 577, 580 (Ohio 1925)
(Marshall, C.J., concurring).
235. State ex rel. Lynch v. City of Cleveland, 132 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ohio 1956) (holding
that a city is not subject to state law in how it selects its police chief).
236. Harsney v. Allen, 113 N.E.2d 86, 88 (Ohio 1953).
237. See, e.g., Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 814 N.E.2d 216, 225–26 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004); Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 581 S.E.2d 415, 425 (N.C. 2003).
238. See supra notes 234–236; see also Springﬁeld Command Ofcers Ass’n v. City
Comm’n for Springﬁeld, 575 N.E.2d 499, 501–03 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a city
charter prevailed over a state law governing the promotion of police ofcers).
239. See, e.g., Dale Krane, Platon N. Rigos & Melvin B. Hill Jr., Home Rule in America:
A Fifty-State Handbook 14 (2001) (noting that home rule was adopted in forty-ﬁve states,
though quite limited in some); Lyman H. Cloe & Sumner Marcus, Special and Local
Legislation, 24 Ky. L.J. 351, 351 (1936) (“With the exception of four New England States
the constitutions of all others contain restrictions upon local and special legislation.”
(footnote omitted)).
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These legal obstacles may help explain why police reform eforts for most
of the twentieth century have been less radical.
2. History. — The preceding section identiﬁes obstacles to disbanding local police agencies resulting from their entrenchment by state and
local law. But how did we get to the point where a municipal department
is so insulated from structural reform? No comparable constraints limit
the power of Congress over administrative agencies, including those
involved with federal law enforcement.240 Nor are state departments insulated to the same extent.241
To understand the peculiar nature of police departments then, we
must delve into the history of their formation and reformation. This
history reveals that policing and police departments have been mired in
state–local conﬂicts from the start.242 These conﬂicts were also part of
broader struggles over control of cities—not only when cities lost their
legal independence in the nineteenth century and became “creatures of
the state” but also when they regained some of that autonomy as a result
of the home-rule movement. Moreover, because both states and localities
sought to entrench their respective gains, each reform made further
reform harder.
The origins of local police departments were not entirely local. Few
were actually created entirely by the cities themselves. In some cities, police
departments were formed only after authorization by the state.243 The
nation’s ﬁrst police department was established in Boston, after state
authorization in 1838. 244 In others, the city police department replaced
police forces that had already been established by the state. Pennsylvania
created a county-wide police force that served Philadelphia and its
surrounding communities in 1850 before creating the Philadelphia police
240. For example, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security meant the
abolition of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107–296, § 471(a), 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (codiﬁed as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 291
(2018)).
241. See, e.g., Suermann v. Hadley, 193 A. 645, 658 (Pa. 1937) (“The Legislature may
abolish or reorganize municipal or other agencies of government, whether they be cities,
boards, or commissions, and the reorganization may be such as to require an efective
abolishment of ofces . . . .”).
242. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532, 534–35 (1857) (challenging
a state law that replaced the New York City municipal police with a state-run police
department); David R. Johnson, Policing the Urban Underworld: The Impact of Crime on
the Development of the American Police, 1800–1887, at 25–34 (1979) (illustrating the
conﬂict between Philadelphia and the Pennsylvania legislature over how the city should be
policed).
243. Mayor of Balt. v. State ex rel. Bd. of Police of Balt., 15 Md. 376, 376 (1860)
(upholding the constitutionality of the law creating the Baltimore City Police Department).
244. Edward H. Savage, A Chronological History of the Boston Watch and Police, from
1631 to 1865, at 77–78 (2d ed. 1865); Olivia B. Waxman, How the U.S. Got Its Police Force,
Time (May 18, 2017), https://time.com/4779112/police-history-origins [https://perma.cc
/8EFR-YJB9] (“The ﬁrst publicly funded, organized police force with ofcers on duty fulltime was created in Boston in 1838.”).
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department in 1854.245 Some police departments were created entirely by
state law. New York City had been debating the creation of a police
department for a number of years when the state legislature imposed one
in 1844, over resistance by the city.246 Five years later the NYPD would be
added to the city’s charter.247
It was not clear in the nineteenth century that municipal police
departments would remain municipal. Indeed, the earliest instances of
police disbanding in America were at the hands of the state and in many
cases only a few years after the police departments were ﬁrst established.
State legislatures abolished the Baltimore police department in 1860248
and the St. Louis and Chicago police departments in 1861.249 In each case,
the disbanding was followed by the creation of a new police force,
sometimes serving a larger jurisdiction than the city, but in all cases under
the direct control of the state.250 The mold for this kind of radical restructuring was cast by the ﬁrst of such disbanding, which took place in New
York.251 A little more than a decade after the NYPD was established, the
state legislature passed a law disbanding it in 1857, replacing it with the
Metropolitan Police Department with jurisdiction over not only New York
City but also surrounding areas in Kings, Westchester, and Richmond
counties.252 It was put under the control of a new board of commissioners
whose membership was composed entirely of gubernatorial appointees.253
This time, the opposition by the city was not just political. The NYPD not
only refused to disband but also violently clashed with the newly formed
Metropolitan Police.254
The reasons behind this early turmoil over policing were both partisan and ethnic. Urbanization gave rise to partisan divisions between state
245. Johnson, supra note 242, at 34–35; Joseph F. Spillane & David B. Wolcott, A History
of Modern American Criminal Justice 13 (2013).
246. See Johnson, supra note 242, at 26; George J. Lankevich, American Metropolis: A
History of New York City 84 (1998).
247. Wood, 15 N.Y. at 534–35.
248. Mayor of Balt., 15 Md. at 454–55; Johnson v. Mayor of Balt., 161 A.3d 95, 101 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2017) (“When the Democrats won control of the state legislature in the 1859
elections, the ﬁrst order of business was to seize state control of the Baltimore Police
Department . . . . The Court of Appeals afrmed the constitutionality of this State takeover . . . .”).
249. See Smith v. State, 152 S.W.3d 275, 278 (Mo. 2005) (“[T]he general assembly has
expressly prohibited the City of St. Louis and its ofcials from presuming to exercise
authority or control over . . . the Police Department.”); Sam Mitrani, The Rise of the
Chicago Police Department: Class and Conﬂict, 1850–1894, at 48–51 (2013) (“The bill
establishing the Chicago Police Board removed control of the force from elected municipal
ofcials and put it in the hands of the governor and an appointed group of experts.”).
250. See supra notes 247–249 and accompanying text.
251. See Wood, 15 N.Y. at 535; Lankevich, supra note 246, at 101.
252. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
254. See Eric H. Monkkonen, Police in Urban America, 1860–1920, at 42–43 (1981);
Richardson, supra note 231, at 39.
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and city governments.255 These partisan divides were exacerbated by
ethnic divisions: While the composition of state governments was largely
American-born and Protestant, city ofcials were increasingly those who
were elected by Catholic immigrants.256 From this perspective, state
reformers believed municipal police departments were too accommodating to immigrant lifestyles and had become corrupt patronage operations
for urban political machines.257 For urban residents, however, ward control of police precincts meant that the police were often seen as representatives of their neighborhood, and for many immigrant newcomers, police
service ofered an economic steppingstone into the middle class.258
Attendant to these conﬂicts, both parties disbanded city forces.259 In New
Jersey, for example, a Democratic-controlled legislature took over the
Republican-controlled Newark police department.260 When Republicans
gained control of the state legislature in 1871, they responded by taking
over the Democratic-controlled police department in Jersey City.261
These partisan and ethnic conﬂicts over policing spilled over into
broader jurisprudential battles over the legal identity of the American city.
Indeed, the emergence of the municipal police department coincided
with a pivotal period in the legal development of cities. During the midnineteenth century, the legal status of cities transitioned from corporations to political subdivisions of the state.262 Then, during the late
nineteenth century, the home-rule movement led many states to reestablish some of the independent authority of cities and limit the state’s role
in municipal afairs.263 Both of these developments played an important
role in the legal construction of the modern city. They are also both
intertwined with policing.264
255. Johnson, supra note 242, at 22, 26 (noting that rising racial and religious tensions
led to mob violence against minorities).
256. See David R. Berman, Local Government and the States: Autonomy, Politics and
Policy 44–45 (2d ed. 2020); Robert M. Fogelson, Big-City Police 41–45 (1977).
257. See Berman, supra note 256, at 45–47 (“[R]eformers . . . identiﬁed with the local
branches of the major political parties—the ‘machines’ headed by ‘party bosses’ that, with
the help of immigrant voters, ﬂourished in many cities.”); Fogelson, supra note 256, at 43,
91; Johnson, supra note 242, at 22–26 (outlining a New York state investigation, motivated
by political battling between the state and city, which revealed corruption and widespread
power wielded by the city alderman).
258. See Fogelson, supra note 256, at 90.
259. See Berman, supra note 256, at 46–47 (noting that where there was a partisan split
between state and city governments, “state lawmakers commonly set out to destroy the local
party organizations[,] . . . often br[inging] direct action against cities where the wrong party
was in control”).
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 52–53 (describing the rise of Dillon’s rule and the “state creature”
doctrine).
263. See id. at 50–52.
264. See id. at 47–48 (discussing state eforts to take over police departments and the
motivation for such takeovers).
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Litigation over the various state takeovers of municipal police
departments played a central role in establishing cities as mere “creatures
of the state.” As Professor Hendrick Hartog argues, the decision by the
New York Court of Appeals in Wood v. Draper—which upheld the
replacement of the NYPD with the Metropolitan police—“inaugurated a
new period in the institutional history of the city.”265 Prior to that, it was
widely assumed that the legislation afecting New York City should be
passed with the city’s consent.266 But when the court upheld not only the
state’s disbanding of the NYPD but also the appropriation of the city’s real
property and funds to support the operations of the Metropolitan Police,
any semblance of municipal autonomy from state dominance evaporated.267 Similarly in Missouri, the state supreme court made clear that
“protection of life, liberty, and property, and the preservation of the public
peace and order” is a governmental power possessed solely by the state,
and which the state can choose to delegate or revoke as it sees ﬁt.268
Moreover, this includes the power to compel cities and counties to provide
funding demanded by the state-controlled Metropolitan Police.269
On the other hand, these takeovers fueled the home-rule movement.270 To be sure, it was not initially clear that home rule would cover
policing. Missouri, the ﬁrst state to adopt a home-rule provision, speciﬁcally exempted the power to establish a police force.271 But in the states
that followed, police takeovers in the mid-nineteenth century motivated
states to amend their constitutions to prohibit special legislation and the
transfer of municipal functions to state-controlled commissions.272 Furthermore, the emphasis of home rule advocates on the power of cities to
frame charters was spurred in large part by states using their power to
preempt city charters for the purpose of disbanding municipal police
departments.273 If these limitations now impede state eforts to disband
municipal police departments unilaterally, this history shows that this
result was intended.
265. Hendrik Hartog, Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the City
of New York in American Law 1730–1870, at 238 (1983).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. State ex rel. Hawes v. Mason, 54 S.W. 524, 529 (Mo. 1899).
269. See id.; State ex rel. Police Comm’rs of St. Louis v. Cnty. Ct. of St. Louis Cnty., 34
Mo. 546, 570–71 (1864); see also State ex rel. Campbell v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs of St. Louis,
88 Mo. 144, 145 (1885) (holding that the Board of Commissioners could not remove the
chief of police without cause, as this would “thwart the clearly expressed intent of the
general assembly”).
270. See Berman, supra note 256, at 49–52.
271. See Mo. Const. art. IV, § 53 (1875); Berman, supra note 256, at 52.
272. See, e.g., Brifault, Our Localism, supra note 228, at 9 & n.17.
273. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 231, at 45 (describing how home rule advocates
in Ohio overturned a state law dictating the governing structure of police and other public
safety departments, and pushed through a constitutional amendment that enabled cities to
adopt their own governing structure through municipal charters).
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The legal entrenchment of these outcomes set the template for
subsequent reforms. Thus, when the progressive reformers of the early
twentieth century turned their attention to policing, they codiﬁed their
gains in ways that made subsequent reforms harder to implement.
Following in the footsteps of the home-rule movement, progressive
reformers did not seek to reenact the state takeovers of the nineteenth
century.274 Yet, motivated by the same concerns, they turned to charter
amendments to insulate police departments from local political inﬂuence,
especially the ward leaders that controlled at the precinct level.275 They
also turned to state law to ensure that police ofcials were not drawn from
the immigrant neighborhoods that they were charged with patrolling.276
As reﬂected in the Wickersham Commission’s Report, these reformers
believed that the “chief evil” of local law enforcement was the public’s
desire to control the police.277 Control of police departments thus was
stripped from multimember boards and turned over to a single chief or
commissioner under the direct control of the mayor, elected by the city as
a whole.278 Precinct lines were redrawn so that they were no longer
conterminous with ward districts.279 State laws on policing also
proliferated, with the implementation of civil service requirements,
mandated city-funded pensions, and later, the elimination of municipal
residency requirements.280
The policing reforms of the Progressive Era contributed to today’s
policing pathologies: the lack of local political accountability, the demographic disparities between police and the populations they patrol, and
the outsized inﬂuence of police unions. But progressive reforms also
shaped the legal structure that entrenches those pathologies. To expand
the inﬂuence of at-large city ofcials over ward representatives, progressive
reformers restructured the accountability of police departments through
the city charter. To exclude local leaders from stafng decisions, progressive reformers passed state laws on hiring, promotion, and termination of
police ofcers. At the same time, progressive reformers were suspicious of
the state as well, and rejected total state or national control. What emerged
was a legal structure that broadly distributed the power to veto reform.
This empowered police departments, a result that aligned with the progressive reformers’ identiﬁcation of a professional and apolitical police
274. See Fogelson, supra note 256, at 91–94.
275. See id. at 42.
276. See id. at 91–94 (noting that reformers, hostile to “immigrant life-styles,”
successfully lobbied states to exercise more control over local policing).
277. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 14, at 1859 (quoting Nat’l Comm’n on L.
Observance & Enf’t, Report on Police 1–6 (1931) (“Wickersham Commission” Report));
see also Livingston, supra note 56, at 565–66 (1997) (discussing the implementation of civil
service systems aimed to counteract the “corrupting” efects of local politics).
278. See Fogelson, supra note 256, at 89.
279. See id. at 43.
280. See id. at 75–89, 102–105, 164.
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force with the rule of law. This immunized police departments against
dissolution and insulated them from democratic control.
B.

Sherifs’ Ofces

For much of the United States, policing falls under the jurisdiction of
county sherifs. Sherifs’ ofces employ about a quarter of all sworn (nonfederal) ofcers in the United States.281 Approximately forty percent of
Americans live in communities where sherifs’ ofces are the sole local law
enforcement body.282 These communities tend to be unincorporated
places within counties, which in many states include townships and towns.
But the role of the sherif often extends beyond these places. Approximately sixty-ﬁve percent of municipalities and towns do not have their own
police departments and contract with the county sherif’s ofce for policing services.283 Even where municipal police departments exist, sherifs
often share concurrent jurisdiction in the cities they serve.284 As protests
in support of police reforms have spread, the focus in many places is
increasingly centered on sherifs’ ofces.285 This section outlines the legal
structure and historical development of sherifs’ ofces. While police and
sherifs serve similar law enforcement roles today, and are both equally
resistant to structural reforms, the sherif and the police arrived at this
point from dramatically diferent directions.
1. Law. — How are sherifs diferent from the police? The most
signiﬁcant diference is that sherifs are “constitutional ofces” in nearly

281. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
282. Estimated from the percentage of Americans who live in unincorporated places,
which is about thirty-seven percent. See Cohen et al., supra note 18, at 2 ﬁg.1 (estimating
that 62.7% of the population in the United States lives in incorporated places).
283. See Steven G. Brandl, Police in America 51 (2018); Soraya K. Kawucha, Sherifs—
The Other Police 140, 148, 155, 165 (Dec. 2014) (Ph.D. dissertation, Sam Houston State
University) (Proquest), https://search.proquest.com/docview/1663996999 (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (“[Sherifs] provide law enforcement in unincorporated areas and
those cities that contract for services, run jails and detention centers, serve civil processes,
hold sherif’s sales, and protect courts.”).
284. See David N. Falcone & L. Edward Wells, The County Sherif as a Distinctive
Policing Modality, 14 Am. J. Police 123, 129 (1995) (“By law, the sherif’s jurisdiction
generally includes everything within the county. The overlapping jurisdictions with
municipalities within the county have clear potential for political conﬂicts and legal
ambiguities.”)
285. See, e.g., Cheryl Corley, Policing Reform, Civilian Oversight and More: After
Months of Protest, Voters Decide, NPR (Oct. 31, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/
10/31/928212758/policing-reform-civilian-oversight-and-more-after-months-of-protestvoters-decid (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing various proposed changes to
sherifs’ ofces by state); Campbell Robertson, What Black Lives Matter Has Revealed About
Small-Town America, N.Y. Times (July 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/15/us/
black-lives-matter-protests-small-towns.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Nov. 7, 2020) (describing how small-town protests have focused on demanding police
reform in City Council meetings).
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all states where they serve a law enforcement function.286 In other words,
state constitutions usually require the selection of a sherif and specify
their jurisdiction and authority.287 This means that any efort to abolish the
ofce of the sherif will likely require an amendment to the state
constitution.
The constitutional standing of sherifs also structures their relationship with county governments. It is common today to refer to sherifs as
“county sherifs.” Most are elected by county residents,288 and their
jurisdiction is generally the same as that of county governments.289
Nonetheless, sherifs operate independently of county governments and
are generally insulated from county control.290 As a historical matter, the
ofce of the sherif in many states preceded the creation of county
governments as we now know them.291 As a result, the two are often
distinguished as a matter of law. Courts in many states treat “sherifs and
deputy sherifs [as] state ofcials, not local government ofcials.”292 Their
“duties are determined by state law, not locally enacted ordinances.”293
Even in states that do recognize sherifs as county ofcials, courts often
make clear that they are not subject to the control of the county
governments.294 Thus, in Illinois, the courts explain that “sherifs answer

286. See James Tomberlin, Note, “Don’t Elect Me”: Sherifs and the Need for Reform
in County Law Enforcement, 104 Va. L. Rev. 113, 123 (2018); see also Roop v. Whitt, 768
S.E.2d 692, 695 (Va. 2015) (“By contrast, constitutional ofcers, including sherifs, are
creations of the constitution itself.”).
287. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. XI, § 4; Colo. Const. art. XIV, § 8; Del. Const. art. III, § 22;
Fla. Const. art. VIII, § 1(d); Ga. Const. art. IX, § 1, ¶ III; Ill. Const. art. VII, § 4; N.C. Const.
art. VII, § 2; Pa. Const. art. IX, § 4; Tex. Const. art. V, § 23.
288. Falcone & Wells, supra note 284, at 125, 127. One exception is the State of Indiana,
where the legislature eliminated elections for sherifs in 1971 and replaced them with an
appointment system. Kawucha, supra note 283, at 141.
289. See Falcone & Wells, supra note 284, at 129.
290. See Tomberlin, supra note 286, at 129 (“Contrary to the perception of the sherif
as an ofcer of the county accountable to county citizens—subject, perhaps, to too much
local control—the sherif’s institutional features actually insulate him almost entirely from
attempts by local ofcials to hold him accountable.”).
291. See, e.g., Julian P. Boyd, The Sherif in Colonial North Carolina, 5 N.C. Hist. Rev.
151, 152 (1928) (noting that the ﬁrst North Carolina sherif was appointed in 1739). Sherifs
have existed in the United States since at least 1634. Kawucha, supra note 283, at 80. Indeed,
in many states, the ofce of the sherif even predates the creation of the state itself. See id.
at 89 (“For example, Ohio appointed its ﬁrst sherif in 1788, and shifted to an elected sherif
once it became a state in 1803.”).
292. Prince George’s County v. Aluisi, 731 A.2d 888, 895 (Md. 1999).
293. Id.
294. See Askew v. Sherif of Cook Cnty., 568 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he
Sherif is an ‘independently elected county ofcer and is not an employee of the county in
which the sherif serves.’” (quoting Carver v. Sherif of LaSalle Cnty., 787 N.E.2d 127, 136
(Ill. 2003))); Lawson v. Lincoln County, 664 S.E.2d 900, 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining
that while the sherif is a county ofcer, the role and its duties are determined by the state
legislature); Prince George’s County, 731 A.2d at 895 (“[T]he duties of the sherifs are those
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to the electorate of the county from which they are elected, and not the
county board.”295 All this sets sherifs apart from police, which were
created as administrative subdivisions of city governments. This is also why
county charters and ordinances rarely address the duties or organization
of sherifs’ ofces in any signiﬁcant detail.296 Indeed, the few instances
where county sherifs’ ofces are construed as county ofces are in the
context of liability and to the detriment of the county.297
The one area where the power of county boards most directly
intersects with the sherif is with respect to funding. But even here, the
county’s role is probably better understood as an obligation rather than a
source of authority.298 In many states, the duty to fund sherifs and their
department is mandated by state law.299 And in a number of states, the
discretion of the county board in doing so is limited.300 Some states, like

prescribed by the common law, the enactments of the General Assembly, and the rules of
the Court of Appeals.”).
295. See Carver v. Sherif of La Salle Cnty., 787 N.E.2d 127, 136 (Ill. 2003); Roop v.
Whitt, 768 S.E.2d 692, 695 (Va. 2015) (“[Sherifs’] compensation and duties are subject to
legislative control, but only by state statute and not local ordinance.”).
296. An additional reason for this is that unlike cities, county charters are relatively
uncommon and exist usually only in the few states that have granted home rule to counties
and among the even smaller number of counties that have elected to adopt a home-rule
charter. See David K. Hamilton, Governing Metropolitan Areas: Response to Growth and
Change 259–60 (Richard D. Bingham series ed., 1999) (estimating that that less than ten
percent of counties authorized to adopt a home-rule charter have done so); Krane et al.,
supra note 239, at 394, 477 tbl.A2 (surveying county government home rule). For the vast
majority of counties, their organization and structure are also speciﬁed by state law. See
David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs 93–94 (2d ed. 1995). Another reason is that state law
usually grants sherifs broad authority with respect to the organization of their department,
including the power to appoint and hire deputies. Carver, 787 N.E.2d at 137 (citing 55 Ill.
Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/3–6008 (West 2019)).
297. See Braillard v. Maricopa County, 232 P.3d 1263, 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010)
(holding that because the state legislature has not authorized sherifs’ ofces to be sued as
a “jural entity,” civil rights suits against them should be raised against the county).
298. See Falcone & Wells, supra note 284, at 126 (“Where the sherif’s ofce is constitutionally mandated, it cannot simply be abolished, have its powers and responsibilities
reduced, or have its personnel decisions made by county boards or commissioners.
Although they nominally may control the budget for the sherif’s ofce, county or state
executives cannot dictate sherif’s ofce policy . . . .”).
299. See Tomberlin, supra note 286, at 133 (“Limits on a county government’s
budgetary power are inherent in the sherif’s constitutional status: no county action may
prevent the sherif’s execution of statutory or constitutional mandates, and budgetary
restrictions are often seen as impermissible attempts by county government to control the
sherif’s operations.” (footnotes omitted)).
300. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 45-37-230 (2020) (mandating a salary of $160,000 a year for
the sherif of Jeferson County and cost-of-living adjustments); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.
Proc. § 2-316(b) (West 2020) (ﬁxing the salary of the Sherif of Baltimore City); Alachua
County v. Darnell, 301 So.3d 1027, 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that the county
is required to fund the sherif and that the sherif’s constitutional duties allow the sherif to
transfer funds between objects without the county’s approval after the budget is approved);
Chafn v. Calhoun, 415 S.E.2d 906, 908 (Ga. 1992) (allowing the county to make some
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Maryland and Alabama, specify the amount of county funding that must
be provided and do so on a county-by-county basis.301 In others, state courts
have limited the inﬂuence that county boards can exercise over the sherif
through the appropriations process.302 In Florida, for example, an
appellate court recently held that once a budget proposed by a sherif has
been approved, there is no further obligation on the part of the sherif to
spend the appropriated funds in accordance with the approved budget.303
As the court explained, the constitutional and statutory independence of
the sherif means that the county’s duty to appropriate funds cannot be
used as a means of controlling the internal operations of the sherif’s
ofce, which belongs “uniquely to the Sherif as the chief law enforcement
of the county.”304
The control that county boards of supervisors can exercise over
sherifs and sherifs’ ofces through the budgeting process is further
undermined by the revenues they receive from noncounty sources.305
Sherifs directly contract with cities to provide law enforcement services in
return for payments from those cities.306 They operate jails, and often build
excess capacity in order to provide beds to other jurisdictions or the
federal government in return for monetary reimbursements.307 In some
states, they are constitutionally or statutorily authorized to contract with
private business to provide them with prison labor.308 All of this is in
addition to the revenue received from asset forfeiture programs from
those arrested for crimes, which police departments take advantage of as
well.309 As section II.B.2 describes, the revenue model of sherifs’ ofces
has historical linkages to the fee-for-service model used to compensate
sherifs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

budgetary cuts to the sherif’s ofce, but not so much that the sherif is divested of their law
enforcement powers and duties).
301. See Ala. Code § 45-37-230; Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 2-316.
302. See Alachua County, 301 So.3d at 1029.
303. See id.
304. Weitzenfeld v. Dierks, 312 So. 2d 194, 196 (Fla. 1975).
305. Falcone & Wells, supra note 284, at 130 (“As a result of historical development,
monetary compensation for the sherif has often come from the collection of fees for
services provided . . . .”).
306. See, e.g., Gary J. Miller, Cities by Contract: The Politics of Municipal Incorporation
22–26 (1981) [hereinafter Miller, Cities by Contract] (noting that the Los Angeles County
Sherif’s ofce contracted extensively with the surrounding municipalities throughout the
second half of the twentieth century); Kawucha, supra note 283, at 152, 178–81 (citing
examples of sherif departments in Nevada, California, and Virginia contracting with cities
and counties).
307. See, e.g., Kawucha, supra note 283, at 174.
308. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. XIV, § 5 (authorizing the county sherif to enter into
contracts to provide inmate labor to external organizations).
309. See Taken: How Police Proﬁt from Seized Property, Pulitzer Ctr.,
https://taken.pulitzercenter.org [https://perma.cc/T5K7-C6F6] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021)
(data visualization of civil asset forfeiture).
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Given the fact that many courts construe sherifs as state ofcials, one
might presume that the lack of county authority over sherifs is ofset by
that of the state. In many cases, that is true.310 Many state constitutions do
not set forth all the powers and duties of the sherif directly, instead delegating that power to the state legislature.311 Moreover, state constitutions
and state laws often set out the process by which sherifs can be removed,
and in most cases, that process empowers state ofcials—whether the
Governor, the Attorney General, or the state legislature.312 Of course, to
abolish the ofce of the sherif entirely in most cases still requires a constitutional amendment. This is how the ofces of “high sherif” were
eliminated in Connecticut through a ballot measure in 2000, which also
transferred the employees of sherifs’ departments to the state Judicial
Department.313
But while states have far more authority over sherifs than county
governments do, the constitutional status of sherifs also provides them
with some protection from state control. Not only is the ofce immune
from legislative abolition, but in many states, its powers cannot be
legislatively modiﬁed314 or eliminated315 because they are deﬁned by
common law.316 Thus, in Beck v. County of Santa Clara, a California court

310. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. 5, § 13 (“It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to
see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced. The Attorney General
shall have direct supervision over every district attorney and sherif and over such other law
enforcement ofcers as may be designated by law . . . .”); Mass. Const. art. XIX, amended
by Mass. Const. amend. art. XXXVI (“[The Legislature] shall prescribe, by general law, for
the election of sherifs . . . .”).
311. See, e.g., Colo. Const. art. XIV, § 8.5; Tex. Const. art. V, § 23; Va. Const. Art. VII,
§ 4; Lawson v. Lincoln County, 664 S.E.2d 900, 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that the
sherif is subject to the control of the state legislature); Prince George’s County v. Aluisi,
731 A.2d 888, 894 (Md. 1999) (stating that the Maryland Constitution leaves the deﬁnition
of sherifs’ powers, primarily, to the legislature).
312. See, e.g., Ala. Const. art. VII, § 174 (“[S]herifs[] may be removed from ofce for
any of the causes speciﬁed in Section 173 or elsewhere in this constitution, by the supreme
court, or under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Supreme Court of Alabama or
law.”); Cal. Const. art. 5, § 13 (giving the Attorney General supervisory authority over
“sherif[s] and over such other law enforcement ofcers as may be designated by law”); N.Y.
Const. art. 13, § 13 (giving the governor the authority to remove an elected sherif).
313. See Conn. Const. amend. art. XXX (repealing art. 4, § 25).
314. See, e.g., Christopher v. Sussex County, 77 A.3d 951, 958 (Del. 2013); Prince George’s
County, 731 A.2d at 894.
315. See, e.g., Jonathan W. Acton, II, Note, The Maryland Sherif v. Modern and
Efcient Administration of Justice, 2 U. Balt. L. Rev. 282, 286 (1973) (“The majority view
was that, because the sherif was a constitutional ofcer, the legislature might impose
additional duties upon him, but could not restrict or reduce the powers granted him by the
constitution (i.e., those powers recognized by custom and common law at the time the
constitution was adopted).”).
316. See William L. Murfree, A Treatise on the Law of Sherifs and Other Ministerial
Ofcers, at v, 22–23 (2d ed. 1880) (noting that it is beyond the power of legislatures “to
circumscribe [the sherif’s] common-law functions or to transfer them to other ofcers”).
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held that “the ofce of sherif is a ‘constitutional’ ofce, whose basic, fundamental duties may not be legislatively modiﬁed.”317 Similarly, in Florida,
an Attorney General opinion argued that sherifs, as constitutional
ofcers, were exempt from competitive bidding regulations.318 All of this
stands in sharp contrast to the traditional account of local government
ofcials and the fundamental principles of “Dillon’s Rule”—that such
ofcials possess only those powers that have been speciﬁcally delegated to
them by the state.319
The legal structure of sherifs then is far more resistant to disbandand-reform eforts than that of municipal police departments. County
governments, including the boards of supervisors that oversee them, can
amend the local ordinances that county sherifs enforce and exercise some
inﬂuence through the appropriations process. But unlike city police
chiefs, sherifs neither work for nor answer to local government. In fact,
constitutional provisions in states like Florida speciﬁcally prohibit counties
from abolishing the ofce of the sherif or transferring their duties to
another ofcer or ofce.320 With respect to counties, an old adage goes:
“[T]he legislature may create municipalities, but only God can create a
county.” 321 A similar comparison might also be drawn between the police
and sherifs.
2. History. — The insulation of the sherif from structural reform is
connected to its unique historical origins. If police and sherifs serve
similar roles today, they reached this point from very diferent directions.
Municipal police departments were imagined right from the beginning as law enforcement agencies.322 To be sure, their speciﬁc duties and
responsibilities have been subject to endless debates and reforms.323 But it
was always assumed that their role would primarily be in the context of
public safety and order. Sherifs, in contrast, did not begin as ofcials
primarily concerned with law enforcement duties.324 Their origins can be
317. 251 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447 (Ct. App. 1988) (noting that “the weight of authority in the
United States holds that the ofce of sherif is a ‘constitutional’ ofce, whose basic,
fundamental duties may not be legislatively modiﬁed” before declining to follow this
practice in California (quoting 1 McQuillin, supra note 204, § 1.27)).
318. Fla. Att’y Gen. Op. 078-122, 1978 Fla. AG LEXIS 49, at *2 (Oct. 20, 1978).
319. See 2 McQuillin, supra note 204, § 4:11.
320. Fla. Const. art. VIII, § 1(d).
321. Rusk, supra note 296, at 93.
322. See Johnson, supra note 242, at 16–22 (describing early police forces in New York
City and Philadelphia).
323. See, e.g., Fogelson, supra note 256, at 84–89 (detailing early police reform eforts).
324. See Tomberlin, supra note 286, at 117–19 (outlining the duties of sherifs in preAmerican history). As James Tomberlin details, “Variation in the sherif’s duties and
importance tracked the importance of counties generally in the diferent colonies: in the
northern colonies, counties were limited to judicial matters; in the Mid-Atlantic colonies,
counties shared power with towns; and in the southern colonies, counties represented ‘the
very foundation of local government.’” Id. at 119 (quoting J. Edwin Benton, Counties as
Service Delivery Agents: Changing Expectations and Roles 7 (2002)).
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traced to ninth-century England, when they were executive agents of the
King.325 In the colonies, sherifs served as local administrators of colonial
governments and later the states, especially in the South.326 The early
responsibilities of sherifs were largely in the areas of tax collection,
adjudication, and executive administration.327 Their law enforcement
activities were largely tied to their administration of the courts and the
judicial process.328 Many were directly appointed by the governor of their
states.329 And although empowered to deputize local residents to quell
riots and insurrections, they were not initially responsible for general law
enforcement responsibilities.330
Two developments shifted sherifs’ mandate toward law enforcement.
The ﬁrst was the model provided by the new urban police.331 The law
enforcement role of sherifs varied by region. In the South, the precursors
were fugitive slave patrols.332 Like these patrols, sherifs were compensated
on a fee structure.333 After the civil war, sherifs established systems of
prison labor to generate revenue.334 In the West, sherifs assumed the role
of frontier lawmen and were also largely compensated by fees.335 Second,
the establishment of general-purpose county governments in the nineteenth century shifted many executive roles from sherifs to elected county
325. See Falcone & Wells, supra note 284, at 125 (“The modern-day American sherif’s
ofce traces its historical antecedents to tenth century England and the ‘shire-reeve’, a local
political ﬁgure, who was appointed to serve and protect the King’s interests in the shire.”);
Tomberlin, supra note 286, at 117, 120 (explaining that the colonial sherif was an agent of
the King in the colonies); Kawucha, supra note 283, at 20, 31 (detailing a sherif’s earliest
role as tax collector for the King).
326. See Falcone & Wells, supra note 284, at 125; Tomberlin, supra note 286, at 119–
22; see also Murfree, supra note 316, at 2 (“Now, as a thousand years ago, the sherif is the
chief executive functionary of the county . . . .”).
327. See Tomberlin, supra note 286, at 120; Kawucha, supra note 283, at 20. Many of
these duties are still provided for in state constitutions today. See, e.g., Tex. Const., art. VIII,
§ 14(b) (“[T]he sherif of the county . . . shall be the assessor-collector of taxes, except that
the commissioners court of such a county may submit to the qualiﬁed voters of the county
at an election the question of electing an assessor-collector of taxes as a county ofcer
separate from the ofce of sherif.”).
328. See Kawucha, supra note 283, at 84–85.
329. See id. at 80–81, 85, 141, 151.
330. Cities employed watchmen and would call the state militia for riots or continuing
violence. See Johnson, supra note 242, at 14, 25.
331. See Kawucha, supra note 283, at 92–93.
332. See id. at 111. Even after slavery was abolished, there were many accounts of sherifs
and their deputies participating or complicit in the lynchings. See William Fitzhugh
Brundage, Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880–1930, at 112–13, 146,
233, 253 (1993). But see E.M. Beck, Judge Lynch Denied: Combating Mob Violence in the
American South, 1877–1950, 21 S. Cultures 117, 118–19 (2015) (detailing the sherifs’ roles
in preventing lynchings).
333. See Kawucha, supra note 283, at 111–15.
334. See id. at 114 (explaining convict leasing).
335. See id. at 115–16 (outlining various fee-for-service schemes common among
western sherifs).
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boards.336 But sherifs retained the law enforcement functions that they
had recently assumed, along with their historic judicial duties of serving
warrants and maintaining jails.337 After all, sherifs were constitutional
ofces that could not be easily eliminated without a constitutional
amendment.
These independent origins explain why sherifs continue to operate
at a remove from county governments and are more likely than police to
exercise broad administrative responsibilities, such as the operation of
jails, service and execution of judicial orders, and the transportation of
prisoners. Moreover, the historic reliance of sherifs on fees for service,338
and their historic role as tax assessors and collectors,339 continues to
inform their law enforcement responsibilities. The fee mentality remained
even when the sherifs’ role coalesced around law enforcement responsibilities. Sherifs earned fees for arrests and sometimes executions.340 In the
South, owners of enslaved persons paid the costs of fugitive slaves’
detention in county jails along with separate “sherif’s fees” for the return
of these enslaved persons.341 In the West, states like Arizona allowed the
sherif to charge the families of inmates for the inmates’ incarceration.342
Today, sherifs are still responsible for the collection of many fees,343 and
the funding structure of sherifs’ ofces continues to be far more entrepreneurial than that of police departments, from municipal contracts for
police services to the “leasing” of excess prison capacity.344

336. See infra note 346 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Boyd, supra note 291, at
152–72 (describing how the discretion of the sherif, as a tax collector, was curtailed over
time by the North Carolina legislature, in part due to administrative inefciencies and
abuses by the sherifs); Kawucha supra note 283, at 164, 188 (noting that “[o]nly a few
shrieval ofces are still connected to tax collection”).
337. See Soper v. Montgomery County, 449 A.2d 1158, 1161 (Md. 1982); Scott v. State,
231 A.2d 728, 732 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967); Tomberlin, supra note 286, at 122.
338. Boyd, supra note 291, at 171 (“[R]evenues came from . . . (1) fees for the
performance of orders of the court, such as making arrests, serving processes, [and]
executing attachments[;] . . . (2) commissions collecting the taxes; . . . and (6) various other
fees and commissions . . . .”).
339. Boyd, supra note 291, at 155; Tomberlin, supra note 286, at 120; Kawucha, supra
note 283, at 99.
340. See, e.g., Raymond Moley, The Sherif and the Constable, 146 Annals Am. Acad.
Pol. & Soc. Sci. 28, 29–32 (1929).
341. Oscar Reiss, Blacks in Colonial America 189 (1997).
342. See Jane Eppinga, Arizona Sherifs: Badges and Bad Men 77 (2006).
343. See, e.g., Kawucha, supra note 283, at 158, 160.
344. See, e.g., Peter J. Nelligan & William Bourns, Municipal Contracting with County
Sherifs for Police Services in California: Comparison of Cost and Efectiveness, 14 Police
Q. 70, 71 (2011); Jessica Pace, La Plata County Sherif to Rent Jail Beds to Boost Revenue,
Durango Herald (Jan. 8, 2017), https://durangoherald.com/articles/126626-la-platacounty-sherif-to-rent-jail-beds-to-boost-revenue (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(“The La Plata County Sherif’s Ofce plans to close its budget gap this year by expanding
its jail bed rental program.”); supra note 306 and accompanying text.
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The status of sherifs as state ofcers explains why reforms of sherifs’
ofces were almost always initiated at the state rather than local level.345 In
some cases, these state reforms were the result of reorganizations of county
governance.346 In others, they resulted from local controversies over
corruption and abuse.347 In a few cases, reforms were tied to state
assertions of power over municipal jurisdictions.348 This was how the City
of Baltimore got both a municipal police department and a city sherif’s
ofce.349 In addition, states often speciﬁed the role of sherifs on a countyby-county basis, with diferent powers and duties assigned to diferent
county sherifs.350 This practice is now limited by prohibitions against
special legislation.351 But state legislatures have sometimes succeeded in
circumventing those, and special legislation enacted prior to those
constitutional prohibitions remained.352
This is not to say that local communities can never succeed in eliminating a sherif’s ofce. Complaints of corruption induced Connecticut to
abolish the ofce of high sherifs and transfer their employees to a state
agency.353 Miami-Dade County managed to abolish its sherif in 1957.354
345. Ind. Code § 36-8-10-3 (2020) (creating and governing sherif’s merit board under
state law).
346. See, e.g., John Archibald Fairlie, Local Government in Counties, Towns and
Villages 106–12 (1906) (describing, at the turn of the twentieth century, how many historic
powers of the sherif were transferred to newly created county ofces); see also Edmund
Thornton Miller, A Financial History of Texas 204–05 (1916) (describing the evolving role
of the sherif as the county tax collector).
347. See, e.g., Christopher Hofman, Connecticut Voters Decide to Abolish
Controversial Sherif System, Middletown Press (Nov. 8, 2000), https://www.middle
townpress.com/news/article/Connecticut-voters-decide-to-abolish-11939612.php [https://
perma.cc/8LSW-EULK] (last updated Aug. 18, 2017) (outlining reasons motivating the
abolition of the ofce of sherif in Connecticut).
348. See, e.g., Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376, 400–01 (1860) (upholding a state law that
places both the Baltimore Police Department and its sherif under a state-controlled Board
of Police); Howard O. Sprogle, The Philadelphia Police, Past and Present 86–87 (1887)
(describing an 1845 Pennsylvania law that granted the sherif the power to call upon the
police forces of Philadelphia and surrounding municipalities for the purposes of
suppressing riots in those municipalities).
349. See Md. Const. art. IV, § 44 (establishing the ofce of Baltimore City Sherif); Md.
Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 2-316 (West 2020) (ﬁxing the salary of the Sherif of
Baltimore City); Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. at 394, 401; Sherif of Baltimore City and County,
Balt. Sun (Mar. 13, 1844) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on an
amendment to the Maryland Constitution, which provided for the election of both a city
and a county sherif).
350. See Ala. Code § 45-2-237 (2020) (requiring municipalities in Baldwin County to
inform the sherif of decision to stop enforcing certain laws); Kline v. Fuller, 467 A.2d 786,
789 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (“Although the sherif is a State ofcial, his duties and
authority are not uniform throughout the State . . . . [T]he General Assembly has treated
the sherif somewhat diferently from county to county.”).
351. See supra notes 227–229 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 229–231 and accompanying text.
353. See Tomberlin, supra note 286, at 145–46; supra note 347.
354. See Dade County v. Kelly, 99 So. 2d 856, 856–59 (Fla. 1957).
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Yet unique legal conditions account for this. The state constitution was
amended in 1956, granting Dade County authority to adopt a home-rule
charter that abolished constitutional ofces like that of the sherif.355 Dade
County passed such a home-rule charter that same year, creating the metropolitan government of Miami-Dade and delegating the power to abolish
constitutional ofces to the county board.356 When the sherif challenged
the abolition of his ofce through ordinance, the Florida Supreme Court
found that the county possessed the power to do so.357 But while that
decision was based on the county’s home-rule powers, the constitutional
foundations of those powers meant they were also subject to subsequent
amendment. And this is what happened in 2018 when a constitutional
amendment was approved by voters,358 requiring an independently elected
sherif in all Florida counties and forbidding abolition by county
charter.359 Given that the sherif’s responsibility had been absorbed into
the Miami-Dade Police Department, the county is now in the process of
ﬁguring out how to transfer power and duties back by 2024, when the ﬁrst
election for the newly restored ofce will be held.360
Given this history, any efort to disband sherifs’ ofces will be
embroiled in state–local battles. This is especially true where blue
metropolitan counties clash with red-state leaders. But to a greater extent
than for urban police departments, disbanding and replacing sherifs will
likely require state constitutional authorization and state political support.
C.

Intergovernmental Interactions

The structural barriers to disbanding police departments and sherifs’
ofces extend beyond those that emerge from the legal structures and
institutional histories examined above. Additional structural challenges
355. See id. at 857.
356. See id.
357. See id. at 859 (holding that the County may enact “an ordinance . . . abolishing
the ofce of Sherif and transferring all of the functions thereof”).
358. See Douglas Hanks & Charles Rabin, After a Storied History of Bad Sherifs, MiamiDade Voters Will Elect Them Again, Mia. Herald (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.
com/news/politics-government/election/article221285885.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
359. The Florida Constitution states:
There shall be elected by the electors of each county, for terms of four
years, a sherif . . . . Notwithstanding subsection 6(e) of this article, a
county charter may not abolish the ofce of a sherif . . . transfer the
duties of those ofcers to another ofcer or ofce; change the length of
the four-year term of ofce; or establish any manner of selection other
than by election by the electors of the county.
Fla. Const. art. VIII, § 1(d).
360. See, e.g., Douglas Hanks, Miami-Dade Must Hold Partisan Elections for Sherif,
Court Clerk, Supreme Court Says, Mia. Herald (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.
miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article233791657.html (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review).
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appear when we consider the institutional relationship between cities and
counties, and police departments and sherifs’ ofces. In other words, the
prospects for radical reforms turn not only on the structural
entrenchment of local law enforcement agencies individually, but on their
possible substitution for one another.
Because county and city jurisdictions often overlap, with counties usually encompassing cities within them, sherifs and municipal police departments ordinarily exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the cities.361 Yet,
although counties often envelop cities, counties are not higher in the
governmental hierarchy. Finally, where they overlap with cities, county
electorates include additional voters with diferent interests, demographics, and politics.
All of this implies that city–county conﬂicts might impede local eforts
to radically reform policing. Moreover, given the functional divide of cities
and counties with respect to social services programs—like mental health
and economic development—any shift of resources from police to these
functions will likely require intergovernmental cooperation between the
two. The next section examines both how city–county and police–sherif
interactions could complicate radical restructuring of policing. Moreover,
we suggest a third complication with respect to law enforcement: the
possibility that radical reforms at the local level will be subverted by eforts
to expand the jurisdictional scope of the state police.
1. The Outsourcing of Municipal Services. — For many cities, radical
reforms of policing will require navigating municipal charters, state law,
and sometimes state constitutional provisions. But for many others, the
path toward radical reforms will also need to go through the sherif and
the county governments.
One reason is that many cities do not have municipal police
departments at all.362 To be sure, policing is generally considered to be an
essential function of municipal governments. But instead of providing that
service themselves, smaller and distressed cities tend to outsource that
responsibility to the county sherif.363 In some cities, like Compton in
361. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
362. See, e.g., Leroy D. Baca, L.A. Cnty. Sherif’s Dep’t, Contract Law Enforcement
Services 8 (2009), https://www.sherifs.org/sites/default/ﬁles/uploads/CLESDocument.
pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ8S-WNWT] (listing forty cities that the Los Angeles Sherif’s
Department provides police services for); Kawucha, supra note 283, at 142, 144, 146–48,
152, 162 (providing examples of where sherifs contract police services in a number of
states); Contract Law Enforcement, Wright Cnty. Minn., https://www.co.wright.mn.us/
222/Contract-Law-Enforcement [https://perma.cc/29LW-DZMU] (last visited Jan. 14,
2021) (“Presently the Wright County Sherif’s Ofce provides contract law enforcement
services to 13 of the 16 cities in Wright County. Only the Wright County cities of Annandale,
Bufalo and Howard Lake have their own police departments.”).
363. See Nelligan & Bourns, supra note 344, at 71. In states without counties, like
Connecticut, small municipalities often contract with the state police. See Noah Kazis,
Special Districts, Sovereignty, and the Structure of Local Police Services, 48 Urb. Law. 417,
430 (2016). On state police, see infra section II.C.3.
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California364 and Camden in New Jersey,365 budget shortfalls convinced city
ofcials to disband their police departments and contract with the county
sherif for law enforcement services. Other cities never established municipal police departments. Rather, following a plan ﬁrst developed by
Lakewood, California, cities contracted with county sherifs for police protection right from the start.366 These tended to be prosperous communities planning to provide few municipal services on their own, which incorporated as cities largely to resist annexation into larger, more ethnically
diverse cities.367 Then there are the townships and unincorporated
communities that do not have the power to establish municipal police
departments at all, and fall within the jurisdiction of the county
generally.368 And while unincorporated communities tend to be rural and
sparsely populated, that category also includes some densely populated
urban areas like East Los Angeles (with more than 100,000 residents) and
Paradise, Nevada, where the Las Vegas strip is located.369
For all these communities, radical reforms of local policing require
restructuring sherifs’ ofces over which they have no direct control. Nor
are county sherifs politically accountable to the city governments that
contract for their services. To be sure, the contracts themselves might
provide larger cities with some measure of inﬂuence and leverage. This
may be why Camden’s contract is largely seen as successful among local
residents even though direct local control over policing was lost.370 But for
smaller cities lacking the ﬁscal capacity to establish their own police
departments, the sherif holds a monopoly. These cities have no choice
but to buy from the sherif, but the sherif has no obligation to sell, leaving
364. See Emily E. Straus, Death of a Suburban Dream: Race and Schools in Compton,
California 225 (2014); see also Nicholas Corsaro & Jeremy M. Wilson, The Efects of Police
Contracting on Crime: An Examination of Compton, California, 14 J. Experimental
Criminology 59, 64–67 (2018) (discussing problems plaguing the Compton police
department).
365. See Goldstein & Armstrong, supra note 177 (“[I]n 2013, the mayor and city council
dissolved the local PD and signed an agreement for the county to provide shared services.”);
Sarah Holder, The City that Remade Its Police Department, Bloomberg Businessweek (June
4, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-04/how-camden-new-jerseyreformed-its-police-department (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that
Camden’s decision to disband its policing was motivated by “dire ﬁnances”).
366. See Miller, Cities by Contract, supra note 306, at 22–26 (detailing the origin of
Lakewood’s contractual relationship with the county sherif’s ofce).
367. See id. at 17–26 (describing the conﬂict between municipalities and neighboring
unincorporated territory over annexation).
368. See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion
at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1095, 1108 (2008).
369. See Robert E. Lang & Dawn Dhavale, Reluctant Cities?: Exploring Big
Unincorporated Census Designated Places, Metropolitan Institute at Virginia Tech Census
Note 03:01, at 1–3 (July 2003).
370. See Goldstein & Armstrong, supra note 177 (describing how the restructured
Camden police force is viewed by locals as “fairer, less menacing and more efective than in
the past”).
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cities without leverage.371 An example is the case of the city of Guadaloupe,
Arizona, a predominantly Latinx community with approximately 5,500
residents.372 When Sherif Joe Arpaio dramatically escalated his
immigration enforcement activities in the city, including an extended raid
in 2008, the residents and leaders of the city protested.373 In response, the
sherif unilaterally cancelled his contract with the city, stating, “If you
don’t like the way I operate, you go get your own police department.”374
With few alternatives, the city eventually capitulated and reinstituted its
contract with Arpaio on the sherif’s terms.375
Cities interested in shifting resources and functions from law enforcement to social service agencies or community economic development
programs may ﬁnd that they need the cooperation of county government.
Currently, most of these social services are handled at the level of county
government and not by the cities themselves.376 Thus, reallocating traditional local law enforcement responsibilities to other social service
providers may require coordination between cities and counties. This suburbanization of social services broadens the tax base supporting them, with
redistributive efects, but also reduces the political control of urban populations reliant on those services. Perhaps demographic and economic
shifts now better enable some cities to provide these services. But even
then, legal reforms might be required to redirect state and federal funds
for those services to these city departments and to coordinate the responsibility of municipal social services with that of the county. A city might
instead decide to contract for new, enriched services with the county. But
that would require the willingness of the county, while the city would lose
direct political control of an important component of its new public safety
program.
2. The Overlapping Jurisdiction of Police and Sherifs. — Another
intergovernmental challenge facing radical reform eforts is the possibility
that sherifs’ ofces would be used to thwart eforts to disband and reform
municipal police departments. In other words, the concurrent jurisdiction
of the sherif is a constraint even in the cities that have not contracted for

371. Nelligan & Bourns, supra note 344, at 89.
372. See Mary Romero, Keeping Citizenship Rights White: Arizona’s Racial Proﬁling
Practices in Immigration Law Enforcement, 1 L.J. for Soc. Just. 97, 109–10 (2011).
373. See id. at 110–11.
374. See Stephen Lemons, Guadalupe Made It Clear that Joe Arpaio’s Attacking Anyone
with Brown Skin, Phx. New Times (May 29, 2008), https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/
news/guadalupe-made-it-clear-that-joe-arpaios-attacking-anyone-with-brown-skin-6431117
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
375. See Tomberlin, supra note 286, at 139.
376. See, e.g., Comm. for the Study of the Future of Pub. Health, Inst. of Med., The
Future of Public Health 186 (1988) (showing that a majority of local health agencies operate
at the county level or above, with only about twenty-three percent under the control of a city
or town).
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their services.377 Of course, there are exceptions.378 Some states, especially
those in the Northeast, have either abolished the ofce of the sherif or
limited its responsibilities.379 Some metropolitan governments, like MiamiDade County, consolidated the sherif’s ofce with the police department380—though, as noted earlier, this particular arrangement will likely
be unwound. Moreover, in areas where sherifs and police departments
share concurrent jurisdiction over the city, the general practice is for both
to organize their activities into respective turfs.381 Sherifs’ ofces tend to
focus their attention on areas of the county not served by municipal police
departments.382
But that comity could disappear if a city’s plans to radically reform law
enforcement provoke an entrenched sherif or suburban voters. If a city
were to disband its police department, a county sherif might take its
place—resulting in conventional policing even less accountable to city
residents. A city’s plans to deprioritize certain crimes, or ban certain police
practices, would be frustrated. Indeed, some courts have suggested that it
is a duty for the sherif to intervene if they believed that a municipal police
force is “neglecting its duty” by “ignoring or permitting ofenses.”383

377. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 66 Cal. Rptr. 257, 265 (Ct. App. 1968); State ex rel.
Danforth v. Orton, 465 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Mo. 1971); In re Sulzmann, 183 N.E. 531, 532
(Ohio 1932); State ex rel. Windham v. LaFever, 486 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tenn. 1972);
Commonwealth ex rel. Davis v. Malbon, 78 S.E.2d 683, 686 (Va. 1953) (holding that the
jurisdiction of the sherif extends throughout the county, inclusive of any municipalities
therein); see also Falcone & Wells, supra note 284, at 129.
378. See Kawucha, supra note 283, at 150 (“Like some cities in Virginia, St. Louis is an
independent city, meaning it is a separate entity from the surrounding county. As such, the
St. Louis County Sherif has no jurisdiction within the city boundaries . . . ; the St. Louis City
Sherif has that responsibility.”).
379. See, e.g., Conn. Const. art. XXX, § 1 (repealing § 25 of article IV and abolishing
the ofce of sherif).
380. See Mia.-Dade Cnty., Fla., Charter, § 9.01(C) (2018); Memorandum from Charles
Anderson, Comm’n Auditor, Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, to Hon. Joe A. Martinez, Chairman, Bd.
of Cnty. Comm’rs 2–3 (June 29, 2011), https://www.miamidade.gov/auditor//library/
consolidating-certain-functions-MDPD-MDCR.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8QG-SSND].
381. See, e.g., State v. Knight, 904 P.2d 1159, 1165 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (“As the
Washington Attorney General has observed: ‘Nowhere has the [Washington] Legislature
indicated that the sherif’s powers and duties are limited to the unincorporated areas of the
county.’” (quoting Interlocal Cooperation Act, Op. Att’y Gen. AGO 1990 No. 4, at 2 (Wash.
May 24, 1990))).
382. See, e.g., id.
383. See State ex rel. Danforth v. Orton, 465 S.W.2d 618, 626–27 (Mo. 1971); accord
State ex rel. Thompson v. Reichman, 188 S.W. 225, 228 (Tenn. 1916) (holding that where a
sheriff “knows that the city officials are deliberately ignoring or permitting a certain class of
offenses,” the sheriff must “prevent and suppress such offenses” as if “there was no
municipality . . . police force”); Commonwealth ex rel. Davis v. Malbon, 78 S.E.2d 683, 686 (Va.
1953) (stating that where a sheriff “knows that any . . . officer is deliberately ignoring or
permitting violations of [the] law,” he has a “duty to take proper steps to prevent and suppress
such violations”).

2021]

DISBANDING POLICE AGENCIES

1385

To be sure, accounts from cities like Camden suggest that county
takeovers might sometimes be efective reforms.384 By disbanding its police
department and contracting with the county sherif, Camden was able to
ofer its residents a new start in their relationship with law enforcement.385
But there are counterexamples as well, especially when the county
electorate is politically and socioeconomically distinct from the city’s.
Consider Sherif Arpaio of Maricopa County. For several years, he clashed
with local leaders in Phoenix and Mesa over immigration enforcement in
their cities.386 But city leaders were powerless, because Arizona law grants
Arpaio’s sherif’s ofce concurrent jurisdiction in their cities.387 And
Sherif Arpaio was willing to ﬂout conventional norms by actively patrolling in these cities on the view that their police departments were abdicating their responsibilities to enforce immigration law.388 Ultimately, Sherif
Arpaio was voted out of ofce and convicted of criminal contempt for
violating a court order to desist from civil rights violations.389 Until then,
however, there was little that the residents of Phoenix or Mesa were able
to do to inﬂuence, much less control, the activities of their sherif in their
jurisdiction. This was especially true when the sherif retained the support
of the state legislature.
The example of Sherif Arpaio also illustrates the limits of political
inﬂuence that a city can exercise through contracting. Camden suggests
that even if county sherifs are less politically accountable to city residents
than municipal police departments, city governments can still exercise
some degree of inﬂuence over their activities through their contracts with
the sherif’s ofce.390 But while this might be more efective with respect
to larger cities that provide substantial funds to the county sherif’s ofce,
smaller cities usually have little market leverage over the law enforcement
activities of the sherifs for which they contract. This is especially true if
those cities do not have the ﬁscal capacity or political will to set up a police
department of their own. Moreover, as Sherif Arpaio astutely noted when
384. See Goldstein & Armstrong, supra note 177; Holder, supra note 365.
385. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
386. See Tomberlin, supra note 286, at 139–41; Nicholas D. Rizzi, Joe Arpaio and the
Phenomenon of the ‘Toughest Sherif in America’, 20, 82–84, 86 (Dec. 2016) (M.A. Thesis,
Sam Houston State University) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
387. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-441 (2020); see also Terry Greene Sterling, Phoenix’s
Crackdown on Illegal Immigration, Newsweek (Apr. 14, 2008), https://www.newsweek.
com/phoenixs-crackdown-illegal-immigration-86429 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(“The sherif, who has concurrent jurisdiction to enforce laws in Phoenix and other towns
in Maricopa County, says . . . he’s simply enforcing the law.”).
388. See, e.g., Paul Giblin, Arizona Sherif Conducts Immigration Raid at City Hall,
Angering Ofcials, N.Y. Times (Oct. 17, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/18/
us/18immig.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
389. See Richard Pérez-Peña, Former Arizona Sherif Joe Arpaio Is Convicted of
Criminal Contempt, N.Y. Times (July 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/
us/sherif-joe-arpaio-convicted-arizona.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
390. See supra notes 363–368 and accompanying text.
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a number of cities threatened to withdraw from their contract with his
department, such withdrawal does not afect the baseline authority of the
sherif to engage in law enforcement activities within those cities.391
Even among sherifs, Arpaio was an outlier. But his example illustrates
how sherifs might be deployed by the state to frustrate police disbanding.
Practical constraints that currently keep sherifs and police on diferent
jurisdictional turfs are likely to hold when political lines sharpen. Comity
between sherifs and police departments might break down if cities are
perceived as going too far, and especially if sherifs have the active support
of the state. And the funding constraints that currently incentivize sherifs
to limit their responsibility to areas outside of cities can easily be removed.
States can expand funding directly. They can direct local reimbursements,
as they have done in the past with state-controlled police forces.392 They
can levy additional local taxes. In sum, the concurrent jurisdiction of
sherifs is a powerful weapon that the state, the sherif, or suburban voters
can deploy to frustrate radical reform of policing.
3. The Possible Expansion of the State Police. — The last intergovernmental interaction that cities must consider is that between municipal police
departments and the state police. Rather than relying on sherifs, states
bent on limiting local control over law enforcement might assume control
by expanding the authority and responsibilities of existing state police.
Since the early twentieth century, states have created a large number
of state police departments directly under state control. The names for
these departments vary—in some states they are referred to simply as the
state police or state troopers, and in others they are known as state patrols
or highway patrols.393 Nonetheless, their responsibilities are usually quite
similar. They patrol freeways, highways, and other interlocal routes that
cross multiple local jurisdictions.394 They coordinate multijurisdictional
investigations involving multiple local law enforcement agencies.395 They
also oversee security for state facilities, like the legislative building or the
governor’s ofce.396

391. See Tomberlin, supra note 286, at 139–140 (“Sherif Arpaio claimed that even if
Guadalupe stopped contracting with him, he would still have the authority to perform his
sweeps within Guadalupe.”).
392. See, e.g., State ex rel. Reynolds v. Jost, 175 S.W. 591, 593–94 (Mo. 1915).
393. See, e.g., Beverly A. Smith & David N. Falcone, Highway or State Patrols and State
Police, in 1 Encyclopedia of Police Science 1197, 1197–98 (Jack R. Greene ed., 3d ed. 2007).
394. See H. Kenneth Bechtel, State Police in the United States: A Socio-Historical
Analysis 42–44 (1995).
395. See Weldon Cooper, The State Police Movement in the South, 1 J. Pol. 414, 424–
26 (1939); Bruce Smith, Factors Inﬂuencing the Future Development of State Police, 23 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 713, 715–16 (1932).
396. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16.065 (West 2020) (assigning to the Kentucky State
Police responsibility over “[s]ecurity of state facilities located in Frankfort”); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 143B-911 (2020) (creating the North Carolina State Capitol Police Division within the
Department of Public Safety).
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As a result, modern state police departments tend to supplement,
rather than supplant, the jurisdiction of local law enforcement agencies.
But this does not mean states cannot expand their authority over policing.
Indeed, the origins of the state police reveal a much more expansive set of
enforcement responsibilities. The Texas Rangers, established in the early
nineteenth century as the nation’s ﬁrst state police force, were originally
charged with protecting settlers from Native Americans and later
participated in armed conﬂicts with the Mexican military.397 State police
forces proliferated in the early twentieth century as a means of putting
down labor strikes, especially in communities where local law enforcement
agencies were sympathetic to the plight of workers.398 The use of state
police further increased in the twentieth century with the rise of
prohibition and state eforts to combat the illegal production and
distribution of alcohol. This expansion of state policing mobilized some of
the same nativist and racist sentiments that propelled early twentieth
century reforms of police departments: Labor unrest and alcohol abuse
were widely perceived at the time to be problems associated with
immigrant and minority communities.399 It was only later, with the
expansion of automobile usage and cross-state travel, that the state police
were reoriented toward highway patrol and trafc stops.400 And even there,
the shadow of discriminatory enforcement remained, especially with
respect to drug and immigration enforcement.401
This history suggests that disband-and-reform eforts at the local level
may not only have to navigate the legal obstacles posed by state law and
the concurrent jurisdiction of county sherifs. They also have to contend
with the possibility that radical restructuring may be undermined by an
expansion of the state police force. The early use of the state police to
further state interests in local jurisdictions provides one such model. In
fact, in many states, the formal legal authority for the state police to act as
a substitute for local police departments already exists.402 In Texas, for
example, state law not only grants general law enforcement powers to the
Department of Public Safety that oversees the Texas Rangers and the state
397. See Bechtel, supra note 394, at 34.
398. See, e.g., Gerda W. Ray, From Cossack to Trooper: Manliness, Police Reform, and
the State, 28 J. Soc. Hist. 565, 566–67 (1995).
399. See id. at 569; see also Lisa McGirr, The War on Alcohol: Prohibition and the Rise
of the American State 14–15, 90 (2016).
400. See Bechtel, supra note 394, at 40.
401. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Proﬁling and
Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 651, 660 (2002) (concluding that
“[t]he Maryland State Police . . . engage[d] in racial proﬁling on I-95”); Anthony E.
Mucchetti, Driving While Brown: A Proposal for Ending Racial Proﬁling in Emerging Latino
Communities, 8 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1, 14, 17, 32 (2005) (“Studies performed nationwide
have consistently shown that Latinos are being stopped and searched by police ofcers at
levels well beyond their proportion to the local population” (footnote omitted)).
402. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-188 (2020); Va. Code § 52-8 (2020); W. Va. Code
Ann. § 15-2-12 (LexisNexis 2020).
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highway patrol,403 but it also requires sherifs and police ofcers to comply
with directives from the state department.404 All that would be required to
thwart radical reforms at the local level would be for the state legislature
to appropriate sufcient funding and a governor to appoint commissioners who are willing to see it through.
Here again, we see the complex web of interagency and intergovernmental relationships that actually makes up our country’s “decentralized”
system of law enforcement. Although we have no national police force, our
system does not place control at the local level. Veto points are found at
all levels of state governments, making it hard to eliminate a particular
police agency, and harder still to eliminate the police function. Overlapping jurisdictions imply that many substitutes can usually be found for any
disbanded agency. Although agencies at diferent levels of government
often refrain from duplicating efort, that comity will not prevent a state
takeover in a context of political conﬂict.
III. LAW ENFORCEMENT EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF
DISBANDING
Any efort to disband police agencies must contend with the legal
entrenchment of police and sherifs' ofces described above. This Part
analyzes the nature, causes, and consequences of this entrenchment. First,
we observe that this entrenchment diferentiates law enforcement from
most other local government agencies. This law enforcement exceptionalism
insulates police agencies from democratic pressures and thereby calls into
question their political legitimacy. Next, we observe that this troubling
state of afairs resulted from the strategic choices of past reformers: In an
efort to consolidate their gains, past reformers created a set of institutional arrangements that strengthened police autonomy and blocked subsequent structural reforms. Third, we argue that those working to disband
should learn from this history and avoid entrenching whatever replaces
current police agencies. That is, disbanders should prioritize structural as
well as substantive reforms, thereby leaving the path open to further democratic experimentation.405 Speciﬁcally, we urge activists and policymakers
to work toward consolidating authority over law enforcement at one level
of government, and ideally at the most local level.

403. See Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 411.002, 411.022 (2019).
404. See id. § 411.009.
405. See generally Rahman & Simonson, supra note 85 (discussing the importance of
structural reforms as “antidotes to the antidemocratic nature of many systems of law and
governance,” which may allow for “push back on the antidemocratic structures of law
themselves” (emphasis added)).
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The Structural Problem: Law Enforcement Exceptionalism

In examining the challenge of police disbanding, we have shown how
local law enforcement is constituted by a web of overlapping legal authorities. Such an organizational structure insulates law enforcement from the
oversight and policy discretion that local governments exercise over their
other departments. This law enforcement exceptionalism is an overlooked
cause of law enforcement’s “democratic vacuum.”406 Speciﬁcally, law
enforcement exceptionalism has two troubling consequences. First, it
clouds the public’s understanding of the legal identity of police agencies,
and thereby frustrates the public’s eforts to organize around reform. Second, law enforcement exceptionalism proliferates veto points, which
police agencies leverage to avoid accountability. Together, these implications call into question the democratic legitimacy of police agencies.
We have already described in detail the institutional arrangements
that give rise to law enforcement exceptionalism.407 To summarize, local
police departments are structured by a mix of city ordinances, municipal
charters, state law, and state constitutional provisions.408 Sherifs are
established by state constitutions and governed (if at all) by state law, while
operating independently of the county boards that ostensibly govern their
jurisdictions.409 To further complicate matters, the jurisdictions of municipal police departments and county sherifs overlap, with cities sometimes
contracting with counties for law enforcement protection and related public services.410 Against this backdrop, state police departments supplement
local law enforcement agencies but could be vastly expanded in reaction
to radical reform eforts at the local level.411
These overlapping authorities make the legal identity of police agencies unlike that of a department of either local government or the state.
City and county governments largely deﬁne the role and responsibilities
of local departments of sanitation, public works, building, housing, planning, and parks, and these departments are frequently restructured or
reorganized as a matter of local discretion.412 The same is usually the case
406. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 14, at 1835; see also supra notes 52–53 and
accompanying text.
407. See supra Part II.
408. See supra section II.A.1.
409. See supra section II.B.1.
410. See supra section II.C.1–.2.
411. See supra section II.C.3.
412. See, e.g., James Beaty, Council to Discuss Reorganization of City’s Departments,
Including Possible Creation of a New Department of Public Works, McAlester News-Capital
(Jan. 7, 2008), https://www.mcalesternews.com/news/council-to-discuss-reorganization-of-citys-departments-including-possible-creation-of-a-new-department/article_59203eed-c4ff-5ae4-88c0
-d52c90a07233.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Sept. 12, 2014);
Alexandra Bjerg, Chico Latest California City to Restructure in Deﬁcit Fight, CA Fwd (Mar.
8, 2013), https://cafwd.org/reporting/entry/chico-latest-california-city-to-restructure-in-deficitfight [https://perma.cc/33Q3-DC68]; Lisa Macneil, County Restructuring of Departments,
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for state departments,413 whose reorganization often leads to the dissolution of local ofces of those departments.414 But since the waves of
restructuring and reform that characterized the early history of local
policing, police agencies have become insulated from structural reforms
in ways unlike other municipal or state departments.
In this respect, a comparison might be drawn between the structural
exceptionalism of police agencies and that of school districts. Like policing, public education is regulated by a web of state laws and local district
policies regarding curriculum, teachers, and funding.415 But the structure
of police agencies also difers in signiﬁcant ways from that of school districts. Police are formally structured as municipal departments under the
umbrella of, and funded by, city governments. In contrast, school districts
are largely independent of local governments, funded directly through
school taxes, and often serve jurisdictions that do not conform to local
government boundaries.416 This independence is balanced by the fact that
school districts are directly accountable to the electorate through the election of school boards,417 which is similar to the direct election of sherifs.
But the state also exercises more power over school districts relative to
sherifs. Moreover, public schools are frequently disbanded and restructured, by such means as the dissolution of schools and change in personnel,418 the replacement of public schools with charter schools,419 and the
remapping of school district boundaries.420

Hernando Sun (June 27, 2019), https://www.hernandosun.com/article/county-restructuringdepartments (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Nikki Ross, South Daytona Looks to
Restructure Public Works Department, Daytona Beach News-J. (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://www.news-journalonline.com/news/20200210/south-daytona-looks-to-restructurepublic-works-department [https://perma.cc/Q7Z4-Z2KH].
413. See, e.g., Michael R. Wickline, Bill Is Signed to Reorganize State Agencies, Ark.
Democrat-Gazette (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/apr/12/
bill-is-signed-to-reorganize-state-agen-1 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
414. See, e.g., Geof Pender, State Health Department Closing Two-Thirds of Regional
Ofces, Miss. Clarion Ledger (June 12, 2017), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/
politics/politicalledger/2017/06/12/health-dept-provides-more-details-reorganization/39
0831001 [https://perma.cc/5ZU7-PLV8] (last updated June 13, 2017).
415. See Nadav Shoked, An American Oddity: The Law, History, and Toll of the School
District, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 945, 954–55 (2017).
416. See id. at 958, 960–61, 1009–12. See generally Kazis, supra note 363 (noting and
seeking to explain why policing has not been assigned to special districts, like schools).
417. See Shoked, supra note 415, at 960–61.
418. See, e.g., Craig Peck & Ulrich C. Reitzug, School Turnaround Fever: The
Paradoxes of a Historical Practice Promoted as a New Reform, 49 Urb. Educ. 8, 9–10 (2013).
419. See generally Danielle Holley-Walker, The Accountability Cycle: The Recovery
School District Act and New Orleans’ Charter Schools, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 125 (2007)
(discussing the phenomenon of federal and state laws allowing charter schools to become
an alternative to failing traditional public schools).
420. See, e.g., Erika K. Wilson, The New School Segregation, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 139,
174–75 (2016).
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Perhaps a better comparison is public authorities. Public authorities
are local entities chartered by the state to focus on a speciﬁc governmental
service, such as roads, mass transportation, and utilities.421 Many of their
responsibilities were once the province of local governments, and many of
them were created speciﬁcally by the state to take over existing municipal
departments.422 Like the modern police department, public authorities
were also the product of Progressive Era politics.423 As a result, even if structurally distinct, public authorities and police agencies share similar design
principles. Public authorities were created as centralized and hierarchical
institutions modeled after the modern corporation and structurally insulated from political accountability.424 They are considered a form of local
government but are primarily subject to state law.425 Moreover, unlike
cities and counties, which are general-purpose governments, public authorities and special districts focus on a speciﬁc mandate to the exclusion
of competing public priorities.426
This comparison underscores the raw power of law enforcement
agencies. As the head of numerous public authorities in the mid-twentieth
century, Robert Moses reshaped New York City and New York State and
became the most powerful ﬁgure in these arenas.427 But few people
understood how he amassed or exercised this power, and fewer still could
name the head of any public authority today. This anonymity is precisely
the point: Public authorities operate outside of the normal channels of
political accountability, and their power is obscured by design. To be sure,
because they patrol in public and interact directly with citizens, police
departments and sherifs’ ofces are less insulated from the public gaze.
But the structure and internal operations of police agencies are nearly as
opaque.

421. See Kazis, supra note 363, at 424; Jerry Mitchell, Accountability and the
Management of Public Authorities in the United States, 59 Int’l Rev. Admin. Scis. 477, 478
(1993).
422. See Annmarie Hauck Walsh, The Public’s Business: The Politics and Practices of
Government Corporations 3–5, 16–17 (1978) (“Some [public] authorities are empowered
to condemn land or to exercise other police powers—over the use of waterways, for
example, or over the behavior on toll highways or in housing projects.”).
423. See Jameson W. Doig & Jerry Mitchell, Expertise, Democracy, and the Public
Authority Model: Groping Toward Accommodation, in Public Authorities and Public Policy:
The Business of Government 17, 19–20 (Jerry Mitchell ed., 1992).
424. See id.; see also Walsh, supra note 422, at 5.
425. See James Leigland, External Controls on Public Authorities and Other Special
Purpose Governments, in Public Authorities and Public Policy: The Business of
Government, supra note 423, at 31, 32–33.
426. See Robert G. Smith, Public Authorities, Special Districts and Local Government
180 (1964).
427. See Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York 15
(1974) (“Moses was able to shape a city and to build an empire because [he] . . . had focused
on the possibilities of . . . the public authority.”).
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It should thus come as little surprise that the critiques of public
authorities echo those of police agencies. Their insulated structure is said
to breed corruption.428 Their single-purpose mission incentivizes them to
privilege their organization’s interests over the public interest.429 Not least,
they can be instruments of racial subordination.430 But the consequences
of law enforcement exceptionalism are perhaps worse than those of public
authorities. Although public authorities have razed neighborhoods and
harmed lives,431 they have not generally wielded armed force. In short,
police departments and sherifs’ ofces operate like Robert Moses, but
with guns.
Moreover, law enforcement’s liminal status as neither wholly local nor
wholly state leaves it with no single master. This fragmentation of authority
has two interrelated consequences for those who wish to check police
power through democratic processes.
First, it shields police agencies from popular oversight. Although
perceived by the public as departments of local government, their
authority is derived from the police power of the state.432 City ofcials
select the leadership of police departments, but state law controls how
police ofcers are hired, disciplined, and terminated.433 Sherifs are
elected by local residents and operate in county jurisdictions.434 But they
operate independently of county governments and, while subject to state

428. See Jerry Mitchell, Policy Functions and Issues for Public Authorities, in Public
Authorities and Public Policy: The Business of Government, supra note 423, at 1, 8–9; Walsh,
supra note 422, at 38–39.
429. See Doig & Mitchell, supra note 423, at 23 (“Sometimes the executive staf[s] [of
public authorities are] . . . accused of ignoring community needs in the quest for budget
surpluses and capital expansion . . . .”); Walsh, supra note 422, at 334–37. See generally
Diana B. Henriques, The Machinery of Greed: Public Authority Abuse and What to Do
About It 17 (1986) (“The mythology about the businesslike, uncorrupted public authority .
. . ha[s] masked how vulnerable . . . [they] really are to corruption . . . .”).
430. See Caro, supra note 427, at 20 (“[T]he total number of people evicted from their
homes for all Robert Moses public works . . . is almost certainly close to half a million . . . .
More signiﬁcant even than the number of the dispossessed were their characteristics: a
disproportionate share of them were black, Puerto Rican—and poor.”).
431. See, e.g., id. at 850–62 (“[W]here once apartment buildings or private homes had
stood were now hills of rubble, decorated with ripped-open bags of rotting garbage . . . .”).
432. See, e.g., State ex rel. Reynolds v. Jost, 175 S.W. 591, 595–96 (Mo. 1915).
433. See supra section II.A.1. As we note, states’ powers to regulate police by singling
out speciﬁc cities through “special legislation” or by imposing a particular structural
organization of municipal departments may be limited. See supra notes 227–239 and
accompanying text. This means that the power of states to disband a speciﬁc police
department may be more limited than their power to regulate policing or police personnel
more generally.
434. See supra section II.B.1.
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control, are also partially insulated from the state as constitutional ofﬁces.435 Local governments must pay for both police and sherifs, yet a signiﬁcant portion of ofcers’ compensation is set at the state level.436 And
the existence, functions, and size of departments may be determined by
state constitutions and city charters.437 This web of arrangements obscures
who has authority to transform police agencies. Few municipal charters or
state laws clearly authorize cities to disband and reform the police.438 The
authority to disband or reform sherifs’ ofces is even less clear.439 In most
states, absent a state constitutional amendment, it is likely that neither
county governments nor the state could radically restructure a sherif’s
ofce.440 This difusion of authority makes it difcult for the public to pin
responsibility for pathological policing on any elected ofcial.
Second, this difusion of supervisory authority positions police
agencies to play diferent levels of government of one another to thwart
democratic reforms. One might argue that by straddling the state–local
divide, police agencies are subject to additional scrutiny through “dual
oversight by their local governments of general jurisdiction as well as by
the state.”441 Yet the varied and overlapping legal authorities that oversee
police departments and sherifs’ ofces can each more easily veto change
than achieve it. To force change, activists must win in several diferent
arenas. Perhaps more importantly, these veto points strengthen the
political position of the law enforcement agencies themselves relative to
those of elected state or local bodies. Local reforms can be impeded by
existing or amended charter provisions, existing or new state laws, or even
the prospect of preemptive legislation. State-led reforms are constrained
by home-rule provisions that protect police departments as political
subdivisions of the city or state constitutional provisions that enshrine the
sherif as a constitutional ofcer.442

435. See supra section II.B.1.
436. See Fung, supra note 15, at 89–91 (arguing that centralized funding is required to
equalize the provision of services such as policing).
437. See supra section II.A.1.
438. See supra section II.A.1.
439. See supra section II.B.1.
440. See supra section II.B.1. The two major instances where a sherif’s ofce was
disbanded both involved a constitutional amendment. See supra notes 353–355
(Connecticut and Miami).
441. Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 Yale L.J. 564, 603 (2017).
442. See supra sections II.A.1, II.B.1.
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Police agencies are adept at exploiting these divides in their dealings
with localities and the state.443 To repeal local residency requirements444
or restore an abolished sherif's ofce,445 law enforcement unions and
leadership turn to the state to pass a state law or amend the state constitution.446 And police can take advantage of earlier legislative victories at the
state level to invalidate local reforms through litigation.447 To contest
charter reforms afecting police departments, police can appeal directly to
residents to thwart carefully designed ballot measures.448 And if state leadership seeks to disband or reform law enforcement, police can pressure
local governments to obstruct these eforts.
This insulation from reform leaves police nearly impervious to
popular discontent. The power thereby left unchecked is considerable.
Recall that police have largely unregulated power to use deadly force. In
addition, they exercise discretion over where to patrol, what and whom to
investigate, whom to stop for furtive movement in a “high crime
neighborhood”449 or arrest450 for commonplace trafc violations,451 and
443. See Lisa L. Miller, The Perils of Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime
Control 3–19 (2008) [hereinafter Miller, Perils] (arguing that the “presence of crime
control as an active agenda item” across federal, state, and local government increases the
likelihood that police agencies’ policy preferences will be implemented at some level of
government).
444. See, e.g., Joe Mulligan, Comment, Not in Your Backyard: Ohio’s Prohibition on
Residency Requirements for Police Ofcers, Fireﬁghters, and Other Municipal Employees,
37 U. Dayton L. Rev. 351, 352–56 (2012) (“The Ohio Supreme Court . . . ruled that the state
statute trumped municipalities’ eforts to impose residency requirements for city
employees.” (footnote omitted)).
445. See Editorial, With Florida Sherifs Armed for a Fight, Champion Needed for
Amendment 10 Repeal Efort, S. Fla. Sun Sentinel (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.sunsentinel.com/opinion/editorials/ﬂ-op-edit-amendment-10-repeal-20190104-story.html (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
446. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Failed Evidence: Why Law Enforcement Resists Science
123 (2012).
447. See, e.g., Julie Shaw, Philly’s FOP Sues the City over Requirement for Public
Hearing on Police Contracts, Phila. Inquirer (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.inquirer.com/
news/philadelphia-police-contract-city-council-public-hearing-fop-lawsuit-20201014.html
[https://perma.cc/PT3C-ZYHC] (describing the Philadelphia police union’s lawsuit
against the City, which alleged that a recently enacted ordinance—requiring a public
hearing on proposed police-department contracts—violated a 1968 state law).
448. See, e.g., Joe Garofoli, While Some California Police Unions Promise Change,
Others Seek to Undo Reforms, S.F. Chron. (June 18, 2020), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
politics/article/While-some-California-police-unions-promise-15348044.php (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review).
449. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 139 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority and arguing that “in a high crime neighborhood unprovoked ﬂight
does not invariably lead to reasonable suspicion”).
450. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit warrantless arrests for nonjailable violations).
451. See 2 Nat’l Highway Trafc Safety Admin., National Survey of Speeding and Unsafe
Driving Attitudes and Behaviors: 2002, at 30 (2003), https://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/
drowsy_driving1/speed_volII_ﬁnding/SpeedVolumeIIFindingsFinal.pdf (on ﬁle with the
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whether to leave serious crime unmolested. Moreover, American law
enforcement rivals a large army in size.452 In any polity that claims to rest
on popular consent, coercive force cannot be legitimately exercised on
this scale without democratic accountability.
At present, there is a vigorous debate among criminal law scholars
about whether the pathologies of policing are better addressed through
increasing democratic control or by increased reliance on bureaucratic
expertise.453 Yet even the proponents of expert policing seek to make
police forces function more like administrative agencies in a wellfunctioning democracy.454 And in administrative law, an agency’s lack of
direct electoral accountability is justiﬁed by other mechanisms of political
oversight combined with public participation in the regulatory process.455
By contrast, law enforcement exceptionalism insulates police from the
oversight of elected leaders and the participation of the public. Even the
bureaucratic expertise model of policing reform requires more democratic accountability than law enforcement exceptionalism permits.
Law enforcement exceptionalism thus renders police agencies illegitimate under a wide range of democratic theories. Proponents of participatory456 and deliberative457 theories of democracy hold that institutions of
Columbia Law Review) (reporting that seventy-three percent to eighty-three percent of
drivers self-report recent speeding, depending on the type of road).
452. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
453. Compare, e.g., Kleinfeld et al., supra note 105, at 1699–700 (arguing that civilian
review boards “should disseminate . . . information and advice to the local community
whenever possible[,] . . . taking into account goals of transparency, legitimacy, and ultimate
democratic control”), and Simonson, Power Lens, supra note 14, at 787–92 (advocating for
reforms that focus “on governance and policymaking arrangements rather than outcomes
or policies themselves”), with Rachel Elise Barkow, Prisoners of Politics: Breaking the Cycle
of Mass Incarceration 165–85 (2019) (“We need to establish expert agencies charged with
instituting and evaluating criminal justice policies so that we get better outcomes . . . .”),
and Rappaport, supra note 82, at 716–21 (“When all the evidence is fairly weighed, the
argument for more participatory democracy becomes signiﬁcantly harder to sustain, at least
if the goal is a better criminal justice system rather than participation for its own sake.”).
For a recent overview of the current debate between “democratizing” and “bureaucratizing”
solutions to criminal law, see generally Benjamin Levin, De-Democratizing Criminal Law,
39 Crim. Just. Ethics 74 (2020) (reviewing Barkow, supra).
454. See Barkow, supra note 453, at 165–85; Rappaport, supra note 82, at 811–13.
455. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1897,
1901 (2013). For a proposal to use state administrative law to require such oversight, see
Christopher Slobogin, supra note 31, at 134–149.
456. See generally Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (1983)
(investigating and describing participatory democracy); James Miller, Democracy Is in the
Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago (1994) (discussing participatory
democracy in the context of the New Left movement of the late 1960s).
457. See generally James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for
Democratic Reform 12 (1991) (arguing for deliberative innovations in the American
political process, “where the people could exercise their power more thoughtfully”); Amy
Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? 7 (2004) (“[W]e can deﬁne
deliberative democracy as a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their
representatives) . . . justify decisions in a process in which they give another reasons that are

1396

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:4

governance, including police agencies, cannot be insulated from citizen
control. Under these theories, democracy requires more of governance
institutions than expert identiﬁcation of and service to the interests of the
governed.458 Rather, democracy requires the collective choice of collective
action in pursuit of common interests, deﬁned by the governed, through
participation or deliberation. Insofar as decisions about collective action
are delegated to representatives, those representatives must be accountable to the governed. This, in turn, requires that the governed be able to
observe the decisions of the institutions governing them and either check
or sanction those decisions.459 As currently constituted, police agencies are
insulated from any such accountability. Thus, law enforcement exceptionalism is not only a barrier to solving the problems of discriminatory and
violent policing—it is the source of an additional problem with policing: a
deﬁcit of democracy.
B.

The Cause: Locking in Reform

Although law enforcement exceptionalism is a barrier to current
reform, it is largely the creation of earlier reforms. Past reforms were
encoded into law at state, local, and municipal levels.460 These eforts to
structurally entrench policy gains helped to create the labyrinthine institutional structure that constitutes law enforcement exceptionalism.
Neither the police nor sherifs were originally created to operate
independently. For example, the leadership of police departments was
mutually acceptable and generally accessible . . . .”); Held, supra note 14, at 231–55
(”Deliberative democrats put a premium on reﬁned and reﬂective [political]
preferences.”); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in Deliberative
Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics 67, 67 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds.,
1997) (discussing “an account of deliberative democracy in terms of the notion of an ideal
deliberative procedure”).
458. Cf. Held, supra note 14, at 134–84 (summarizing, distinguishing, and critiquing
“competitive-elitist” and “pluralist” theories of democracy); James Q. Wilson, Varieties of
Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities 278–99 (1968)
(studying patterns of, and constraints, on police discretion, exemplifying the pluralist
tradition); Sklansky, Police and Democracy, supra note 131, at 1754–56 (describing how
pluralist theories of democracy conceive of police agencies). Law enforcement
exceptionalism is arguably compatible with a narrow pluralist theory of democracy under
which democratic legitimacy requires only competition among interest groups regarding a
narrow range of distributive questions, while elites are left unmolested to deﬁne and pursue
the public interest. See Sklansky, Police and Democracy, supra note 131, at 1736–41 (noting
that while Progressive Era reformers relied on expert oversight of police, postwar pluralists
preferred to substitute judicial oversight—but both feared that democratic supervision
would yield partisan policing). Following participatory and deliberative theorists, this Essay
rejects the narrow view, and holds that democratic legitimacy requires political choice by
the governed.
459. Arnold S. Kaufman, The Radical Liberal: New Man in American Politics 58–60
(1968) (arguing that both pluralist and participatory democracy require “subjection of
leadership to the will of the people” because unaccountable leaders are not likely to satisfy
popular preferences); Manin et al., supra note 14, at 4.
460. See supra sections II.A.2, II.B.2.
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chosen by the mayor, while elected council members also controlled the
nomination of police ofcers and the priorities in their speciﬁc districts.461
Sherifs always had a degree of independence, but they were not initially
deﬁned by their law enforcement responsibilities.462
Our current structural entrenchment reﬂects past eforts to reform
this state of afairs, motivated by partisan conﬂicts. In this reform
environment, success was not only measured by the ability to efectuate a
particular vision of policing. It also meant codifying one’s gains in ways
that made them harder to unravel. Thus, to limit local opposition in the
future, reformers turned to the state.463 To compensate for the possibility
that future state legislatures might waver, constitutional amendments were
pursued.464 Through a series of such steps, reformers created local law
enforcement agencies that were increasingly resistant to subsequent
reforms.
This strategy of structurally entrenching reform was, like overﬁshing
a pond or overgrazing a commons, individually rational but collectively
self-defeating. One majority could lock in its gains but only at the expense
of future majorities denied the same opportunity. Earlier reformers used
structural entrenchment to secure their gains because their battles over
law enforcement reform were often fought along partisan, ethnic, and
racial lines.465 These reformers understood that substantive debates over
which kinds of institutional reforms to implement—state versus local control, the degree of political accountability, etc.—were not truly based on
neutral principles of institutional design. Rather, reformers understood
that the institutional structures of police agencies would afect whose
interests they would serve.466 For big cities at the turn of the twentieth century, local political control of policing meant an immigrant-dominated
police force sympathetic to the lifestyles and “vices” of their immigrantheavy precincts.467 State control over the selection of police ofcers,
severing the link between police departments and ward leaders, promised
stafng by native ofcers.468 The goal then was not simply to set in place
substantive reforms but to do so in order to disempower rival ethnic and
partisan constituencies.
The result is our current structure of local law enforcement:
inﬂexible, entrenched, and resistant to political challenge. The lesson of
461. See Fogelson, supra note 256, at 24–25.
462. See supra notes 324–330.
463. See Richardson, supra note 231, at 46 (“The struggle for domination of the police
took place . . . between the urban majorities and the state legislature. Those groups outvoted
in a city could look to the state capital for relief, relief which was often granted because the
interests of the urban and the state majority conﬂicted.”).
464. See, e.g., Fogelson, supra note 256, at 289, 308.
465. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 231, at 41.
466. See id. at 45–46.
467. See, e.g., Fogelson, supra note 256, at 47, 91–92, 129–30.
468. See id. at 90–92, 249–250.
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this history is not that radical reform should be avoided. Rather, it is that
the institutional strategy for implementing reform is no less important
than the substance of the reform. A strategy of structural entrenchment
may calcify a set of institutional arrangements that are politically liberating
in the short run, but oppressive in the long run.469 Unintended consequences or unanticipated problems will arise. Circumstances will change.
Diferent priorities and needs will emerge.
Our strategies for challenging police power must be attentive to these
possibilities. The question then is not just what kind of reforms we
implement today but whether the reforms put into place today will leave
room for future generations to do the same. Radical as it may seem to
disband police forces, replacing them with other law enforcement
agencies falls short of the abolitionist vision of peacefully cultivating public
safety without reliance on coercion and punishment. Locking in any
currently feasible replacement deprives future democratic majorities of
any opportunity to pursue further steps toward that more radical vision.
Structural ﬂexibility thus ensures that achievable short-term reforms do
not become tools for preempting more ambitious ones.
C.

A Lesson: Simplifying Police Governance

Bleak as it is, our account of law enforcement exceptionalism points
toward a new strategy for attacking the pathologies of policing. To change
policing, it may be necessary to make its legal structure more dynamic, and
thereby also facilitate future change. One way to do so is to vest authority
over the institutional structure of law enforcement in one representative
body of government of general jurisdiction. This strategy is one of
reasserting democratic control by clearly identifying decisionmakers
responsible for overseeing and, when necessary, changing law enforcement performance. Vesting control of law enforcement in a government
of general jurisdiction ensures that law enforcement will have to compete
for resources with other priorities. Simplifying police governance is
designed to target the two most troubling consequences of law
enforcement exceptionalism.
First, it will increase the transparency of police governance by restructuring police agencies so the public can recognize who has authority over
them. Locating the power to disband or reform a department at one level
of government enables the public to understand who has power to efect
change. Through the amendment of state constitutions—a more realistic

469. Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 315 (1998) (“[E]fective government services and
regulations must be continuously adapted and recombined to respond to diverse and
changing local conditions, where local may mean municipal, county, state, or regional as
the problem requires.”).
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endeavor than amending the U.S. Constitution470—policymakers can
create or clarify the authority of an elected body to disband a police
agency. A clearly identiﬁed elected body, with the power to destroy a police
agency, will clarify for the public who has the power to control and
transform that agency.
Second, vesting policing authority in one level of government will
eliminate veto points that police agencies leverage to guard their power.471
At present, a successful campaign to disband a police agency might require
activists to overcome veto points across local, county, and state
governments. Cities seeking to restructure their police departments need
to contend with the limitations of state law, and whether those laws prevent
them from disbanding police departments or limit the kinds of reforms
they may put into place. They may also have to contend with the possibility
of state preemption, and the prospect of increased law enforcement
activity by county sherifs’ ofces in their jurisdiction. If cities were free of
these limitations, police departments could no longer rely upon state
legislatures to protect them from local political pressure. Conversely, if
state governments were to assert full control over local policing, activists
could direct their energy toward state legislatures without fearing that
police departments would block reform at the municipal level. Our
normative preference, as we argue below, is for local control over police
agencies.472 More important, however, is that there be only one level of
elected government mediating between police agencies and the public
will.
Simplifying police governance is strategically necessary for those who
wish to transform policing, but normatively desirable for all. At the
strategic level, unless the new institutions are easily altered, they will
ultimately entrench and empower police again. At the normative level,
policymakers can strengthen the political legitimacy of policing by
strengthening democratic control over law enforcement agencies. Under
law enforcement exceptionalism, the locus of political contestation is at
the agenda-setting stage—where police bureaucracies have a strategic and
informational advantage over informal citizen groups.473
This consolidation of democratic levers changes the locus of political
contestation from this agenda-setting stage to that of substantive deliberation. Such a change will likely redound to the beneﬁt of citizens and
weaken entrenched actors’ stranglehold over the agenda-setting process.
By locating power at one level of government, simplifying police governance empowers citizen groups that are currently unable to participate in
470. See James A. Gardner, Devolution and the Paradox of Democratic
Unresponsiveness, 40 S. Tex. L. Rev. 759, 762 (1999).
471. Given the separation of powers at the state and local levels and the bicameral
nature of most state legislatures, our solution will not eliminate every veto point that police
departments can leverage.
472. See infra section III.D.
473. See Miller, Perils, supra note 443, at 167–74.
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the complex, multilevel political process that shapes law enforcement
policy.474 Eliminating veto points should better enable elected ofcials to
deliver the results their constituents demand.475 The increased efcacy of
such demands should incentivize citizens to mobilize. Simplifying police
governance thus would create a structure that would render police
accountable to an elected decisionmaker and, thereby, to the people.
Greater ﬂexibility is also necessary in anticipation of reform eforts yet
to come. The importance of promoting structural ﬂexibility is also to pave
a path for future generations of reformers. We should hope but not
presume that any reform that is put into place today will stand the test of
time. We should also recognize that law enforcement structure might need
to be tailored continuously to accommodate local conditions and
changing circumstances.476 More importantly, structural ﬂexibility is
important in order to ensure that debates and discussions about law
enforcement reforms are robust and worthwhile. Countless conversations
about reforms have been unduly limited or prematurely cut of when
confronted with the legal entrenchment of the existing law enforcement
structure. Promoting structural ﬂexibility will ensure not only that the
current political conversation continue but also that future conversations
can take place.
D. The Structural Case for Local Control
The principal lesson of our analysis is that police agencies should be
restructured not only to expose the pathologies of policing to democratic
reform but also to end law enforcement exceptionalism. Any reform
adequate to address the pathologies of policing—whether disbanding,
defunding, or disaggregating the policing function—should be pursued
in tandem with reforms to the political organization of policing. Those
reforms should vest control over the institutional form of policing and the
practice of policing at one level of government. Moreover, the electorate
of that government should be geographically congruent to the territorial
jurisdiction of the police—thus ensuring conformity to the democratic
principle that decisions should be made by those most afected thereby.
That principle, in turn, achieves both the normative goal of freeing
policed communities from illegitimate governance and the strategic goal
of controlling police conduct.
The question remains as to where that authority should be placed.
Our answer is that the power to disband and otherwise transform the
police should be vested in local governments, whether cities or counties.

474. See id.
475. Cf. id. at 174 (“[F]ederalism exacerbates the classic collective action problem by
increasing the number of potential veto points for single-minded, narrow interests and by
isolating potential allies from one another.”).
476. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 469, at 315.
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Here we set out the case for local control and outline how it could be
achieved as a matter of law.
We recognize at the outset that expanding structural ﬂexibility does
not require entrusting authority to local governments. Some might believe
that because the police power is ultimately held by the several states,
authority over law enforcement structures should also be centralized in
the state.477 But we believe this would disempower geographically concentrated communities of color. Others might believe that the problems with
law enforcement in America is that it is too decentralized and subject to
local discretion, and thus we should follow other countries in creating a
national police force and centralizing authority over law enforcement
structure in the federal government. But we believe the problems of
discriminatory and violent policing are not conﬁned to any region and
have been exacerbated by federal decisionmaking. Regardless, one can
agree that structural entrenchment is a problem and still disagree that the
organization of local law enforcement should be a matter of local control.
Nevertheless, we believe there are many good reasons to favor cities and
counties over the state and federal governments.
First, for path-dependent reasons, locating all authority at the local
level is the shortest route to simplifying and democratizing policing. That
arrangement comports with the currently decentralized nature of law
enforcement jurisdiction. Police departments and sherifs’ ofces, currently the primary agencies of law enforcement, have local jurisdictions
and are funded primarily from local cofers. They work with county prosecutors, appear as witnesses in county and local courts, and—although
perhaps unfortunately478—enforce local ordinances.
Second, cities and counties are “general-purpose” governments. Law
enforcement should be assessed and funded in competition and coordination with all the other services that local governments provide. Policing
is only one interest local governments serve, and general-purpose local
governments are in the best position to see how it ﬁts with those other
interests. It is also through local governments that residents can most directly participate in balancing those interests and deciding whether police
or other public service agencies are in the best position to serve them.
Third, local control allows for the ﬂexibility and policy variability necessary for governing under conditions of uncertainty.479 The enforcement
even of state laws should be tailored to local context. This is especially true
when the beneﬁts of enforcement are weighed against the costs. Certain
communities may decide that low-level drug ofenses are not as important
477. See, e.g., Ponomarenko, supra note 193, at 59–63 (arguing for state-level legislative
and administrative regulation concerning “police policies, training requirements, data
collection, and monitoring”).
478. See Brenner Fissell, Local Ofenses, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 837, 840–45 (2020)
(observing that local ofenses are often deﬁcient in legality and culpability).
479. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 469, at 315.

1402

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:4

as violent crimes and redirect their resources accordingly. Moreover, given
that many of the concerns with policing involve the activities of ofcers on
the street—far from the notice of elected ofcials at the state and national
levels—it is often the local residents themselves that are in the best
position to assess the nature and impact of those activities. This local
knowledge is a necessary tool of efective governance under such
conditions.480 Moreover, in most states, prohibitions on special legislation
restrict the ability of state legislatures to tailor the design of institutions to
local circumstances—which would likely lead to a dangerous delegation of
decisionmaking discretion to police ofcials.
Fourth, local control is the best way to ensure political accountability
and legitimacy. Local control is especially important given the disproportionate impact of policing on poor and minority neighborhoods. Control
at the state or national level might better ensure uniform standards. But
the minority groups most severely impacted by policing often have little
inﬂuence at those levels.481 And while local representation is a concern in
many local jurisdictions, Blacks and other minorities tend to succeed more
often in inﬂuencing local politics.482 After all, this was why the states so
quickly became involved in regulating police departments after their creation at the local level: They believed police were too beholden to the
urban immigrants that had seized political control of the cities. And the
groups that sufered the most from the expansion of state control were the
Black and Latinx residents who achieved local political power only after
those reforms.483 Local control would ensure that local law enforcement
agencies are accountable to the residents over which they exercise power.
At the same time, local democratic control would not preclude civil rights
enforcement eforts by the Department of Justice,484 or by state attorneys
general.485 More ambitiously, local control could allow for experimentation with institutional mechanisms that shift law enforcement decisionmaking power to those who are most afected by aggressive policing.486
In sum, local control confers political legitimacy by ensuring that “those
who bear the costs of crime and punishment alike . . . exercise more power
over those who enforce the law and dole out punishment.”487

480. See id.
481. See Miller, Perils, supra note 443, at 7.
482. Id. at 170–74 (concluding that citizen groups comprised of poor people and
minorities are more engaged in crime control politics at the local level than at the state or
federal levels).
483. See supra note 256 and accompanying text; supra Part I.
484. See supra notes 85–94 and accompanying text.
485. See generally Mazzone & Rushin, supra note 87 (advocating for such reforms).
Indeed, simplifying police governance at any level might ease such enforcement eforts by
rendering police practices more transparent and ﬁxing responsibility in one decisionmaker.
486. See Simonson, Power Lens, supra note 14, at 782–92.
487. See Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice, supra note 103, at 7.
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Local control does not, however, require state and federal governments to abnegate oversight over local policing. Rather, local control
would require that local elected ofcials have (1) the primary political
responsibility to oversee police agencies and (2) the legal authority to
organize, restructure, and reconstitute those agencies when necessary. It
would be consistent with this allocation of political authority for the
federal government to continue in its eforts (however modest) to pursue
consent decrees against local police departments that engage in civil rights
violations. Likewise, local control is compatible with reforms that enable
state attorneys general to obtain consent decrees through litigation. Such
federal and state oversight is consistent with a regime of simpliﬁed police
governance as long as local ofcials retain ultimate legal authority to
oversee and restructure local police departments.
Given the desirability of local control, it is worth mapping the steps
required to vest policing authority exclusively in these jurisdictions. For
police departments, this entails reforming state and local laws to make
them function as subordinate municipal departments. The ﬁrst step might
be for cities to amend their municipal charters to permit disbanding of
police departments to take place, and to entrust that power to the city
council going forward. The role of state law will also need to be
reconsidered. In some states, state laws may need to be repealed or
amended to restore local control over police departments. In others, a
similar result might also be achieved if existing structural home-rule
protections are interpreted by courts to limit state interference with the
organization and operation of municipal departments. The Ohio
Supreme Court, for example, has struck down state laws regulating the
selection of police chiefs488 and the organization of municipal police
departments489 as violations of municipal home-rule powers over “local
self-government.” It is possible that similar arguments can succeed in
other states.
Reforms to the legal structure of sherifs are more difcult, but
perhaps even more important. Home rule might also prove to be a
convenient path to bring sherifs’ ofces under county control. When
Miami-Dade County abolished the ofce of the sherif in the 1950s, it was
due to a state constitutional amendment granting counties home-rule
powers over their own governmental structure and other county ofces
that serve in their jurisdiction. Even counties that did not go this route
used county home rule to assert greater control over sherifs. To be sure,
Florida has rolled back these reforms through a subsequent constitutional
amendment. Yet the expansion of county home rule in the 1950s might be

488. See State ex rel. Lynch v. City of Cleveland, 132 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ohio 1956)
(holding that a city is not subject to state law in how it selects its police chief).
489. See Harsney v. Allen, 113 N.E.2d 86, 88 (Ohio 1953) (“The organization and
regulation of its police force, as well as its civil service functions, are within a municipality’s
powers of local self-government.”).
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a model that could be adopted in other states and eventually restored in
Florida.
The concurrent jurisdiction of police departments and county sherifs
also should be eliminated. Cities where a police department has been
established should be excluded from the jurisdiction of county sherifs
unless assistance is requested by an elected body. At the same time, the
ability to contract with sherifs should be retained. Thus, cities without
police departments—either as a result of disbanding or because one was
never created—could still choose to contract with the sherif for policing
services. But eliminating concurrent jurisdiction over policing will give
cities more control over law enforcement encounters on their streets.
In short, there are good reasons to simplify and democratize the
governance of law enforcement by placing decisions about its structure as
well as its operations under the control of elected, general-purpose, local
governments.
CONCLUSION
Policing in America is aficted by pathologies that incremental
reforms are unlikely to solve, both because of the scope of such reforms
and the structural obstacles to their implementation. Given this troubling
state of afairs, localities may better address the pathologies of policing by
disbanding and replacing police departments and sherifs’ ofces. Yet any
efort to disband law enforcement agencies will have to address their
structural entrenchment.
All of this implies that contemporary eforts to reimagine policing
should also seek to reimagine the legal structure of local law enforcement
agencies. The law enforcement exceptionalism that now diferentiates
police departments and sherifs’ ofces from other organs of local government should be dismantled. The structural authority of general-purpose
local governments over these “local” agencies should be expanded to
ensure that law enforcers are democratically accountable to the residents
they are sworn to serve and protect.
Reformers should sometimes work to disband police agencies, but in
doing so should resist the temptation to entrench new institutions of local
government. Ambitious as disbanding and replacing may seem, it falls far
short of the abolitionist aspiration to achieve public safety by entirely
peaceful and cooperative means. In subjecting policing to popular rule,
we need not preclude the people from someday deciding to abolish it
entirely.

